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Then with both hands [Milo] made a great circular sweep in the air and watched 
with delight as all the musicians began to play at once. The cellos made the hills 
glow red, and the leaves and grass were tipped with a soft pale green as the violins 
began their song. . . . As Milo frantically conducted, the sky changed slowly from 
blue to tan and then to a rich magenta red. Flurries of light- green snow began to 
fall, and the leaves on the trees and bushes turned a vivid orange. All the flowers 
suddenly appeared black. . . . Seven times the sun rose and almost as quickly 
disappeared as the colors kept changing. In just a few minutes a whole week had 
gone by. At last the exhausted Milo, afraid to call for help and on the verge of 
tears, dropped his hands to his sides. The orchestra stopped.
— Norton Juster, The Phantom Tollbooth (1961)

About the Cover Art
✦ ✦ ✦
Jess Landau is a fine artist and photographer whose work involves themes 
of culture, community, personality development, and human desires for 
interpersonal connection. In 2014, she received her BFA in photogra-
phy and art therapy from the University of the Arts in Philadelphia.
The cover art shows a portrait printed on the inner surface of an egg-
shell (using liquid emulsion, a chemical applied in alternative darkroom 
printing). It comes from a series called Growth, which Landau created 
in an effort to heal after suddenly losing a childhood friend to suicide. 
Handling the eggshell during the photographic printing process exem-
plified the time needed to appreciate present moments, along with the 
importance of reflecting on life’s fragility. Her website is www.jesslandau.
com.

Open Access and Alt- Text
✦ ✦ ✦
Just Vibrations has been published in both print and Open Access. The 
goal of digital OA is to reach as many readers as possible, especially those 
who might otherwise be unable to afford or access this text. By harmo-
nizing the book’s medium and message (of care, outreach, accessibility), 
OA offers an electronic file that accommodates convenient text search-
es, text- to- voice dictation, and transportability via e- readers. For readers 
with additional visual needs, Alt- Text is available in the digital version for 
all illustrations in this book. Alt- Text verbally describes images so that 
readers can access their content.
OA for Just Vibrations has been made possible through the generosity 
of Harvard University’s William F. Milton Fund, the Dartmouth Open- 




For all the care devoted to this manuscript, the acknowledgments 
remains a section where things won’t sound good enough. Appreciative 
words can’t do justice to my enduring gratitude for the people without 
whom the book wouldn’t exist.
Susan Brison, Richard Leppert, and Alexander Rehding imparted 
the vital spirit I needed to trace this project from beginning to end. At 
the University of Michigan Press, editor Mary Francis trusted in the book 
early on and presciently knew what it could become long before its ful-
fillment. For insightful copyediting and smooth production at the Press, 
I thank Richard Isomaki, Marcia LaBrenz, and Christopher Dreyer. Two 
anonymous reviewers went to remarkable lengths to recommend diverse 
improvements.
Revisions benefited from a workshop at the Leslie Humanities Cen-
ter of Dartmouth College, with participants Aimee Bahng, Andrew 
Dell’Antonio, Brianne Gallagher, Rosemarie Garland- Thomson, Chris-
tian Haines, Graziella Parati, and Steve Swayne. Steve and other Dart-
mouth music faculty— Michael Casey, Kui Dong, Ashley Fure, Ted Levin, 
Melinda O’Neal, Sally Pinkas, and Spencer Topel— made me feel unfal-
teringly welcome and empowered me to do the work I most believed in. 
Having the freedom to write a book like this was an immense privilege 
that I won’t take for granted. A year’s leave via the Harvard Society of Fel-
lows afforded me much- needed headspace during the final stretch. Jess 
xiv  •   Acknowledgments
Landau lent her gorgeous art for the cover. Susan McClary generously 
took the time to pen a profound and vibrant foreword.
I’m grateful for all friends who read the manuscript, gave care, 
or otherwise patiently handed me building blocks of prose. Alas, the 
appearance of names below in list form belies the uniqueness of people’s 
individual, crucial contributions: Chloe Angyal, Michael Bakan, Karol 
Berger, Michaela Bronstein, Avery Brown, Scott Burnham, Suzanne 
Cusick, Ryan Dohoney, Rowan Dorin, Noah Feldman, Marta Figlerowicz, 
Charles Hiroshi Garrett, Roger Mathew Grant, Thomas Grey, Heather 
Hadlock, Lydia Hamessley, Kyle Kaplan, Mark Katz, Eva Kim, Christine 
Larson, Frank Lehman, Neil Lerner, Hannah Lewis, Fred Maus, Felicia 
Miyakawa, Roger Moseley, Anthony Newcomb, Emily Richmond Pollock, 
Elaine Scarry, Kay Kaufman Shelemay, Anthony Sheppard, Cassie Stod-
dard, Joseph Straus, Elizabeth Teisberg, Scott Wallace, Emily Wilbourne, 
Eunice Wong, and Rosalind Wong. I’m also fortunate to have shared 
portions of this work during colloquiums and classroom discussions 
at Dartmouth College, Northwestern University, Harvard University, 
Cornell University, Clark University, New York University, University of 
Oregon, and Eastman School of Music, where students and faculty pro-
vided encouragement and critiques. For late-stage conversations, eagle 
eyes, and helping hands, I thank Naomi André, Mike Backman, Greg-
ory Barz, Samantha Bassler, Anna Maria Busse Berger, Lauren Berlant, 
Monique Bourdage, Samantha Candon, Dale Chapman, Paula Durbin-
Westby, Yesim Erdmann, Roger Freitas, Samuel Golter, Stephanie Jen-
sen-Moulton, Jeannette Jones, Loren Kajikawa, Kelly Katz, Catherine 
LaTouche, Peter McMurray, Katherine Meizel, Diana Morse, Stephan 
Pennington, Marcus Pyle, Maureen Ragan, Matthew Leslie Santana, 
Amartya Sen, Anne Shreffler, and Jonathan Sterne.
Final and always thanks go to Chris Schepici, my parents, and family, 
whose love makes life good.
Brief excerpts from Just Vibrations appeared in recent articles for Slate, 
Huffington Post, Washington Post, and Musicology Now.
Contents
✦ ✦ ✦
 Foreword by Susan McClary
 Humanizing the Humanities xvii
 Introduction
 Dare We Care? 1
1. Aching for Repair 20
2. Sing the Ivory Tower Blues 37
3. How Hopeful the Queer 54
4. Earsplitting 71
 Coda
 If We Break . . . 93
 Notes 105







Case Western Reserve University
Many people choose to specialize in the humanities because they prom-
ise a life of the mind, a labor that involves reading poetry, gazing at paint-
ings, listening to music. With the humanities growing ever more embat-
tled in today’s institutions of higher learning, our advocates often claim 
that immersion in cultural media makes our students better people: 
more open to empathy, more fully acquainted with and tolerant of mul-
tiple points of view. If only world leaders would take time out to attend to 
da Vinci or Schubert or Proust; then, we’d like to imagine, there might 
be universal peace. A worthy goal, of course. But to what extent do the 
humanities (as practiced in our universities) actually foster the ideals to 
which we give voice?
I recall vividly the first time I noticed a turning point in literary stud-
ies. I was serving as a member of the doctoral committee for a candidate 
in an English department, and I admired her close readings of Derrida, 
de Man, and Deleuze. But I kept thinking that this must be a prolegom-
enon to an analysis of a novel or a poem— an analysis that never material-
ized. At the dissertation defense, I asked the candidate to demonstrate 
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her points with respect to an actual work. She was shocked that I would 
expect such a thing. When pressed further, she could not offer a single 
title within her stated area of specialization.
And I feared that young musicologists would eventually jump on this 
bandwagon of French theory and obfuscating prose. The urge to do so 
may be all the more tempting for those who were spooked by under-
graduate classes that focused on the labeling of chords. Resisting now 
the analysis of what they dismissed cavalierly as “the music itself” could 
become a moral high ground. Never mind that relatively few scholars 
can understand the gnarliest prose styles of critical theory; this lack of 
popular comprehension only renders the writer more smug, and, alas, 
worthy of greater adulation. Certain humanists effectively seal them-
selves off with hermetic language and competition for impenetrability.
The so- called New Musicology is sometimes blamed for spreading 
these trends from other disciplines into music studies. To be sure, some 
of us did introduce Adorno, Foucault, and the like into the field. But 
much like the hapless Australians who imported rabbits only to have 
those lagomorphs take over their environment, so we occasionally wit-
ness theory usurping our publications. If I might raise a word of justifica-
tion, musicologists such as Lawrence Kramer, Rose Rosengard Subotnik, 
and myself first turned to cultural theory in order to break through the 
thick wall of aesthetic autonomy that musicology had erected around its 
subject matter. Creatures of the 1960s, we had witnessed popular music’s 
power to transform genders, sexualities, race relations, and the political 
status quo. Our goal was not to exchange the jargon of music theory for 
that of deconstruction.
Will Cheng’s Just Vibrations holds a mirror up to musicology and other 
humanities disciplines, inviting scholars who focus on the arts to take 
stock. As a young gay man, he never had to fight those tawdry battles over 
gender and sexuality that wrenched the field in the 1990s; as an indi-
vidual who experiences severe chronic pain, he did not have to invent 
the field of disability studies. Thanks to Philip Brett, Joseph Straus, and 
other pioneers, he seems to have inherited a musicology perfectly suited 
to his needs.
And yet for all the strides we have made in the last two decades, Cheng 
demonstrates that we still fall short of meeting our goals. Is there room for 
caring, he asks, in what can sometimes manifest as a dog- eat- dog academy? 
Does the hermeneutics of suspicion discourage restorative approaches to 
our research? To what extent do we flaunt prohibitive prose as a defense 
mechanism against insecurity and fears of seeming soft?
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If the Nazis taught us anything, it is that one may listen to Mozart and 
still act in barbaric ways. Today’s musicians are not likely to offend so 
egregiously— though the television series Mozart in the Jungle reveals that 
classical music does not guarantee good behavior. And at conferences of 
the American Musicological Society, some of the most confrontational 
sessions still resemble blood sport.
Perhaps we can aspire to the grace and balance we experience when 
we listen to music. Perhaps we can bring that beauty and humaneness 
into our relationships with our colleagues and students. Rodney King 
asked, “Can we all get along?” Will Cheng brings that question back 
to those of us who purport to identify with music. He challenges us to 






In the spring of sixth grade, my friend Philip and I spent our lunch 
breaks running from a clan of corrupt ninjas. It was a dangerous time 
to be a student at Annie B. Jamieson Elementary in Vancouver, British 
Columbia. Ninjas were relentless, and since they blended so smoothly 
into the shadows, none of our other classmates believed they existed. 
Good thing Philip and I could fend for ourselves: we knew the ideal 
hiding spots, stayed swift on our feet, melded into crowds, and commu-
nicated over walkie- talkies in secret code (more or less Mandarin, given 
that the ninjas were reputedly French- Canadian). The affair concluded 
melodramatically one rainy recess at the monkey bars, with Philip dying 
in my arms while a flock of our peers looked on with genuine concern. 
Yet by the next day, everything returned to normal. Philip came back 
from the dead, and the ninjas vanished, as ninjas do.
In childhood, we played many games. Some games weren’t simply 
adversarial, but driven further by the imagination of clear and present 
dangers: cops and robbers, Bloody Mary in the mirror, the nominally 
dehumanized It of tag— always posing a sense of virtual villainy afoot. 
Play- fighting was par for the course; as animals boisterously show, it’s 
helpful should real threats ever strike.1 So we hid from the Seeker as 
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if our lives depended on it, scarpered when Mr. Wolf howled for din-
ner, and leaped across the nice furniture in the house because the floor 
seethed with lava. In adult life, even the most serious activities continue 
to be deemed game- like, from relationships and elections to drone oper-
ations and the war on drugs. As grownups, we remain experts at invent-
ing and obsessing over bogeymen— no longer actual monsters under the 
bed (though superstitions can persist), but in the form of criminals, poli-
ticians, corporations, and ideologies. In the absence of immediate con-
cerns, we might nonetheless go rooting out causes for outrage, jumping 
on social media pages to join the deluge of righteous protest that sweeps 
the Internet. From cradle to grave, we imagine dragons. They bring the 
world alive, fueling the fiery power grabs of daily existence.
Even when engaged as harmless games, the summoning of big bad 
adversaries channels a feeling of paranoia. Around the same time Philip 
and I were making a public display battling ninjas, I began stumbling 
privately toward a murky awareness of my gay identity. With neither the 
proper vocabulary nor maturity to process my emotions, I had only an 
inkling that something about me wasn’t right, wasn’t normal. Accompa-
nying this impression was an equally vague anxiety about being found 
out. I couldn’t yet put my finger on what I was trying to hide, but what-
ever it was, I knew I wanted to keep it under wraps. Each day of an oth-
erwise privileged upbringing was attended by a pulsing dread about 
how the secret might burst. Through a slip of the tongue? An off- pitch 
inflection or a limp twirl of the hand? A misdirected glance in the locker 
room? With dilated pupils?
In angst, I found sanctuary in two activities— playing piano and play-
ing video games. With piano, the demands were simple: eighty- eight keys, 
make them sing. Video games were straightforward as well: a handful of 
buttons, beat the boss. Of particular comfort was the clarity of rules and 
goals. The flow of play afforded meditative escape into a protracted pres-
ent. Aside from worries about the next cadence or the next castle, time 
fell away. Like many queer or questioning youths, I lived in cloudy fear 
of futurity, with scary tomorrows emptied of heterosexual prospects and 
cozy conformity. Getting in the groove of a Chopin waltz or Mario Kart 
was akin to hitting Pause on life, freezing the countdown to the outing 
sure to come. At worst, the hazards of playing piano were wrong notes, 
memory slips, and my teacher’s rebukes when I swayed too dramatically 
on the bench in precocious efforts to appear profound. Video games 
proved even more forthcoming in their concrete presentations of pitfalls 
and enemies. Although these pixelated obstacles were virtual, they— like 
Introduction  •   3
French- Canadian ninjas— sometimes felt more tangible than the dan-
gers out there in the physical world, and infinitely more vanquishable 
than whatever demons rattled here in my psyche.
A pair of opposing metaphors from Chinese lore sums up the world’s 
queer and playful indeterminacies: paper tigers, things that seem more 
powerful than they really are; and hidden dragons, things that are more 
powerful than they initially seem.2 Paper tigers, spawned from paranoid 
imaginations, crumple like origami under investigative pressure. They 
are the spooky shadows cast by household objects, the freaky noises of 
branches scraping against the window, the flimsy strawmen invoked in 
polemics, and anything else we treat as threats until we acknowledge 
(with sheepish relief, maybe slight disenchantment) that they are not 
very threatening at all. Hidden dragons, by contrast, are underestimated 
forces, perchance dangers, that elude attention and care: environmen-
tal menaces (secondhand smoke, greenhouse gas emissions), medical 
misdiagnoses (severe health conditions masked by run- of- the- mill symp-
toms), hurtful words (leaving deep, latent cuts), and thorns that sting 
with extra savagery by virtue of rosy ruse.3 People disagree widely, of 
course, on what perils are real or false, urgent or trivial. This truism 
alone accounts for plenty of society’s ails. Opinions can diverge based 
on political partisanship, religious belief, philosophical dogma, and cul-
tural affinity.
If any consensus exists, it’s that life is a dangerous game. No guaran-
tees of extra lives or take- backs or do- overs. But even in a world overrun 
by red herrings and silent killers, we sometimes go looking for still more 
trouble, conjuring foes and obstacles where none existed. We might do 
this out of boredom, mischievous impulses, or efforts to distract ourselves 
from other problems at hand. Threats, by definition, bear directly on 
our happiness and survival. On this front, we have every reason to keep 
our priorities straight. Frequently, however, people show that they’re not 
above queering such priorities. On an unpredictable basis, we switch up 
our views of the booby- trapped universe, resist social mandates of what 
and whom we’re meant to fear and fight, dance away from paths of least 
resistance, and play fast and loose with dictums of self- preservation.
Paranoid impulses lurk in the recesses of academia. Years ago, Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick came up with the term paranoid reading to describe 
the mainstream strategies of modern critical scholarship.4 Academics, 
according to Sedgwick, are trained to write in a manner that preemp-
tively repels potential knocks against their work. With abundant quali-
fiers, quotes, caveats, and precautionary self- disparagement, the savvy 
4  •   just vibrations
scholar anticipates and suppresses others’ grievances before they can be 
aired. Building on the ideas of Melanie Klein, Sedgwick found problems 
with these bids for power and, even more so, with aspirations to omnip-
otence.5 As Heather Love puts it, paranoid readings involve “familiar 
academic protocols like maintaining critical distance, outsmarting (and 
other forms of one- upmanship), refusing to be surprised (or if you are, 
then not letting on), believing the hierarchy, becoming boss.”6 Paranoid 
work desires authority. Driven by negative affects and a “hermeneutics 
of suspicion,” such scholarship aims to outfox, to enact power, and to 
produce results beyond reproach (figure I.1).7 It embodies a form of 
“strong theory”8 that is expository, generalizable, and glaringly ambi-
tious, “disavowing its affective motive and force, and masquerading as 
the very stuff of truth.”9 By actively mining for the threats in the world, 
practitioners of paranoid readings rarely fail to unearth the truths that 
they are chasing. With seductive rhetoric and logic, they produce self- 
satisfying critiques, which in turn affirm, after the fact, that no one can 
ever be paranoid enough. Examples of paranoid reading sound like 
what many academics today would simply consider good scholarship. And 
this is the point: paranoid registers have become so common that they 
now pass as self- evident and normal. To attempt otherwise can come off 
as weak or weird. “In a world where no one need be delusional to find 
evidence of systemic oppression,” sighed Sedgwick, “to theorize out of 
anything but a paranoid critical stance has come to seem naïve, pious, or 
complaisant.”10
Because paranoid readings work to stave off unfavorable judgment, 
they encourage a polyvocal writing style, one that mixes the author’s voice 
and values into an echo chamber of what others have said (citations and 
footnotes galore), what others would say (using impersonal pronouns 
such as the royal we or the universal one), and what others will say (antici-
pated criticisms). With rapid- fire delivery of points and counterpoints, 
this rhetoric performs a flashy fugue that spins out the authorial subject 
and its answers into multiple guises. In the paranoid mode, polyphony is 
key and complexity is king. Its fugue reverberates through a fun house 
of mirrors, a daunting setup that enables the writer- illusionist to keep 
the true self a moving target, leaving interlocutors guessing. A herme-
neutics of suspicion plays peekaboo with signifiers and their vanishing 
traces, a dour game of semiotic cat and mouse. As Rita Felski points 
out, suspicious reading “is a language game in quite a literal sense of 
‘game.’ As such, it combines rules and expectations with the possibility 
of unexpected moves and inventive calculations, enabling a form of care-
Introduction  •   5
fully controlled play.”11 Trained as a musicologist, I’ve learned to play this 
game by parsing musical texts and moments through analysis, archival 
research, and fieldwork. Music scholars’ recent efforts to privilege sen-
sation and performance have upped the ante, pushing for contempla-
tion of ephemeral events, excitable bodies, and unruly choreographies.12 
Although music comes with “broad shoulders” capable of supporting 
variable interpretations, riding around on these shoulders never feels all 
that steady.13 As impressive as any critical effort might be, there’s always 
more ground to cover, more notes to catch.
But as we scramble for authority— as we race for erudite discoveries 
and prestige— should we pause to check our moral pulse as well as the 
pulse of respective academic fields? Amid paranoid readings and dia-
lectical games, what and whom are we really running for, running to, 
and running from? How do real and imagined monsters (critics, fears, 
failures) nip at our heels and dictate our courses? Can we ever afford to 
slow down? As we seek professional strength and safety, what important 
things might we be leaving in the dust? In the face of modern informa-
tion and illusions, how can we renegotiate the means and purposes of 
careful labor, intellectual inquiry, and living soundly?
Yes, It Is!
Leading up to the 2009 conference for Feminist Theory and Music, Lyd-
ia Hamessley shared this memory:
Figure I.1. Bill Watterson, Homicidal Psycho Jungle Cat: A Calvin and Hobbes 
Collection (1994). It is revealing (and probably no coincidence) that Calvin’s 
proposed title refers to gender (a jab at the perceived denseness of, among 
other critical ventures, early ’90s feminist theory).
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The genesis of the first FTM can be traced to the American Musi-
cological Society annual meeting in Baltimore, MD in 1988. At that 
conference, there was an unprecedented critical mass of panels and 
papers that focused on “women in music.”  .  .  . At a Committee on 
the Status of Women meeting, Rosemary Killam rose in anger when 
a male audience member (I absolutely cannot remember who it was) 
suggested that it wasn’t his problem if his female students couldn’t 
work late in the library because they feared walking across campus 
late at night. “Oh yes, it is, sir; yes, it is!” she shouted.14
What institutional and intellectual alibis could lead a scholar (or any per-
son) to voice a disregard for students’ safety? We can try to guess where 
this male audience member believed his priorities lay: in musicology, in 
the study of music— its beauty, import, intricacies. Music served as an 
out, enabling him to run from extracurricular care.
Maybe this man didn’t mean what he said. No doubt, we all say bad 
things and lamentably sound off from time to time. Maybe he regret-
ted his words and quickly reformed his views. Most of us would agree, 
after all, that a professor does bear responsibilities for students’ well- 
being. It’s common sense and basic decency, an implicit clause in the 
job contract.15 Actually, it’s more than just a clause: arguably, it’s the 
moral bottom line. Students, not least women walking alone at night, 
have legitimate reasons to be on guard against incident of rape and 
violence. In September 2015, the Association of American Universities 
published results of a massive survey on sexual assault. Across twenty- 
seven universities, “the incidence of sexual assault and sexual miscon-
duct due to physical force, threats of physical force, or incapacitation 
among female undergraduate student respondents was 23.1 percent, 
including 10.8 percent who experienced penetration.”16 Although 
some writers have since criticized this survey for its methodologies 
and possible inaccuracies, the disseminated results have helped boost 
awareness and action across campuses.17 Skeptics are entitled to con-
tinue quibbling about the infamous one- in- five or one- in- four statistic 
(the percentage of female college students who allegedly experience 
sexual assault), but at a certain point, the hairsplitting starts to sound 
apologist. Numerically, any study contains margins of error. The point 
is that ethically— when it comes to our collective obligations to address 
these injuries— the margin of error should be zero.
Let’s pose the question of scholarly priorities in a more challenging 
way. Is musicology about the safety of a female music student?18 No, it 
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isn’t, if we define musicology starkly as the study of music. But yes, it 
is, if we envision musicology as all the activities, care, and caregiving of 
people who identify as members of the musicology community. In a post- 
Obama yes- we- can era, Killam’s yes, it is! can serve anew as a disciplinary 
rallying cry. Beyond overtly activist work, what if we regularly upheld care 
not just as a bonus activity or a by- product of scholarship? In a world 
where injuries run rampant, what if care is the point?19
Riffing on Marshall McLuhan and Andy Warhol, Phil Ford has charac-
terized the discipline of musicology as “anything you can get away with.”20 
By this, he means that rather than categorically insisting on what topics 
do or do not fall under musicology, let’s conceive of musicology as what-
ever self- identified musicologists choose to do. Disciplinary boundaries 
incessantly shift and shimmer anyway— so why not justify their flexibility 
via people’s diverse, quirky interests? “The primary pleasure that scholar-
ship offers is the chance to encounter other minds and thereby expand 
one’s own,” Ford muses. “The full range of other minds constitutes the 
true horizon that bounds the humanist; nothing human should be alien 
to us.”21 But if musicology is anything we can get away with, a caveat is 
that the discipline must simultaneously encompass everything we cannot 
afford to run away from— care, compassion, and interpersonal concerns 
that don’t always sound scholarly as such. In other words, the purpose 
of disciplinary belonging isn’t to get away with your choice of labor, so 
as merely to survive. The purpose is to thrive and to enable others to do 
so in turn.22 For scholars fortunate enough to land on tenure tracks or 
obtain positions of influence, doesn’t the task of caring become even 
more pressing? Cynthia Wu declares that we shouldn’t “forget about the 
original purpose of tenure— to protect academic freedom.”23 Yet Wu also 
implores us not to forget the duties of academic freedom— namely, to 
advocate for people who do not possess such freedom and its privileges. 
Tenure, Jennifer Ruth believes, “enable[s] you to endure unpopularity 
for something bigger than yourself.”24 Academic freedom, then, isn’t a 
license to be carefree. It’s an opportunity to care widely, assertively, and 
generously.
Ford points to Susan McClary as an example of a scholar who endured 
unpopularity for her trailblazing overtures in feminist musicology. 
McClary’s initial adversity can remind us to “appreciate the license her 
work gave to all of us coming up behind her. She took a lot of crap— the 
critical response to Feminine Endings was perhaps the most epic bout of 
mansplaining in the history of musicology— but she . . . did it with style, 
and she got away with it.”25 The flair of McClary’s prose, Ford emphasizes, 
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went a long way in boosting the influence and controversies of Feminine 
Endings. As academics know, writing and speaking proficiently can carry 
enormous cachet. Sounding good grabs attention. It gets people to care.
With this in mind, Just Vibrations asks a small question with big 
answers: what is the purpose of sounding good? Rhetorically, sound-
ing good entails writing and speaking in a seemingly intelligent man-
ner, which can impress people, win arguments, and elevate one’s status. 
Paranoid criticism, as described by Sedgwick, exemplifies some of these 
dazzling tactics. An ability to reason artfully and communicate efficient-
ly reaps rewards.26 Even in our most banal exchanges, we’re constantly 
navigating tricky tides of verbal and sonic propriety. Recognizing the 
importance of language to our self- presentation, we choose words and 
sounds that minimize our risks of being shamed or shot down. Fear 
of sounding bad, sounding off, or sounding wrong can deter expres-
sion altogether. If you write eloquently enough, will your paper get 
accepted by a top- ranked journal? If you speak normatively enough dur-
ing a phone interview, can you pass as straight, able- bodied, white, and 
American, potentially improving your chances? If you sing melodiously 
enough, will your amateur YouTube recordings go viral? History has 
shown how mighty pens and silver tongues— just ink on a page, just 
vibrations in the air— can move mountains and make leaders. In this 
regard, sounding good is a means of doing well in society, if by well we 
mean claiming positions of power.
My proposal, simply put, is this: what if the primary purpose of sound-
ing good isn’t to do well, but to do good? In competitive economies, 
doing well tends to mean pulling ahead of others. Doing good would 
involve reaching out and reaching back, lending help to those in need, 
and seeking opportunities for care and repair. Repair is a crucial word 
here. Its many significations include physical reassembly, bodily reha-
bilitation, restorative justice, monetary reparation, and disaster relief.27 
But repair also attaches to crass synonyms of fix and cure, notions easily 
co- opted by a capitalist ethos of purportedly healthy competition and its 
reinvestments in inequality, resilience, and normativity.28 In Just Vibra-
tions, I’m interested in the ethical tensions within repair’s connotations, 
and specifically in reparative horizons where speech acts and other sonic 
matter converge. Literate societies put huge stock in rhetorical ability— 
yet for reasons of alterity, disability, or disenfranchisement, some peo-
ple do not speak well (by societal conventions), some are admonished 
for speaking too much (oversharing and making noise), some do not 
speak frequently (due to, say, shyness), some speak unusually (slowly, 
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or with a stutter, or via conspicuous technological assistance), some do 
not speak at all (from injury or trauma), and some speak but neverthe-
less go unheard.29 By the same token, some people hear (neuro)typi-
cally, whereas others hear less (by normative standards), hear differently 
(Deaf Gain), or hear too much (sensory overload, hyperacusis). None of 
these conditions should be grounds for depriving individuals of compas-
sion and connection. Try to recall a time in your life when you found 
yourself speechless or supernoisy, whether from joyous news or devastat-
ing injuries, from a gorgeous sight or a terrible deed. Amid crushing 
silence or the din of shouts— at the apex of emotion— you felt, as the 
saying goes, beside yourself. As such, sounding good likely also felt beside 
the point, as you stayed mute or snorted or sobbed or hollered. Yet these 
are often the precise moments when we most desire companionship, 
consolation, and leeway. Beyond questions of words and feelings, Just 
Vibrations reimagines the viability of solidarity and optimism through our 
pressures to sound good and hear good in daily life, where sounding and 
hearing signify more capaciously than as the literal faculties of able minds 
and bodies.
An easy target for a societal dearth of care is neoliberalism, which 
insists on self- reliance over dependency, on cutthroat competition 
over mutual welfare.30 Akemi Nishida notes how “productivity, or hyper- 
productivity, is an expectation and desire within academia under neolib-
eralism.”31 Despite a nominally shared root, people who identify as social 
liberals tend to scorn neoliberals’ values of privatization and self- interest. 
But as for larger questions of who speaks and who gets heard, liberalism 
has its own shortcomings. “Liberalism invokes a notion of political par-
ticipation in which one makes one’s voice heard,” points out Eva Feder 
Kittay. “It depends on a conception of the person as independent, ratio-
nal, and capable of self- sufficiency.”32 Kittay has written extensively about 
her daughter Sesha, who lives with congenital cerebral palsy. Sesha can-
not read, talk, or walk. Within liberal and neoliberal frameworks, her 
condition renders her a misfit in terms of autonomy and personhood. 
This is where care comes in. As Kittay avows, care “is a labor, an attitude, 
and a virtue. As labor, it is the work of maintaining ourselves and others 
when we are in a condition of need. It is most noticed in its absence, 
most needed when it can be least reciprocated.”33 Care is a labor of 
love.34 Sesha loves and is loved. She loves people and she loves listening 
to music. Kittay remarks that “music is [Sesha’s] life and Beethoven her 
best friend. At our home, listening to the Emperor Concerto, she gazes out 
the window enthralled, occasionally turning to us with a twinkle in her 
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eye when she anticipates some really good parts.”35 Although Sesha may 
never be able to verbalize her enjoyment of Beethoven, her feelings feel 
evident for those who care to watch and listen.
As a musicologist, I’ve sometimes heard colleagues from other disci-
plines tell me how lucky I am to spend my days (they assume) listening 
to and thinking about music. Studying music, these envious comments 
imply, must be a labor of love. I’ve been led to wonder, therefore, wheth-
er musical skills ever enable or prime us to listen better to people and to 
take up love’s labors more broadly. Do musicians and musicologists— 
having undergone so much ear- training— possess any specialized aural 
capabilities or inclinations when it comes not just to music, but also to 
human interlocutors (how they sound, what they say, and unvoiced con-
cerns)? People and musical pieces are obviously different entities, yet 
people routinely identify with music and identify as musical, sounding 
out subjectivities through melodies, lyrics, and bodies. Without paint-
ing an exceptionalist portrait of musicianship, is it possible that people 
who work with music for a living can lead by example in agendas of 
interpersonal care and communication? Could we go beyond modest 
understandings of empathy as a complement to musicality, and venture 
empathy as a resonant form of musicality? If part of musicianship can 
involve listening for better worlds, then musicology has the potential to 
initiate various progressive currents in ethics and critical thinking. To 
be clear, this isn’t saying that music makes us good people. It’s saying 
that certain aural positions may hold profound uses outside the music 
classroom, and that as much as anyone else, musicians and music schol-
ars already recognize the immense challenges and rewards of listening 
creatively and caringly.36
Care is, per John Rawls, a matter of fairness and a matter of justice.37 
And justice, asserts Amartya Sen, can accommodate both reason and 
emotion.38 My caution here, however, has to do exactly with how societ-
ies privilege certain expressions of reason and emotion above others. 
If some people seem to lack rational faculties and rhetorical virtuosi-
ty, where do their voices fit in the chorus of just debate? Pain, impair-
ment, intoxication, desire, and despair can all thwart our efforts to feel 
and appear reasonable. From time to time, lapses in judgment make us 
sound unintelligent, politically incorrect, or cold. To this end, my stance 
jibes with a memorable insight from the legal activist Bryan Stevenson, 
who works with the poor and the incarcerated: “Each of us is more than 
the worst thing we’ve ever done.”39 To this, I would add that each of us is 
potentially better than the worst things we’ve ever said. Sadly, society and 
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news media don’t operate under this assumption. Think of how swiftly 
celebrities who utter prejudicial slurs (Mel Gibson, Isaiah Washington, 
Paula Deen) fall from grace, or how easily singers who sound off (Milli 
Vanilli, Ashlee Simpson, Amy Winehouse) get booed off the stage. Vin-
dictive societies can enchain people far longer than necessary. Within 
the discipline of musicology, recall the male audience member quoted 
by Lydia Hamessley, or the numerous scholars who responded in misogy-
nist fashion to feminist and queer musicology. Our baser instinct is to 
immortalize these individuals as villains: once a jerk, always a jerk; once 
a sexist, always a sexist. But Stevenson’s merciful words would encourage 
us to believe that people can change, not least because people are more 
than what they once said.
Yet nor do I believe each of us is definable solely by the best thing 
we’ve ever said or done. We don’t get to rest on laurels, so long as the 
world needs work. Yes, abundant impediments can erode our resolve 
to bring care into the equation: self- interest; lack of motivation; believ-
ing we’re up against lost causes; and anxieties of being called a sanc-
timonious crusader. These deterrents don’t release us from reparative 
work. A profusion of obstacles means, if anything, that we must work that 
much harder.40
Besides the foundations of musicology writ large, this book builds 
on a triad of critical muses: affect theory, care ethics (refracted through 
disability studies and ideas of dependence), and queer theory. Affect con-
tinues to elude easy definition, but Kathleen Stewart captures one shade 
of it beautifully. Ordinary affects, Stewart says, are “things that happen. 
They happen in impulses, sensations, expectations, daydreams, encoun-
ters, and habits of relating, in strategies and their failures, in forms of per-
suasion, contagion, and compulsion, in modes of attention, attachment, 
and agency.”41 Focusing on affect means seriously considering feelings, 
pleasurable as well as painful. For my aims, hermeneutics and sensation 
enter into a lively tango, toeing into slippery spaces for rich discussions 
of sound and selfhood. Affective concerns resonate with care ethics in that 
both prioritize embodied encounters and the precarities of lived expe-
rience. Care ethics, in turn, maintains strong attachments to feminist 
inquiries. It is no coincidence that Hamessley’s anecdote, which raises 
questions about the care of female graduate students, pertains to the 
origins of the conferences for Feminist Theory and Music (now entering 
its twenty- fifth year).42 A call for care, as productive as it sounds, comes 
historically loaded because of societal and cultural presumptions about 
who is or is not responsible for giving care. Women, more so than men, 
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are expected to undertake care work and to make it work irrespective 
of professional obligations. Although some early proponents of feminist 
care ethics have argued that women are especially suited for caregiving,43 
critics have rebuked these arguments as essentialist, parochial, and per-
petuating female slave morality.44
Insofar as care continues to be unjustly gendered, raced, classed, 
and allocated, I’m inclined to push care discourses out of their com-
fort zone and, in particular, to think of care as a queer matter. Calls for 
care can sound queer because they remain alien to straight- and- narrow 
mandates of professional life and capitalist systems.45 Care can benefit 
from greater scrutiny, yet it remains weirdly radical, a sentimental out-
lier against normative critical impulses.46 Although queer theory has a 
reputation for being angsty and abstract, optimistic and caring accounts 
are possible.47 One of my favorite vignettes of queerness comes from José 
Esteban Muñoz: “Some will say that all we have are the pleasures of this 
moment, but we must never settle for that minimal transport; we must 
dream and enact new and better pleasures, other ways of being in the 
world, and ultimately new worlds. Queerness is a longing that propels 
us onward, beyond romances of the negative and toiling in the present. 
Queerness is that thing that lets us feel that this world is not enough, 
that indeed something is missing.”48 By this account, to perform queer 
and caring work is to recognize that things aren’t always what they seem 
and that things don’t have to stay the way they are. Queerness, more than 
an invitation for againstness, entails a sort of playfulness, a commitment 
to testing and transgressing boundaries in hopes of creatively thriving 
anew. One chapter in Just Vibrations deals overtly with LGBTQ subjects, 
yet queer inquiry at large serves to spark the book’s vast imaginations of 
livability and living on.
You, Reader
I still remember what it felt like to lose a tenure- track job in 1982, when the 
Reagan recession drove the college where I worked into bankruptcy, and what 
it felt like to live for ten years the grindingly hard life of ad hoc, marginal and 
marginalizing labor as a journeyman adjunct faculty member, what it felt like 
to teach at three institutions in a single day, preparing lectures in my head as 
I drove from place to place. But I do not want to patronize you, my un- and 
under- employed colleagues, nor do I want to slip into some patronizing, falsely 
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empathetic stance, some version of “I feel your pain” or “just hang on!” I 
remember too well how similar remarks would fill me with rage when I was young.
— Suzanne Cusick49
Momentum is building— not fast enough, but building all the same. The 
2015 annual meeting of the American Musicological Society in Lou-
isville, Kentucky, hosted more papers on accessibility, disability, labor, 
and public scholarship than ever before in AMS conference history. 
The program contained, however, a dire glitch. Among the most vital 
sessions was one called “Feminist Musicology and Contingent Labor,” 
featuring people who spoke at once powerfully and vulnerably about 
the challenges of justice, fairness, and parenthood in adjunct teach-
ing and professional pursuits.50 The large room contained at least 150 
chairs but, over the course of the session, drew no more than twenty 
audience members, including just three men (by my estimate). The low 
attendance owed unmistakably to the fact that this session took place at 
exactly the same time as the standing- room- only event of the LGBTQ 
Study Group, “A Serious Effort Not to Think Straight: Suzanne Cusick in 
Dialogue with Emily Wilbourne,” which likewise grappled with themes of 
love, care, and reform. Although the organizers and participants of both 
panels had previously pleaded with AMS officials to move the sessions to 
separate time slots, the appeals were denied. Without casting blame at 
administrators or coordinators (who hold the difficult and unenviable 
task of putting together a huge program), a cruel irony lay in how this 
scheduling conflict reproduced the precise issues of competition and 
scarcity that these two exceptional sessions aimed to address.
Questions of care and outreach have lately assembled under the 
umbrella initiatives of accessible musicology and public musicology, 
both of which push scholars to teach and learn from people outside the 
academy. Public musicology’s label is recent, but the practice is not.51 
Agendas of justice, social change, and environmentalism have radiated 
through many of musicology’s siblings and study groups, from music 
education and music therapy to ecomusicology and applied ethnomu-
sicology. By all appearances, public musicology has been happening for 
a while.52 And how could it not, given this wired era of social media and 
rapid informational exchange? Borrowing from Nicholas Cook: we are 
all public musicologists now.53 The only question is what kinds of schol-
ars we choose to be and how to lead by example. Public scholarship, for 
what it’s worth, cannot flourish in the paranoid mode. Scholarship quali-
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fies as publicly salient only if it accommodates critiques by the public. It 
has to be accessible and comprehensible, open to praise and pushback 
from more than specialists alone. Addressing academics who aspire to 
public discourse, Mark Greif puts it this way: “Intellectuals: You— we— 
are the public. . . . The public must not be anyone less smart and striving 
than you are, right now. It’s probably best that the imagined public even 
resemble the person you would like to be rather than who you are.”54 
Intellectual diligence can coexist with social relevance. Public scholar-
ship means speaking up without talking down.
I dedicate Just Vibrations foremost to people concerned with repara-
tive work, advocacy, and the distant yet colorful horizons of intellectual 
and interpersonal responsibility. Certain case studies will sound familiar 
primarily to music scholars, but the project aims to reach anyone invest-
ed in the intersections of care and criticism. The book is for the tenured 
Distinguished Professor who feels professionally secure enough to take 
on risky endeavors with relative freedom; and for not- yet- tenured junior 
colleagues or graduate students who tread nervously through minefields 
of institutional norms, expectations, and politics. The book is for over-
worked, underpaid adjunct instructors who are multiply marginalized by 
bureaucracies, material scarcities, and the shrinking prospects of equi-
table employment; and for alternative academics who have ventured out-
side the ivory tower and wish to destigmatize the choices of alt- ac labor.55 
I don’t presume to speak on behalf of anyone who does not wish it. I 
speak to you, the reader, and hope to have an eventual opportunity to 
speak with you about our points of agreement and disagreement.56
In this spirit, Just Vibrations listens for voices across diverse sources and 
mediums— not solely peer- reviewed print scholarship (still upheld as a 
gold standard in academia), but also trade books, queer memoirs, illness 
narratives, polemical blog posts, personal anecdotes, emotional email 
correspondences, and anonymous pleas for care on Internet forums. 
Without claiming to equate or democratize these disparate registers of 
expression, I unsettle conventional wisdoms about what sorts of publica-
tions are deemed more versus less valuable. One purpose is to let voices 
chime with each other. The result, though not always harmonious, can 
help destabilize the systemic dominance of so- called strong theory and 
writing. I want Just Vibrations to start a conversation. It isn’t— shouldn’t 
be— the last word.
Following Sedgwick’s gambit in Epistemology of the Closet, I lay bare 
three interlaced axioms for my book.57 First, that each of us has the 
potential to resonate molecularly, socially, and ethically with others.58 
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Second, that by attending to how our convictions, relations, and actions 
ripple through public spaces, we can achieve a sense of how we matter 
and what matters most. And third, that sounds— things we say, music we 
make, noises we hear, pressures we feel— are too often and too facilely 
conceived as just (mere) vibrations, at times to the detriment of agendas 
that are just (fair, good, conscionable). Presumably ephemeral and invis-
ible, sound’s offensive usages may escape commensurate prosecution 
and rectification, whether it’s the threatening words of bullies (waved 
off as pure threats versus sticks and stones) or the deafening force of 
police squads’ Long Range Acoustic Devices, deployed increasingly 
these days to quell protests. Music in particular, with its cultural connota-
tions of leisure and pleasure, occasionally skirts moral scrutiny and seri-
ous intervention, even in such extreme cases as government- sanctioned 
music torture.59 Yet unjust, unethical vibrations can emotionally, physi-
cally rub us the wrong way and thus awaken us to action. Joachim- Ernst 
Berendt conceives of loud and disturbing sounds as such: the English 
word alarm, he points out, comes from the Italian allarme, “which in turn 
leads to all’arme, a call to arms. When we hear noise, we are constantly— 
but unconsciously— ‘called to arms.’ We become alarmed.”60 Alarms can 
drive us to care, convene, and act. By auditing our bodies’ reactions big 
and small, we gain options of mobilizing against injurious manifestations 
of music, sound, noise, speech, and silence.
Chapter 1 traces the harrowing circumstances that moved me to 
undertake this project. Some years back, the onset of a chronic pain 
condition rendered me speechless for long spells at a time. Housebound 
and heavily medicated, I found myself unable to converse soundly, much 
less write properly. Pain swallowed language. My dialogues, internal 
and external, sounded fractured and feeble to my ears and, I assumed, 
to the ears of others. As an academic, I had taken rhetorical ability for 
granted. Its sudden recession left me adrift, unsure of my place in the 
world. Despite doctors’ use of stethoscopes, ultrasounds, MRIs, and oth-
er impressive equipment, I sometimes felt like I, the patient, wasn’t actu-
ally being heard. My intention behind these personal reflections isn’t to 
present an overcoming narrative. What I offer, rather, is a total disclo-
sure of the situational and affective motives behind this book’s reparative 
slant. The goal isn’t to peddle inspiration, but to proffer insights that may 
come to us on the brink of expiration, when we feel curtains closing on 
lyrics left unsung.61
Chapter 2 lends an ear to the powers and problems of sounding good 
in scholarly domains. Academic employment, promotions, and prestige 
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hinge on writing and speaking well. Paranoid readings showcase criti-
cal athleticism, playing awesome tennis with theses and antitheses, facts 
and counterfactuals. But such semantic sports can harden into habit. In 
recent years, scholars have proposed low, thin, and weak critical modes as 
alternatives to the traditional rubrics of high, thick, and strong. Irrespec-
tive of the scholarly practice in question, we can do good by reflecting 
on which truths matter most to us and to others. For all the care shown 
in academic production, we cannot neglect the care due to our peers. 
Reflections on early backlash against feminist and queer musicology 
bring echoes of Rosemary Killam’s yes, it is! and attendant feelings of 
responsibility. By applying pressure to concepts of aesthetic autonomy, 
academic freedom, and human agency, I aim to renovate the ivory tow-
er’s architecture so as to shelter those who most need it.
Chapter 3 takes a queer turn toward the endangered currency of 
hope in our modern critical and social transactions. The archives of 
LGBTQ scholarship to date indicate that shame is topically sexy, full of 
secrets and affective turmoil. Pride, by contrast, is too plain, too easy. 
Queer theory seems gay- married to paranoid imperatives— but why? 
Drawing on Guerrilla Queer Bar, the It Gets Better Project, David Hal-
perin’s peculiar visit to the AMS LGBTQ Study Group, and old debates 
about classical composers’ sexualities, I probe the dilemmas of shame, 
resiliency, and survival from childhood to adulthood. Among the most 
profound open secrets is that paranoia can breed more paranoia, and 
pain more pain. Breaking this vicious cycle requires a firmer grasp on 
the slippery reins of hope. It means opting out of the cultures of humili-
ation that pervade twenty- four- hour news cycles, social media, and spec-
tacles of failure. Without promises of happily ever after, questions linger 
as to what attitudes and actions might offer some happiness and care, 
here and now.
Chapter 4 insists that reparative attitudes toward soundscapes can 
serve as barometers of better worlds. I stress- test this hypothesis by apply-
ing it to acoustic offenses that run the gamut: from tiny bleeps and 
clangs of urban noise pollution (exceedingly ordinary) to the American 
government’s use of music for torture (extraordinary, though not as rare 
as the dearth of public awareness would suggest). Practices of paranoid 
listening have proliferated alongside modes of paranoid reading. How 
we choose to think about the perpetration and tolerance of noise can 
lead us down ethical avenues of ruin or repair. I propose a vested aware-
ness of how we might survive and thrive differently with the occasional 
hard reset on rote orientations toward scholarship, self, and sound. So 
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many opportunities exist for us to vibe empathically with those around 
us, even those who are emphatically not us.
At its heart, Just Vibrations is a voluminous thought experiment that 
brings a motley of musical, cultural, philosophical, pedagogical, and 
queer wisdoms to bear on modernity’s bitter truths and candied lies. 
The book charts a precarious escape route out of these suspicious games, 
sounding off against the power plays within and beyond music and musi-
cology. From childhood onward, we get caught up in contests, facing real 
and imagined threats in daily routines. In academia, paranoid readings 
keep an iron grip on critical discourse. And in life as a whole, we rarely 
call time- outs or stage interventions for our mutually enabled dependen-
cies on naysaying. But do alternatives to adversariality exist? If so, how 
can they resonate through the ways we write, identify, teach, learn, col-
laborate, perform, and love? What futures burst open when we temper 
our flares of chronic suspicion with cooling bouts of reparative belief, 
willful vulnerability, and childlike optimism? Looking to move against 
the grain, I try to do as I say— that is, to cultivate a tone that descants 
above the droning hums (and hmms . . .) of paranoid imperatives. This 
book strives not for paranoid readings’ comprehensiveness or monu-
mentality, but rather for impact and accessibility. The goal is prose that 
eschews the prosaic, opting instead to be conciliatory, flighty, upbeat: 
not blithe, but playful; not naive, yet radically wishful. By harmonizing 
rhetorical registers that are at once grave and gay— by setting the stark 
realities of the here and now against the important games of as if and what 
if— I feel my way through the noise, sounding out despair and pity and 
joy and pride. Tracking the pressures of dulcet and dissonant existence 
can ultimately work to illuminate our currencies of caring for a world 
that, in its morally bankrupt moments, seems to care so little for us.
A Note on Scenes from Childhood
Stories of youths flow freely through this book because they lend both 
weight and levity to explorations of optimism, imagination, and peril. 
Children do not, as a rule, sound good by societal standards: infants bawl 
on planes, kids say the darndest things, and moody teens clam up. Yet I 
cannot see a way to delve into a reparative project without diving for the 
trove of insights offered by youths as they mature, rebel, and resolve. My 
model isn’t some archetypal Freudian child, but rather a figure along 
the lines of Jack Halberstam’s description:
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If, for the child, language is a playground where meaning is contin-
gent, illusionary, motile, impermanent, and constantly shifting to 
keep up with the data flows that course across their inchoate con-
sciousnesses, then maybe adults should improvise more, pick up 
terms, words, lexicons from children who, in many ways, live the world 
differently than we do, live it more closely, live it more intensely, and, 
sometimes, live it more critically.62
Childhood can be a queer, sometimes terrible, experience.63 Bullies, 
puberty, and tragic realities haunt kids coming of age. Gay youths (even 
more so, transgender youths and LGBTQ youths of color) continue to 
get left out in the cold, facing homelessness and violence at high rates. 
This makes childhood all the more central in urgent conversations about 
care and the need for good.
So before pushing forward, here’s one more glance back.
During my time at Annie B. Jamieson Elementary, students were 
required each year to bring earthquake preparedness kits, which teach-
ers would collect and deposit in enormous steel boxes that sat on the 
playground. The idea was that if an earthquake trapped everyone within 
the school perimeter, students would find comfort in the kits’ personal-
ized objects. All kits needed to include at least four items: emergency 
rations (typically candy bars), a flashlight, a game (such as a deck of 
cards), and a sealed envelope containing a loving letter from parents 
or guardians. The precautionary measure was merited by a lot of talk— 
which continues to this day— about Vancouver being overdue for an 
enormous quake (the Big One).
Needless to say, these preemptively reparative measures made the stu-
dents paranoid. My friends and I spent time imagining how the world 
could literally crack open any day. At the end of each earthquake- free 
year, our kits were returned to us and we got to eat the stale candy inside, 
play our games, and read affectionate letters. Year after year, my parents 
kept it short and sweet with the same note:
We love you! Don’t worry, be happy . . . bye- bye.
The vaguely morbid farewell was my parents’ English- as- second- language 
way of signing off (拜拜, the loanword of the English bye- bye, is more com-
monly used by Mandarin- speakers than the actual native term for fare-
well). In third grade, a friend teased me about my parents’ silly choice 
of words. He called the letter fobby (the slang adjective for fresh- off- the- 
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boat) and Engrish. I concurred with nervous laughter. Years later, I would 
come across an essay by Amy Tan in which she confessed her shame at 
having previously referred to her mother’s English as “broken,” which 
connotes a speech in need of repair, something that is “damaged and 
needed to be fixed, as if it lacked a certain wholeness and soundness.”64 
Tan’s shame informed my own as I came to regret ever having belittled 
my parents’ language.
Because the point is that I still remember the earthquake letter. I hap-
pened to memorize its words because, as comically terse as they may be, 
the key sentiments are all there, idiomatic fault lines be damned:
Love! Optimism, happiness . . . closure.
My translation; or, things that matter in the end.
And so what if the syntax came broken, as long as I caught the falling 
pieces and held them close after all these years?





Laugh, and the world laughs with you;
Weep, and you weep alone;
For the sad old earth must borrow its mirth,
But has trouble enough of its own.
. . . 
There is room in the halls of pleasure
For a large and lordly train,
But one by one we must all file on
Through the narrow aisles of pain.
— Beginning and ending of “Solitude,”  
a poem by Ella Wheeler Wilcox (1883)
Everything’s Good
On a June afternoon in 2014, I lay in bed, body screaming and brain 
ablaze. Ears buzzing, I barely heard the phone ring. Someone from the 
physician’s office was calling to report multiple red flags on my recent 
blood panel. I was told to go to the emergency room right away. My 
partner picked me up, and on our short ride to Mt. Auburn Hospital, I 
braced myself for the worst. I feared the doctors would tell me my sys-
tem was shutting down. But I was just as afraid they’d say I looked fine 
enough and then send me away to continue a half- life of mysterious 
chronic pain. By this point, I had gone months scarcely able to eat or 
sleep or get out of bed, much less work or play piano or socialize. The 
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week before the ER visit, I had passed out twice from pain, the first time 
landing on my back, the second time smacking my head against a desk 
on the way down.
After an electrocardiogram, blood draw, and physical exam at Mt. 
Auburn, an affable doctor delivered the verdict that I desired and dread-
ed: no emergency. Besides signs of malnourishment and fatigue, he said, 
my condition wasn’t critical. Everything looked good. I could tell from 
his smile that he thought he was giving excellent news— surely a rare 
commodity in the ER— so I forced a croak of thanks. That night, as I 
tried to celebrate staying alive, I watched reruns of sitcoms in hopes that 
the occasional joke might tease an involuntary laugh out of me, against 
all odds. No such luck. I heard canned tracks of people laughing without 
me and saw cool comedies unfolding in spite of me. But the noise was 
still better than my body’s abject vibes. Around this time, I was sobbing 
more than all of Julianne Moore’s roles combined, though my break-
downs weren’t nearly as pretty. Anytime I cried, I couldn’t tell if I was 
yearning for a life before this pain, irretrievable; the present gauntlet of 
pain, intolerable; or some future relief, unimaginable. Tears ran togeth-
er anyway, just vapor in the end.
Daydream in Thunder
It all began a year earlier, the summer of 2013— a searing feeling that 
spread across the abdomen and under the ribs, like a stomachache that 
never let up, with or without food, day or night. A constant companion, 
the pain wrenched me awake in the morning and beat me into uneasy 
slumber each evening. Medications, herbs, and dietary changes had no 
effect. A workup of endoscopies, ultrasounds, CTs, and MRIs turned up 
nothing. With each clean exam, doctors congratulated me, exclaiming I 
should be relieved that I didn’t have ulcers or celiac disease or esopha-
geal cancer. I sensed my body shutting down in slow motion and my mind 
coming apart, yet experts and charts and numbers and hard evidence— 
everything I trusted (as a scholar, as a person)— were saying I was okay. 
Nothing felt more real than the pain, but I started doubting its reality all 
the same. For once in my life, I wasn’t seeking normal. I didn’t want to pass 
in society or pass medical tests with flying colors. Although I recognized 
my tremendous privilege of having access to healthcare, this acknowledg-
ment didn’t mitigate the worst moments, when implosive pain would col-
lapse any belief in bearable, much less privileged, existence.
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Gastroenterologists didn’t know where to start. They were perplexed 
as to why acid- inhibiting drugs were ineffective and why the gentlest pal-
pations of my abdomen caused me to flinch greatly. Light contact— hugs 
from friends, a fitted shirt, or even dangling wires of Apple earbuds— 
fired twinges across the torso. One doctor concluded that I was overly 
sensitive to pain and sent me away with a vague diagnosis of functional 
dyspepsia. Thus began my resigned migration from internal medicine to 
pain clinics, from specialists I hoped could solve the problem to those 
who worked damage control.
Waiting rooms at pain clinics were hushed places. First rule of the 
clinics: no talking in the clinics. Sounds may disturb. Newcomers would 
quickly grasp that words weren’t welcome. Patients snuck glances at one 
another but never held a gaze for long. Perhaps we feared that, with 
eye contact, we would see too much of one another’s pain as well as the 
sorry reflections of our own. The only breaks in silence came from the 
greetings of nurses who fetched us one by one. They’d say to a patient, 
“How are you today?” and more often than not, the patient would mut-
ter, “Good.” A pleasantry, an empty exchange. Just vibrations, sounds of 
good without much truth.
Once inside the physician’s room, questions didn’t get any easier. 
Inquiries such as “Where does it hurt?” led me to gesture toward my 
abdomen, but if I wanted to be more comprehensive, I would’ve also 
mentioned my seized- up back, my locked hips, my throbbing head— 
just . . . inside. “Pain is a symphony,” points out Atul Gawande, “a complex 
response that includes not just a distinct sensation but also motor activ-
ity, a change in emotion, a focusing of attention, a brand- new memory.”1 
It’s easy yet wrong to assume that most people with chronic pain experi-
ence the totality of their pain in one localized area of the body. Cascades 
of pain can lead to physical inactivity, tension, depression, alienation, 
loss of appetite, and side effects of medication, taking compounded tolls. 
A symphony; or rather, cacophony.
Sometimes, talking did help. I began meeting weekly with a cognitive 
behavioral therapist, Heidi, who imparted mindfulness techniques and 
encouraged me to keep a diary of my pain levels and feelings through-
out the day. The result has been a sixty- page- and- counting document of 
pain scores (0 to 10) and strings of broken prose erring on the side of 
sad. Two things Heidi said have stayed with me. First, without feeding me 
promises that it gets better, she told me I “can still live a beautiful life” 
even with chronic, idiopathic pain. But during actual moments of excru-
ciation, reclaiming beauty struck me as an impossibility: I felt wretched 
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(emaciated, dejected, antisocial); believed I sounded bad (inarticulate, 
curt, defeated); and, even though I would go on walks along the Charles 
River and will myself to take in beauty everywhere, I usually ended up 
coveting all this resplendence as the pageantry of an alternate universe 
fairer than my own. Heidi’s second insight: “Any pain is endurable if 
you know it’s temporary.” All pain is, of course, temporary in that death 
promises release. The question is whether there’s life after pain.
I spent the next year in a daze, sleepwalking through entire seasons, 
now just yawning gaps in my memory. On the worst days, I didn’t leave 
my apartment or eat or speak. On the best days, I wore a taut mask and 
forced myself outdoors. My ears rang inexplicably like church bells on 
the fritz. My vision came smeared with scrawls of floating dots and graf-
fiti. Unable to focus or sit still, I found it difficult to read, much less write. 
Among prescribed medications, the drug gabapentin caused aphasia, 
leading me to grope for basic words like curtains or polo shirt. Syllables 
would sit on my tongue, then dissolve. Emails took an eternity to craft, 
and in live conversations, my speech was full of holes. Elaine Scarry’s the-
sis in The Body in Pain— about the opposition between pain and creation, 
and about pain’s language- destroying and world- shrinking effects— rang 
true in my case.2 I ceased producing and was no longer invested in mak-
ing anything of myself. My priority wasn’t moving up and advancing my 
career, but simply going on. And instead of worrying about what schol-
arly legacy I could leave behind, I fantasized about leaving . . . period. 
Ideas of nonexistence lost their bite. A few depressive episodes earlier 
in life had been attended by angst about mortality, despite an other-
wise healthy body. Yet with health now failing for real, death’s threats 
sounded hollow.
Suffering blackouts, hallucinations, and nightmares, I could feel my 
tether to reality starting to fray. In the spring of 2014, I had published a 
book about music and video games, with case studies devoted to explora-
tions of porous boundaries between the real and the virtual. But none 
of this knowledge kept me grounded. Fancy deconstructions of the real- 
virtual binary didn’t ease my plight, nor did my familiarity with pertinent 
literature. In the clutches of pain, I couldn’t translate critical insights 
into palpable doses of relief and resilience. Pretty prose floundered 
against ugly feelings. Social models of disability didn’t contain instruc-
tions on how to cope.3 Compassionate theories of pain’s inexpressibility 
didn’t remedy my loss for words. Knowing that others had gone through 
ordeals similar to (or far worse than) my own didn’t make me feel less 
lonely. I became profoundly, sometimes ragefully, envious of people 
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around me who looked pain- free, from a smiling barista to the hardcore 
cyclists braving Boston traffic. But I also began thinking about how even 
people who looked indomitably happy and able- bodied might be endur-
ing pain all the same. Around this time, I tried picking up on others’ 
chronic pain, the vibes of friends and strangers who may keep agony 
shut up in stoic facades. Small clues here and there: subtly raised shoul-
ders, a grimace under a grin, sentences punctuated by breathy cadences. 
Maybe I was just projecting my problems onto others. But I couldn’t help 
suspecting some of us shared memberships to a secret club of afflicted 
bodies, even if we all returned to our own homes at the end of each day 
to wither and burn, alone.
Alone at home, then, I sought answers on the Internet. Online mes-
sage boards for chronic pain were inspiring and disheartening in equal 
measure. People related devastating stories and cried for care (figure 
1.1). Many messages were rife with grammatical errors and misspellings 
and non sequiturs and ellipses. But these posts weren’t incoherent. Rath-
er, they were painfully coherent, a surplus of expression in typos and 
caesuras. Entering these forums was like walking into a thunderstorm: 
no triage, just a booming world of hurt. The gist of every post was the 
same. People were exclaiming (as they say in cell phone commercials): 
Can you hear me now? Now— right away, please. Pleas shouted into the 
ether in hopes of fetching echoes. On rare occasions, someone would 
come bearing happy news (that the pain’s under control, or a cause has 
been found) and receive an outpouring of congratulations. Usually, this 
fortunate person would then vanish from the forums, never to be heard 
from again. And who could blame them? Go, fly, live. Maybe some day 
everyone will join you.
One bad night, I was in bed scrolling through an online support 
group when I came across a post, dated two years back, by a man who 
listed a phone number. He was experiencing complex pain syndromes, 
his insurance was maxed out, and his doctors had pretty much given up. 
He couldn’t take it anymore. If someone could reach out, he said, please 
call, please care. As if by reflex, I picked up my phone and punched in 
the number. Before pressing dial, I paused: what if he remained sick, and 
I could only console him with clichés? Much of my own internal dialogue 
was a merry- go- round of “No pain, no . . . ,” “What doesn’t kill me . . . ,” 
“Blessing in . . . ,” “Look on the bright . . . ,” and other fragmentary mot-
tos punctuating the rhythms of hard days. Or what if he were well, and 
he made me feel queer for calling a stranger’s number and disturbing a 
peaceful family dinner? Risking mild embarrassment, I dialed the number.
The phone didn’t even ring once. Instead, I got an automated mes-
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sage saying that the number was no longer in service. I hung up, fearing 
the worst.
Anterior Motives
Music is something I teach and talk and write about every day, [but] pain is not. 
I dwell in pain, subsisting in silence, in hopes that no one will notice and think 
less of me— expect less of me— or, by far the worst, take pity on me, while being 
thankful they are not me.
— M. Celia Cain, a music professor who lives with fibromyalgia4
Figure 1.1. Example of discussions from Daily Strength forum on chronic 
pain
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Making a case for reparative readings, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick declared 
that the “vocabulary for articulating any reader’s reparative motive 
toward a text or a culture has long been so sappy, aestheticizing, defen-
sive, anti- intellectual, or reactionary that it’s no wonder few critics are 
willing to describe their acquaintance with such motives.”5 Strange, isn’t 
it? For isn’t motive crucial? Economists regularly home in on the incen-
tives driving human choices and social behaviors, and legal trials force-
fully weigh intent in cases of life and death. So it is curious that I drafted 
much of Just Vibrations without including the present chapter and reflect-
ing on how I came to be interested in reparative work. I had allowed my 
own circumstances to go missing from the puzzle. The sentiments laid 
out in these pages originated from times when I most desired rehabilita-
tion, yet was least able to imagine its fruition. I rebooted a mild writing 
regimen in late summer of 2014. I wasn’t completely better (not by a 
long shot), but with the aid of medications and visits to the Beth Israel, 
Brigham, and Dartmouth- Hitchcock pain clinics, I gradually became 
able to sit still for twenty- minute intervals. I would write at the computer 
for as long as I could, trying to make up for lost time, then lie down to 
catch my breath; sit up, then go flat; and on this cycle went.
I share this ongoing episode of my life out of neither self- 
congratulatory transparency nor a wish to claim exemptions in read-
ers’ judgments of the book at hand. I share these stories because, in 
my mind, what follows makes little sense without a sense of self at the 
center.6 In fact, with myself in these lines, I hope readers will feel free to 
scrutinize the book more, not less. Some writers, to be sure, still believe 
that academic and first- person narratives don’t mix well. Feminist and 
queer theorists repeatedly run into accusations of narcissism, of overmix-
ing the personal and the political.7 Disability scholars who admit their 
own hardships are likewise charged with indulging in “moi- criticism,” 
appealing to emotions (and scoring so- called sympathy points) rather 
than to the intellect.8 My own writing has tended toward an interplay of 
moods and styles, merging anecdotal, journalistic, and academic regis-
ters that at once embody fractured feelings and reparative ambitions. 
Given academics’ valorization of experimental art (rife for interpreta-
tion and politicization), I’ve long found it odd that much of academic 
writing itself shies away from experimental rhetoric.9 A fear may be that, 
were unusual writing to proliferate, some academics could undeservedly 
claim bad writing as something that sounds good, or pass off ungram-
matical fragments as brilliantly neurodiverse and neurodivergent.10 Criti-
cal writing is the scholar’s safe haven, an expressive vehicle beholding 
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but not beholden to art’s radical standards. Rita Felski puts it this way: 
“Critique often thinks of itself as a weightless, disembodied dance of the 
intellect— as something that is outside, against, at odds with prevailing 
norms and patterns of thought.”11 In this quote, “critique” is positioned 
as the sentence subject (a wink from Felski), capable of “[thinking] of 
itself.” Such syntax riffs on how people attribute agency and exceptional 
status to critique. The myth is that good scholarship can stand on its own 
merits, good ideas speak for themselves, and a good paper practically 
writes itself.12 But surely scholarship about art or about anything else is 
no more autonomous than art itself. Pretending otherwise risks leaving 
human interests out of the equation.
For months, I refrained from divulging my illness— my human 
interest— to peers in academia because I feared they would see and treat 
me differently. The first professional commitment from which I with-
drew was an essay for The Oxford Handbook of Music and Disability Studies, 
and one of its editors, Joseph Straus, was the first colleague to whom I 
disclosed my pain.13 Joe replied graciously, closing his email with this 
advice: “I hope you will take the time you need to get better. Nothing 
else really matters anyway.”14 Until this point, I had relayed my problems 
only to my partner and a few close friends. I even held out on telling— 
and, I assumed, causing unnecessary stress for— my parents until a week 
before my first surgery (a gallbladder removal that, in retrospect, tar-
geted not only a red herring but subsequently worsened the pain by far). 
As I resumed professional duties over time, I role- played as someone of 
sound mind and body, getting through conferences and job interviews 
with a mix of painkillers and pure adrenaline. I came close to tears at 
random moments on these occasions, but each time, would compose 
myself, usually by dashing into the nearest restroom stall. I wasn’t yet 
ready to stumble out of this closet of illness, worrying that people would 
consider me broken.15 But some colleagues eventually perceived some-
thing was up anyway, asking if I was okay and pointing out that I looked 
low- energy or not quite like myself. This bred a whole extra set of inse-
curities. If people were noticing I didn’t look well or sound good, would 
they start speculating about my condition? Would they judge my work 
with heightened suspicion or, alternatively, handle it with kid gloves? 
Would my terse replies and weak smiles signal aloofness, haughtiness, 
even inebriation? Would declining invitations to happy hours or confer-
ence receptions brand me as rude and reclusive?
Pain was a queer experience unto itself. My everyday rituals involved 
negotiations between passing and coming out, between self- effacement 
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and self- advocacy, between craving and rejecting concrete labels. Abject 
yet immanent, pain unmoored my perspectives on futurity and finitude. 
Hopeful and hopeless feelings took turns preying on the purview of who 
I was and who I could be again. Pain necessitated a performative lifestyle, 
the undertaking of physical, physiognomic, and verbal choreographies 
that could either keep people in the dark or let them in on the secret. 
One problem was that I had no clear diagnosis and didn’t know how 
to describe myself anyway. No external violence had been done to me, 
and I hadn’t suffered a trauma per se. I briefly discussed disability leave 
with my department chair and dean, but didn’t comfortably identify as 
disabled. Perhaps I didn’t feel entitled or courageous enough. And what 
if the pain disappeared one day as suddenly as it came? With doctors 
scratching their heads, with tests coming out clean, what if the pain was 
truly in my mind (as opposed to what)? Or, on the contrary, what if I 
was downplaying the pain and therefore not receiving sufficient aid? 
I remember leaving certain physicians’ offices scolding myself for not 
speaking up as vigorously as I could have on my own behalf. During one 
visit to a pain clinic, the nurse who took my vitals asked me how much 
pain I was experiencing on a scale from 0 to 10, with 10 being the worst. 
I first said 6, then quickly changed my mind and mumbled, “Wait  .  .  . 
actually, 8.” The nurse grinned and told me she had to write down the 
first number because it represented my gut instinct (my gut, as if it could 
think straight). I considered pleading with her to update the number 
and convey greater urgency to the physician. But I ended up just nod-
ding and smiling.
Over endless consultations with gastroenterologists, anesthesiologists, 
surgeons, nutritionists, and acupuncturists, my ability to describe pain 
hardly improved. I was easily stumped by routine questionnaires asking 
whether the pain was sharp or dull, shooting or throbbing. One visceral iro-
ny lay in how despite the amazing medical technologies of imaging and 
auscultation, I didn’t always feel seen or heard. Although stethoscopes 
let physicians eavesdrop on my heartbeats, these rituals of “hydraulic 
hermeneutics” couldn’t substitute for my own illness narrative.16 Physi-
cal exams of palpation and percussion (tapping my abdomen, checking 
for masses) treated my cavities and organs as vibrating instruments, but 
couldn’t glean the agony induced by, among other things, precisely these 
forcible tests. Among the most dissonant experiences arose during MRI 
scans, which bombarded my supine figure with brassy noises of magnetic 
fields and oscillating coils; inside the tube, the sounds were harsh, yet, in 
my imagination, every beep served a purpose, working to sketch my scars 
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and prove my pain. Even as MRIs homed in on my atoms, I longed to 
retain a sense of self apart from whatever results emerged. Physicians’ 
tests positioned me as a resonant vessel, an object poised to confess struc-
tural flaws. The exams alone could not, however, say much about who I 
was— who I hoped to be— as a person, a musician, and a writer.
Piano and Prose: Impasse
During the time I took a hiatus from research, I also stopped playing 
piano, and as of 2016, I have yet to resume. In years past, I had given 
regular recitals, including a series of performances in graduate school 
called Improvisations on Themes from the Audience. These performances 
began with audience members recommending themes (anything from 
Bach to Beyoncé), which I would work into real- time mashups according 
to classical idioms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. I loved 
the interactivity, the freedom, the danger. Austere etiquettes of Western 
art traditions flew out the window as people shouted out “Flight of the 
Bumblebee” or “Bohemian Rhapsody” or “that theme from Star Wars . . . 
no, the other one!” During a performance, I could reciprocally hear the 
audience’s hearing of my playing because people would chuckle upon 
recognizing variegated melodies. At the same time, I tried to make listen-
ers feel heard by weaving their recommendations into the recital’s musi-
cal fabric. Ten fingers, numerous voices. To be clear, I don’t think my 
improvisations always sounded good. I would hit weird notes or fudge 
up the pacing or linger too long on a single theme or overdo clichéd 
circles of fifths. But it was my favorite way to play, a way that felt electric 
and alive.
With the onset of illness, it became painful to sit on a hard bench 
and difficult to concentrate. My hands turned disobedient and my run- 
throughs of even easy repertoire became disorderly. Passagework sound-
ed broken, yet not in a beautifully salvageable way. There was nothing 
romantic or poète maudit about playing through physical anguish. As 
much as I would’ve hoped to find some transcendental inspiration in 
pain, it hasn’t panned out. No overcoming narrative, no supercrip cour-
age.17 But it wasn’t for lack of trying. Some people, after all, have bet-
ter luck when it comes to finding distraction or even respite in musical 
activity. In his book Anatomy of an Illness, Norman Cousins recalled his 
astonishing encounter with the conductor and cellist Pablo Casals in 
1966, a few weeks before this musician’s ninetieth birthday. At the time, 
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Casals had developed difficulty breathing and walking and dressing him-
self. “His hands were swollen and his fingers were clenched,” Cousins 
remembered.18 But one day before breakfast, Casals headed to his piano. 
According to Cousins:
I was not prepared for the miracle that was about to happen. The 
fingers slowly unlocked and reached toward the keys like the buds 
of a plant toward the sunlight. His back straightened. He seemed to 
breathe more freely. Now his fingers settled on the keys. Then came 
the opening bars of Bach’s Wohltemperierte Klavier, played with great 
sensitivity and control. I had forgotten that Don Pablo had achieved 
proficiency on several musical instruments before he took up the 
cello. He hummed as he played, then said that Bach spoke to him 
here— and he placed his hand over his heart. Then he plunged into 
a Brahms concerto and his fingers, now agile and powerful, raced 
across the keyboard with dazzling speed. His entire body seemed 
fused with the music; it was no longer stiff and shrunken but supple 
and graceful and completely freed of its arthritic coils.19
No matter how accurate or embellished this description may be, suffice 
it to say that I haven’t been capable of showing such virtuosic transfor-
mation during pain. My inability to translate suffering into artistry has in 
fact made me doubt how much I care about music— a queer thing for a 
musicologist to wonder. If I loved music enough, shouldn’t music some-
times be enough to comfort and care for me?20 Or, to frame this as the 
three- word inquiry people ask about difficult relationships: Is love enough? 
As my body and worldview came undone, it wasn’t a huge stretch for me 
to start questioning my relationship to music. Playing music didn’t serve 
as a magical security blanket, and listening to it couldn’t help me sleep. 
Music wasn’t exceptional. It was just one more thing excised from daily 
activities, one more broken luxury in a life falling silent.
My sense of inadequacy extended from the playing of piano to the 
perusal of books. In the summer of 2014, on the better days when I 
could focus enough to get some reading done, I opted for a mix of queer 
memoirs (for enjoyment) and critical theory (to stay abreast of academic 
literature).21 In many ways, the two genres couldn’t be more different. 
Memoirs come across as vulnerable and transparent, while critical the-
ory can border on domineering and opaque. Authors of memoirs often 
sound out reparative measures, recounting life’s challenges in search of 
meaning and closure, whereas critical theorists traffic in paranoid dis-
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course, deferring meaning and closure via deconstruction. It was around 
this time that I began exploring ideas of resonance, the physical and 
metaphorical vibes at work in interactions between selves and surround-
ings. The writings of French philosopher Jean- Luc Nancy left a mark on 
me, though not in the traditional sense. Consider the following excerpts 
from Nancy’s Listening (Á l’écoute):
To be listening is thus to enter into tension and to be on the lookout 
for a relation to self; not, it should be emphasized, a relationship to 
“me” (the supposedly given subject), or to the “self” of the other (the 
speaker, the musician, also supposedly given, with his subjectivity), 
but to the relationship in self, so to speak, as it forms a “self” or a “to 
itself” in general, and if something like that ever does reach the end 
of its formation.22
And, a few pages later:
We should linger here for a long time while on rhythm: it is nothing 
other than the time of time, the vibration of time itself in the stroke of 
a present that presents it by separating it from itself. . . . Thus, rhythm 
separates the succession of the linearity of the sequence or length of 
time: it bends time to give it to time itself, and it is in this way that it 
folds and unfolds a “self.”23
Self, “self,” self, itself, “to itself,” in self. With my own sense of self eroded 
by pain and painkillers, I had a hard time wrapping my mind around 
these passages, which I ended up highlighting in green and annotating 
with question marks. Nancy’s writing struck a nerve, and as I now write 
this, over a year later, I think I’ve figured out why. To be clear: rather 
than gloss here what I take Nancy’s words to mean, what follows is my 
attempt to describe my own feelings toward these words. Granted, peo-
ple don’t usually elaborate on the emotions elicited by others’ scholarly 
writing. The aesthetic objects of critique (music, poetry, photography), 
maybe; but critique itself— less so. We do, in other words, commonly talk 
about what we think someone like Nancy is trying to say and what his 
theories let us say in turn. We don’t talk about how Nancy makes us feel. 
Enlightened? Obtuse? Irritable? Under the generous canopy of critical 
inquiry, there should be room for discussions about the affects elicited 
by, not least of all, affect studies and phenomenology.24
Nancy boasts a monumental oeuvre and has plenty of admirers. But 
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as I scanned and rescanned his definitions of listening and rhythm, I 
stayed stumped. Here was Nancy, showing off language resembling 
nested math equations, operating with what sounded like second- order 
and third- order logics— and here I was, out of order, making do with a 
shortened attention span and diminished retention. I could have coolly 
dismissed Nancy’s writing as sophistry and shaken my head sagely at its 
esoteric pretense. I could have chosen to laugh at the impenetrable rhet-
oric and shared it on Facebook with a humorous tag (#obscurantism). 
Instead, I wept as I read: teardrops hit paper and made neon watercol-
ors out of the highlights. Affliction had whittled down my patience for 
mind games and wordplay. Latching onto these few lines of text was 
arbitrary, even irrational. I know I reacted with disproportionate sadness 
and shame toward Nancy’s abstract musings. Perhaps I fixated on this 
mental impasse as evidence of my futile endeavors to steady my intel-
lect and repair my body. The hard words stood for all the things that no 
longer came easy: producing good work, eating good food, enjoying a 
pain- free summer car ride to the Cape with windows down and radio up. 
The smudged ink before me coalesced into a snapshot of my muddled 
psyche. It represented the end of my line, telling me this was as far as I 
will go.
My queer failure to understand Nancy may offer its own humble rev-
elations. I think of Noam Chomsky, who, among others, has admonished 
postmodern theorists for polysyllabic posturing. These theorists, Chom-
sky says, envy (and seek to mimic) the complex, rarified work of physi-
cists and mathematicians.25 Revisiting the two Listening excerpts, howev-
er, it seems as if Nancy envies not only science but also music. Look at his 
language. It’s arguably more musical in itself than it is about music itself. 
The prose delights in repetitions with minor variations and coy inver-
sions, echoing with assonance all the while. And as with music, Nancy’s 
words can accommodate sprawling interpretations. Recall that a trait of 
paranoid criticism is, according to Sedgwick, its attempt to ward off oth-
ers’ faultfinding efforts. One way to accomplish this involves comprehen-
sive topical coverage and displays of erudition. Another way is to write in 
a manner that defies comprehension altogether. High theory’s golden 
logic states that if you don’t get it, you’re not smart enough; if people 
can’t see the emperor’s new clothes, quip the sly weavers, it’s because 
they’re unfit for their posts.26 As much as I’d like to feel as confident as 
the vocal child who denudes the emperor, there’s always the fear that I’m 
the one who’s lacking acuity, that I alone am the one who cannot see.
Assumptions about the intangibility and ephemerality of sound 
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enable us to talk about it in abstruse, ambivalent ways. Discursively, this 
is freeing. Sociopolitically, this can be problematic, as such abstractions 
may be partly responsible for how sonic offenses go unaddressed. To 
me, Nancy’s language is unclear. But does it also verge on unethical? 
Lest we doubt his elitism, consider how Nancy regards musicology and 
its Others: “If someone listens to music without knowing anything about 
it— as we say of those who have no knowledge of musicology— without 
being capable of interpreting it, is it possible that he is actually listening 
to it, rather than being reduced to hearing [entendre] it?”27 How many 
people subscribe to this characterization of musicology? Is it strange that 
an author so invested in ideas of listening would write in a manner com-
prehensible to so few?
At the time, getting worked up over a morsel of cloudy philosophy 
may have been a poor use of my dwindling energy and scant moments 
of lucidity. Yet these passages by Nancy exemplified much of what I’ve 
found troublesome about academic operations and social hierarchies 
at large: worlds divided into the haves and have- nots— those who have 
purported knowledge of music and those who don’t, those who just get it 
and those who cannot. A reparative reading of Nancy would give him the 
benefit of the doubt, refraining from accusing him of condescension. 
But more to the point, what is the purpose of sounding smart and writ-
ing well? Amid the imperatives of knowledge, aptitude, and eloquence, 
where do compassion and care fit in?
Senseless
I remember the day a doctor offered a correct diagnosis for my con-
dition. He was a gastroenterologist, yet his diagnosis was not gastroen-
terological. After listening to my description of symptoms and previous 
treatments, he informed me that perhaps there was pain in my abdomi-
nal wall— the layers of skin, muscle, and fat surrounding the stomach 
and nearby organs. It goes by the name of abdominal cutaneous nerve 
entrapment syndrome (ACNES), or just abdominal wall neuropathy for 
short. As the doctor explained this, things started to click: why endosco-
pies came out clean, why changes in diet made little difference, why ant-
acids were ineffective, and why I would yelp uncontrollably upon palpa-
tion of my abdomen. A quick online search brought up several medical 
articles pointing to ACNES as a frequently overlooked problem when it 
comes to idiopathic abdominal pain. It can be brought on or exacerbat-
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ed by specific incidents or injuries, but often, people with the condition 
are seemingly just born this way.28
Once ACNES was raised as a possibility, all health practitioners who 
were involved recognized that we were dealing with neuropathy rather 
than gastritis or cholecystitis or pancreatitis. But for over a year, I had 
already presumed the malady to be digestive in nature, something deep 
within. I had developed an eating disorder through the systematic elimi-
nation of foods from my diet, becoming anemic in the process. I had 
grown to fear mealtimes, especially on social occasions. Lastly, I had lived 
with an assumption that my threshold for pain was unusually low, given 
that even soft contact with my abdomen would cause me to wince.29 In 
essence, I had learned to feel weak. But my complaints now sounded 
justified, for with neuropathy, my peripheral nerves were transmitting 
needless pain signals to the spine and the brain. The problem didn’t 
stem from organ failure. The problem was pain itself.
In a January 1939 interview, Winston Churchill spoke about the need 
for democracy and free press in the face of totalitarian threat. “Criticism 
may not be agreeable, but it is necessary,” said Churchill. “It fulfills the 
same function as pain in the human body; it calls attention to the devel-
opment of an unhealthy state of things.”30 Preserving people’s rights to 
criticize their government keeps powers in check. Pain receptors alert us 
to injury, telling us to take our hands off a hot stove. In short, pain serves 
the body in the way that criticism serves the body politic. Norman Cous-
ins, who lived with and recovered from chronic pain, shared Churchill’s 
sentiments: “Pain is part of the body’s magic. It is the way the body trans-
mits a sign to the brain that something is wrong.”31
But suppose that your nerves fire unnecessarily and pathologically, as 
in the case of neuropathy. Suppose the only wrong thing telegraphed by 
this pain is pain. Neuropathy is a body crying wolf, paranoia overdrive. 
Misfiring synapses yell Watch out! on a loop, raising alarms about phan-
tom threats when in fact these nerves are their own worst enemies. The 
pain is useless and has, now and again, made me feel useless in turn. It’s 
easy to call pain magical or inspirational or a badge of honor.32 It’s hard-
er to appreciate such silver linings when you’re still caught in the storm.
Suppose, contrary to Churchill’s analogy, that certain practices 
of criticism likewise stem from socialized rituals rather than thought-
ful decisions and reparative aims. Neuropathy involves pain for pain’s 
sake; do paranoid readings, among other discursive practices, showcase 
criticism for criticism’s sake? Suppose we, in daily interpersonal and aca-
demic activities, introduce more injurious stimuli into the world than 
Figure 1.2. A sculpture called Hope and Confidence in one of the waiting 
rooms at the Dartmouth- Hitchcock Medical Center. Placed here in 1991, it 
was created by the American sculptor and plastic surgeon Dr. Burt Brent as a 
gift for his mentor Dr. Radford C. Tanzer. Do you see two hands of a single 
person, clenched together pleadingly and hopefully? Or do you see the 
respective hands of two people (say, patient and doctor) coming together in 
a gesture of care and outreach?
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needed, for the sake of . . . what? Pursuit of truth? Authority? Thrill of 
competition? Do we ever get so busy trying to sound good and do well 
that we forget to care for others? Has naysaying become a reflex rather 
than a choice, a tendency hardwired into neural pathways? If so, would 
we even know it?
To date, I can’t say what has or has not definitively come out of my 
pain, because I have not yet come out from it. I remain in it, it in me. I still 
visit pain clinics, receiving consultations, injections, and radiofrequency 
ablations. I underwent an anterior abdominal neurectomy at the end of 
2015 with only minor relief. More surgeries loom. Pain is my shadow, 
forcing me to check my mood and stamina every time before booking a 
trip, teaching a class, or agreeing to coffee with a friend. On dark days, I 
stay at home, unavailed, letting hours dissipate, fantasizing about what I 
would trade to make the pain go away, barricading myself in the bargain-
ing stage of grief, the futile stopover between anger and depression. On 
bright days, I write avidly, laugh loudly, and love better, wishing for each 
minute to linger a little longer.
As I’ve gradually shared drafts of this book, one shining spot is how 
many friends have reciprocally shared their own personal tales. Walls 
came down, sound barriers shattered. Across these emotional exchang-
es, a valuable affective commodity began to stir: confidence. Not con-
fidence as in resilient authority or self- assurance, but confidence as in 
confidentiality— a readiness to trust, to empathize, and to be vulnerable in 
the company of another (figure 1.2). As I continue to wonder whether 
I can be unbroken, what 0– 10 pain level tomorrow brings, and how I 
can make it through a conference next month, the sentimental vibes 
in these honest conversations have felt refreshingly truthful. They have 
confirmed my suspicion that it’s possible to tread alternate paths of cri-
tique and care. For the moment, what I care about most is seeking a 




Sing the Ivory Tower Blues
✦ ✦ ✦
I know of no rule which holds so true as that we are always paid for our suspicion 
by finding what we suspect.
— Henry David Thoreau1
Do you see now why it feels so good to be a critical mind? Why critique, this most 




In hard times, suspicion is always in style. It’s a survival tactic, a way of life 
that lets us anticipate and avert bad surprises. At the most mundane, sus-
picion comes through in an arched eyebrow or a glance over the shoul-
der. Taken to extremes, it balloons into clinical paranoia and conspiracy 
mongering. With digital technology, our everyday means of deception 
and fabrication have multiplied, giving consumers persistent cause to 
wonder whether a broadcast is truly live, whether Beyoncé lip- synched 
the national anthem, whether leaked nude photos of Jennifer Lawrence 
are the real deal, and whether any of these matters are worth one’s time 
to begin with. In the wake of Edward Snowden and whistleblown scan-
dals, citizenries have plenty of reasons to keep up their guards and watch 
what they say. Fears of falling skies feel justified, grounded in the reali-
ties of climate change, unending wars on terror, and a global buildup 
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of nuclear weapons capable of annihilating the planet many times over 
(overkill in the most literal sense).3 News cycles paradoxically broadcast 
constant states of emergency— threats and catastrophes, just a channel 
or click away. Browse WebMD or watch House long enough and you will 
start believing you have the rarest of diseases. Cynics and hypochondri-
acs lack no vindication.
Even (or especially) in moments when we do feel safe— in precious 
instances when the world seems transparent and uneventful— we might 
manufacture dissent, stirring up drama for drama’s sake: by engaging 
the made- up foes of games; fanning flame wars on Internet forums; imp-
ishly spreading rumors at school or by the water cooler; nitpicking at the 
tiny faults in near- perfect relationships; fashioning self- fulfilling omens; 
or otherwise making waves where waters were once calm. Nowadays, 
observes Bruno Latour, “The smoke of the event has not yet finished 
settling before dozens of conspiracy theories begin revising the official 
account, adding even more ruins to the ruins, adding even more smoke 
to the smoke.”4 Latour terms this “instant revisionism,” a social mesh of 
immediate feedback, pushback, and blowback.5 Deborah Tannen calls it 
“argument culture,” the perpetuation of a “pervasive warlike atmosphere 
that makes us approach public dialogue, and just about anything we 
need to accomplish, as if it were a fight.”6 Yet even when we are the mak-
ers of mischief, it’s tempting to see ourselves as embattled protagonists, 
to fixate on personal impediments and play up antagonistic presence. 
Me against the world is the mantra of the modern (neo)liberal individual, 
the spirit by which we console and congratulate ourselves as the scrappy 
heroes of spectacular adventures.
Academics frequently view their work and workplace as institutions 
under budgetary and ideological siege.7 Hardly a day goes by without 
multiple articles in the Chronicle of Higher Education reporting the finan-
cial gutting of universities. Anti- intellectualism evokes barbarians rat-
tling the gates of the ivory tower, but adversariality also rages within the 
tower itself: notwithstanding the conventions and collegiality of mutual 
citation, scholars learn not just to write, but to write against— to uproot 
status quo, fill in lacunae, and change up the game.8 Musicologists, toil-
ing on the fringes of academia’s better- known fields, may find particu-
lar cause to believe they have something to prove. Music’s reputation 
as an object of leisure— frivolous, recreational, merely pleasurable— has 
shaped the development and discontents of musicology since its incep-
tion.9 The discipline’s unsung status stands to enervate as well as ener-
gize its students, inspiring vigorous allegations against visual biases and 
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the tuned- out sensorium. Prefatory tsk- tsks about ocularcentrism have 
become a reliable gambit, a way to open up discourses for sounds in 
need of bended ears.10
Revisionist critiques, at their most fruitful, build dialectical momen-
tum and foster constructive dialogue. In less productive cases, this rheto-
ric can descend into knee- jerk contrarianism and mudslinging. Big- name 
academics tend to generate high- profile rivalries. Each discipline has its 
Godzillas and Mothras, the clarion giants whose radioactive words edify, 
entertain, or perturb the younger colleagues who might not feel person-
ally or professionally safe enough to enter the fray. There’s the adage 
that academic politics are so vicious because the stakes are so low.11 This 
saying is not only anti- intellectualist in its accusation but also infantiliz-
ing in its tone. It likens scholars to children who play at war, who feel 
free to engage in bombastic verbiage precisely because the procedures 
and consequences are thought to be virtual, a lot of simulated sound and 
fury, signifying nothing.12
Big Talk
What transformation would need to occur before those who pursue academic 
discourse can be “heard” (which I take to mean “respected”), not in spite of our 
mental disabilities, but with and through them?
— Margaret Price13
Against the monopoly of virtuosic paranoid readings, it’s not easy to 
devise or trust alternate modes of scholarly production. Academics may 
find little incentive to rock the boat in the first place. One possibility lies, 
however, in what Sedgwick calls reparative reading— a way of approach-
ing texts, events, and people with refreshing surges of positive affect. In 
one of her articles on music and torture, Suzanne Cusick glosses and 
builds on the reparative as follows:
The paranoid, [Sedgwick] showed, believes in the efficacy of knowl-
edge, exposure and demystification. By contrast, the critical practices 
that result from the reparative position aim toward “a sustained seek-
ing of pleasure.” Reparative critical practices produce weak theory with 
only locally applicable explanatory power, and they are easy to dismiss 
(from a paranoid position) as “merely aesthetic” or “merely reform-
ist.” And yet, Sedgwick concludes, the reparative is “no less realistic, 
40  •   just vibrations
no less attached to a project of survival, and neither less nor more 
delusional or fantasmatic” than the paranoid. Unlike the paranoid, 
however, it leads us toward moments when joy (not “gotcha!”) can 
be a guarantor of truth, when practices that are weak, sappy or anti- 
intellectual may bespeak the spiritually and psychologically healthy 
reclamation of sustaining pleasure from a world that may not have 
intended to sustain us.14
The reparative is unflinchingly reflexive and reflective, unafraid to lin-
ger on the naked reasons for why and how we produce critical work. 
“Faced with the depressing realization that people are fragile and the 
world hostile,” remarks Ellis Hanson, “a reparative reading focuses not 
on the exposure of political outrages that we already know about but 
rather on the process of reconstructing a sustainable life in their wake.”15 
On its face, this mode of reading can come across as preachy and gooey. 
For doesn’t sentimentality belong to greeting cards, romantic comedies, 
after- school specials, and cutesy banter between lovers? There’s no cry-
ing in criticism; cynicism is safer, stronger.16 The reparative’s plea of Can’t 
we all just get along? is answered by the paranoid’s Maybe . . . but why risk it? 
and Better safe than sorry! Sounding strong feels good. Paranoid rhetoric 
stakes out authority and quashes opposition. Lauren Berlant reminds us 
that the “intellectual referent of the word ‘smart’ derives from its root in 
physical pain. Smartness is what hurts, or to say that something smarts is 
to say that it hurts— it’s sharp, it stings, and it’s ruthless. It is as though to 
be smart is to pose a threat of impending acuteness (L. acutus— sharp).”17 
Sharp tongues and rapier wits make powerful tools for combating others 
and shielding oneself.
Everyday acts of writing and speaking compel us to harness the voic-
es of peers, mentors, and interlocutors who leave their marks on our 
linguistic habits and intellectual conscience. Paranoid motives amplify 
these voices to forge them into armor: that’s not quite what I said, that’s 
not quite what I said, that’s not quite what I said, and so on. One irony is 
that the paranoid’s myth- busting “strong theory” tends to rely on open- 
ended, wavering words and syntax: “seems,” “might,” “maybe,” “one 
could say,” “simultaneously A and not A,” and other guarded construc-
tions. Contrast this with reparative readings, which dare to be fallible 
and thus don’t shy away from “is,” “in fact,” “I believe that,” and affirma-
tive language that leaves the writer open to contradiction. To embrace 
“weak theory,” then, takes some strength as well, a willingness to risk 
being wrong— and being wronged.
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Weak theory has close ties to “low theory,” which Jack Halberstam 
posits as “theoretical knowledge that works at many levels at once  .  .  . 
one of these modes of transmission that revels in the detours, twists, and 
turns through knowing and confusion, and that seeks not to explain but 
to involve.”18 Low theory, in Halberstam’s formulation, isn’t indebted to 
interpretative cohesion. It can appear protean and even scattered. Caro-
lyn Abbate uses similar terminology in comparing “low hermeneutics” 
and “soft hermeneutics,” a distinction that “separates a musical herme-
neutics craving the blessing of history or the dead and seeing immanent 
supra- audible content in musical artifacts from the past (low) from that 
which acknowledges such content as a product born in messy collisions 
between interpreting subject and musical object (soft).”19 Abbate goes 
on, all the same, to expose this differentiation as illusory. “In fact,” she 
cautions, “soft hermeneutics inevitably becomes low as well; hermeneu-
tics’ fundamental gesture is determining and summoning authority, not 
leaving open or withdrawing.”20 In recent years, scholars have also begun 
seeking alternatives to anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s influential ideal 
of “thick description,” which favors ethnographic disclosures of mean-
ing and depth.21 Whereas thick description follows, as John Jackson Jr. 
notes, a seductive “totalizing ethos” that “imagines itself able to amass 
more and more factual information,” the principles of “thin description” 
locate value in dialogues, surface behaviors, and “a way of knowing that 
privileges continued nonknowing.”22
Weak, soft, low, thin— terms often pejoratively writ, connoting some-
thing fluffy or flimsy or sissy. As antidotes to paranoid readings, however, 
they take on antinormative forces of their own, performing disobedi-
ence and offering queer possibilities. Reparative work, after all, doesn’t 
shoot for perfect compromise or intellectual homogeneity. Its goal isn’t 
the elision of difference or the suspension of critical faculties, but rath-
er a recognition that such faculties may prove meaningful even when 
they prioritize (rather than blackball) peace and pleasure. Reparative 
scholarship acknowledges that the transactions of power in rhetorical 
exchanges have potential to harm and to heal. Its aspirations go beyond 
the merely constitutive, the act of putting things and selves back together 
again. Its greater aims are creative and creational, making promises and 
moments anew.
Shortcomings of repair lie in the stark implausibility of its own lofty 
promises. It’s impossible to behave reparatively around the clock and 
unfeasible to write only ever in the reparative mode. Sedgwick’s own 
reparative calls contain paranoid traces of insecurity, despondence, and 
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even gotcha!— feelings that undoubtedly show up in Just Vibrations and in 
all of our writing. “So many of us feel compelled to answer Sedgwick’s 
call to reparation, which cracks us out of academic business as usual and 
promises good things both for Sedgwick and for us,” says Heather Love. 
“But I also think we need to answer the call to paranoia and aggression. 
Sedgwick taught me to let the affect in, but it’s clear that by doing so 
I won’t only be letting the sunshine in.”23 Not only sunshine, but also 
shadows and chills: the point, perhaps, is to allow feelings in and out, 
to make room for affective archives at the hearths where we tell stories. 
Just because repair isn’t promptly achievable shouldn’t deter us from 
desiring its fulfillment. In efforts to do well and to do good, people can 
hold paranoia and repair in perpetual tension, recognizing that neither 
means (or feels like) much without the other.
Paranoid motives, whether born out of play or panic, boil down to 
power. Inhabiting a world believed to be overbearing and antipathetic, 
paranoiacs work to claim knowledge over fates and surroundings. And 
if paranoid readings prize control above all (seizing critical authority to 
prove, persuade, and even punish), then the reparative has the task of 
defetishizing control as a de facto positive value. This agenda can sound 
counterintuitive— for what does scholarship showcase if not intellectual 
control over subject matter? As a start, the reparative could acknowledge 
the improprieties and vices that the pursuit of power might entail; reflect 
on the ethics and politics of rhetorical norms; and decenter the tacit 
enviability of ability by shifting focus to adjunct rubrics of accessibility 
and accommodation.24 It’s satisfying to play master of a situation, but 
there’s also wisdom, humanity, and even joy in surrendering to swirls 
of circumstances beyond our command.25 Whether we’re dealing with 
an improv recital, an online multiplayer game, BDSM, or a conference 
Q & A gone off the rails, life’s out- of- control moments pose humbling 
reminders that we can’t always stay in charge.
A reparative discourse would pick up negation as an option rather 
than as an obligation.26 In his controversial 2003 book, Decentering Music, 
Kevin Korsyn painted a dire portrait of contemporary musical research. 
He likened the institution of musicology to the Tower of Babel:
The situation [in musicology] recalls the biblical story of the attempt 
to build a tower that would touch the heavens. God frustrates this 
scheme by sowing linguistic confusion.  .  .  . We can easily imagine 
how the exasperated builders might have turned to violence when 
their companions answered them in gibberish. Something similar has 
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happened to music, although the violence is rhetorical rather than 
physical. Members of opposing groups seem to be speaking different 
languages or playing different language games. . . . As voices become 
increasingly shrill, the hope of building a community, of joining a 
common enterprise, lies in ruins.27
If we can “easily imagine” that violence would arise simply from Babel’s 
“linguistic confusion,” then might we be giving people too little cred-
it?28 If being answered in “gibberish” is cause for turbulence, it may owe 
to a paranoia about being mocked or disrespected in foreign tongues, 
about being insulted without even knowing it. If the Tower lies in dis-
repair, the solution comes with learning to get along not despite but 
precisely because of human biodiversity and its ethical possibilities.29 
“The hope of harmony in the contemporary world,” writes Amartya 
Sen, “lies to a great extent in a clearer understanding of the pluralities 
of human identity, and in the appreciation that they cut across each 
other and work against a sharp separation along one single hardened 
line of impenetrable division.”30 It goes without saying that people who 
sound different, or who do not express themselves well, or who do not 
(or cannot) speak at all— or talk only in weak or soft or low or thin or 
queer lingo— are not automatic candidates for exclusion or injury, and 
no less deserving of care.31
A shared language, in any case, doesn’t accomplish much if uttered 
in sour tones. Prospects of repair depend as much on what we say as on 
how we say it. It doesn’t take a musicologist to point out how intonation 
can make all the difference. It doesn’t take a poststructuralist theorist 
of voice to observe how verbal inflections and modulations exceed and 
excite semantic content. Even over the phone, we (think we) can discern 
good or ill will in a voice, and hear a smile in how it gently sweetens the 
speech flowing through. Maybe some of us have traveled to countries 
where we didn’t speak the native language, yet encountered the rare 
vendor or passerby who sang some pleasantry of such warmth that we 
felt the uncanny confidence of believing we knew not just the kind inten-
tions behind the words, but exactly what those words were saying. Same 
goes for a colleague whose work we don’t fully understand, or whose 
work doesn’t fit our preconceptions of what is or is not valuable. Incom-
prehension doesn’t justify instant dismissal or cynicism, much less rhe-
torical violence. If Babel is our reality, the challenge involves acting and 
speaking in manners that won’t give others— especially those with whom 
communications seem difficult— reasons to feel shame.
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A Case for Lento?
A bickering Babel evokes noises of people talking fast— maybe talking at 
and past one another, neglecting to listen and to learn. But tone aside, 
our daily communications also run up against expectations of tempo: 
how quickly we’re supposed to talk, how efficiently we deliver informa-
tion, and the idiosyncratic pacing that enables us to sound well spoken. 
At the beginning of this book, I asked what we’re running from, run-
ning to, and running for. Some answers so far show that we run from 
monstrous failures, run toward success, and hopefully at times, run for 
something other than just our own pride and preservation. Hard to deny 
is that we’re indeed constantly running. In an era of social media and 
flash- in- the- pan phenomena, there’s little time for slow.
Over the last decade, however, a far- reaching philosophy called the 
Slow Movement has gained popular traction. It encompasses everything 
from slow food (versus fast food) and slow dating (versus speed dating 
and swipe- happy Tinder) to slow reading (savoring words, countering 
the hypermediated bombardment of modern information) and slow 
travel (enjoying leisurely journeys rather than rushing to destinations).32 
Advocates for slow scholarship and slow writing point to the potential 
harms in academia’s breakneck mentalities: “Slowing down involves 
resisting neoliberal regimes of harried time by working with care while 
also caring for ourselves and others. A feminist mode of slow scholarship 
works for deep reflexive thought, engaged research, joy in writing and 
working with concepts and ideas driven by our passions.”33 Neverthe-
less, universities encourage competition, efficiency, and self- reliance.34 
Neoliberalism, in higher education and elsewhere, tends to operate via 
“linear time— an end- product driven time.”35 Its implicit questions to 
laborers are What do you have to say for yourself? and How soon can you do 
as you say?
Scholars and activists have lately used the term “crip time” to describe 
the temporal pressures and accommodations pertaining to disability in 
particular. Margaret Price emphasizes that crip time alludes to more 
than simply giving people extra time to complete tasks. At academic con-
ferences, for example, “Adhering to crip time might mean permitting 
more than fifteen minutes between sessions; it might mean recogniz-
ing that people will arrive at various intervals, and designing sessions 
accordingly; and it might also mean recognizing that audience mem-
bers are processing language at various rates and adjusting the pace of 
conversation.”36 The larger message here is a call for flexibility and for 
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the destigmatization of slowness. People with phonic tics might seem-
ingly speak out of turn, interrupting a conversation or disrupting a pre-
sentation. People who stutter could likewise be accused of speaking out 
of time, that is, out of sync with normative pace and taking too long to 
convey a thought. Unsympathetic listeners would fault speech impair-
ments for erecting communication barriers, causing delays, and holding 
up queues. A crip- activist perspective would instead draw attention to 
how societies are too quick to privilege speediness and semantic econo-
my. Business, academia, and everyday situations show prejudice against 
redundancy, roundabout rhetoric, and circular reasoning. Slow is bad. 
Repetitiveness is bad. By contrast, clear informational trajectories and 
efficient delivery sound good.
To crip (or to queer) normative attitudes toward time and teleolo-
gy is foremost to ask why fluency holds so much sway, how disfluencies 
can be accommodated, and what the capital of time (time is money) says 
about human values and priorities. One problem is that not everyone 
can afford to slow down. Institutional, financial, and emotional penal-
ties might await people who dare to lag behind others. “Self- help slow 
experts can advise us to improve our own lives by going slower,” points 
out Luke Martell. “But this is not too far away from university managers 
who respond to stress and overload by pushing it away from the insti-
tution and structures on to individuals, by proposing solutions such as 
stress counselling or time- management training.”37 Put another way, a 
lone musician cannot just take a ritardando if the orchestra is going a tem-
po (or presto). Doing so would earn the wrath of the maestro and peers, 
with consequences sure to follow.
Norms of speed can lead some researchers and instructors to feel 
not merely slow by comparison, but veritably stuck— trapped on a tread-
mill powered by unrealistic expectations. In a recent spate of “quit lit,” 
people have described how and why they left academia. Debra Erickson, 
observing these writers’ analogies of confinement, notes how academia 
“has been unfavorably compared to many things: a cult, a bad boyfriend, 
fraternity- style hazing, or indentured servitude. In all of those analogs, 
victims are bound to perpetrators in such a way that the victims believe 
they have chosen to stay in dysfunctional relationships, when in reality 
they have been manipulated or coerced into them.”38 Within ensnaring 
relationships, care is lacking, yet leaving is hard. People on the cusp of 
escape are often ironically urged to slow down and wait it out, to take 
time and hold off on rash decisions. Exit barriers include peer pressure, 
anxieties about sunk costs, the lure of part- time (yet glass- ceilinged) 
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instruction, and an inability to envision or obtain satisfying alternatives 
to academic work.
Another significant deterrent— more sentimental than circum-
stantial— may be someone’s genuine love for scholarly work.39 Academ-
ics learn to care for one of academia’s most obvious goals: the fostering 
of learning. But is there really such a thing as just learning for learning’s 
sake? Are cravings for knowledge always self- justified? Do paths to truth 
ever come with unforeseen tolls?
Truth and Care
I see misplaced notions of aesthetic autonomy— misplaced Romanticism— 
impeding the writing of history. . . . It is all too obvious by now that teaching 
people that their love of Schubert makes them better people teaches them nothing 
more than self- regard, and inspires attitudes that are the very opposite of humane. 
There are— there must be— better reasons to cherish art.
— Richard Taruskin40
A dream come true, stay true to yourself, tell the truth and shame the 
devil— by most measures and idioms, truth is good, a sign of something 
veridical and verifiable. Scholars seek truth, even if the word or idea 
itself is taboo (too taut, too arrogant): instead of insisting our claims to 
be true as such, we call them timely, relevant, or interesting. Ambiva-
lence feels responsible and, for all its virtuosity, sounds humble. With 
admissions that certain truths may be unattainable or inexpressible, we 
submit narratives that work to enhance or revise collective wisdoms.41
Pursuits of truth have dark sides. Agendas of truthers (pushing 9/11 
conspiracy theories), birthers (demanding Barack Obama’s birth certifi-
cate), and deathers (insisting Osama bin Laden is alive) tend to upset 
the mainstream populace. On more personal levels, disclosures can be 
disgraceful and uncomfortable— for why else would the game Truth or 
Dare pose a quandary? We’re not always ready to acknowledge or share 
facts about ourselves, and we tell white lies to spare others’ feelings. Mor-
al and legal maxims say that truth can set us free, but, as Susan Brison 
reflects, there is also “something deadening about the requirement for 
truth.”42 A judicial process may demand a victim to restate ad nauseam 
the horrifying truths about a trauma she would rather forget. Attempts 
to get the truth out of a suspected criminal might lead interrogators 
to use and justify injurious techniques. Forcing loved ones to verbalize 
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the truths about their doubts and discontents can sink good relation-
ships without good cause. Truth, when mandated or coerced, isn’t freely 
given, and therefore not necessarily freeing.
If paranoid readings thirst for truth, reparative readings find satia-
tion elsewhere. For all of truth’s virtues, we can conceive of things no 
less important: love, for one; beauty, too. If we believe, as John Keats 
wrote, that beauty is truth, and truth beauty, then there’s no conflict 
of interest here. We might sense ineffable truths about the beauties we 
behold. A beautiful object invites replication, compelling us to draw it, 
photograph it, describe it, remix it, and retweet it in order to share it 
with more and more people who may in turn come to appreciate that, 
yes, this is beautiful, something about it rings true.43 Beauty, moreover, 
can complicate and illuminate our sense of self. It can move us to action, 
hopefully to do good. “It may even be the case,” muses Elaine Scarry, 
“that far from damaging our capacity to attend to problems of injus-
tice, [beauty] instead intensifies the pressure we feel to repair existing 
injuries.”44 Scarry offers this hypothesis to counter the presumption that 
“beauty, by preoccupying our attention, distracts attention from wrong 
social arrangements.”45 Yet there are cases in which, at least on the sur-
face, a fixation on beautiful objects seems partially responsible for the 
beholder’s neglect of justice and care. Recall the AMS audience member 
who, in Lydia Hamessley’s anecdote, stood up and proclaimed that the 
safety of female graduate students was not his problem. Is it possible he 
said this out of a belief that his concerns lay primarily in musicological 
truths and musical beauties?
Concepts of music’s aesthetic autonomy— that musical pieces can 
claim value apart from societal, political, and personal concerns— have 
in recent years become passé, synonymous with fuddy- duddy insularity 
and intellectual conservatism. In the 1990s, music’s alleged autonomy 
floundered against the rise of feminist and queer provocations. Predict-
ably, some people refused to get onboard these new trains of thought. 
Among the most notorious polemics came from Pieter van den Toorn, 
who criticized Susan McClary’s musical hermeneutics of gender and 
sex as advancing “ulterior motives” and “naked self- interest.”46 Van den 
Toorn, doubtful of women’s “self- proclaimed oppressed status,” insist-
ed that “arguments about sex and music are largely a form of propa-
ganda, an attempt to advertise blanket claims of special disadvantage 
and oppression which, in contemporary life in the West generally, are 
dubious and farfetched.”47 Van den Toorn’s tirade crescendoed toward 
an invective that feminists’ allegations of injustice and injury amounted 
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to self- victimizing bids for sympathetic attention. For all his keen ear- 
training as a music theorist, Van den Toorn heard the emphatic calls 
of feminism but didn’t think to listen for its silences (the discontents 
not voiced, the charges not filed, the muted wounds of women facing 
discrimination, battery, rape). With entire articles and books devoted 
to caesuras, Kundry, and 4′33′′, musicologists of all people know that 
silence speaks volumes. In a response to Van den Toorn, Ruth Solie 
asserted that we’re not dealing with rhetorical exercises or games of 
make- believe: “A reader might be tempted to seek refuge in amusement 
at the exactitude with which [Van den Toorn’s] rhetoric enacts the very 
rage and aggression he says he’s unfairly accused of. But there is no 
such refuge: on this side of the curtain it’s not an academic exercise. A 
female is raped every six minutes in this country. . . . Amidst the routine 
inequities and accepted aggressions of that culture, my welfare remains 
precarious, and so does the welfare of the students I teach— who are 
also women. If this is ‘naked self- interest,’ so be it.”48 Although this skir-
mish took place a quarter- century ago, its frictions remain relevant. A 
misogynist (or a one- in- five denier) would tell Solie that her reply cries 
rape, that such an appeal to real- world violations is a cheap trick in the 
courts of academia, a trump card to shut men up. But crises of sexual 
assault do continue to strike universities nationwide. Bonnie Gordon, 
writing about Rolling Stone’s controversial 2014 report of an alleged gang 
rape at the University of Virginia, observes that there can be “very vis-
ceral reasons” for teaching courses on music and gender.49 By critically 
reading rape in history and in musical texts, students acquire versatile 
“tools to identify the structures of patriarchal control that perpetuate 
rape culture and to exploit this knowledge in order to effect change.”50 
Classes on Claudio Monteverdi’s L’Arianna or Giovanni Battista Guarini’s 
L’Idropica, says Gordon, enable students to engage the disturbing narra-
tion and aesthetic presentation of nonconsensual sexual acts. If instruc-
tors and students are willing to go there— there, meaning beyond the 
sanitized conventions of polite pedagogy— even musical artifacts from 
long ago can impart urgent strategies for listening and speaking up.
If the idea of art for art’s sake is dead, our autopsy would show that 
it perished not simply from unrealistic ideals, ontological falsity, and 
hero worship, but also from its moral untenability.51 To my ears, aesthetic 
autonomy brings echoes of academic freedom. It’s not that they’re synony-
mous, but that recommendations of Let music be music bear injunctive 
similarities to Let scholars be scholars, the belief that academics have a right 
to pursue their work free from political pressures and without fear of ter-
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mination.52 Such freedom can nurture creative thought. But how can one 
ethically claim such extreme immunities without also attending to others’ extreme 
vulnerabilities? Scarry declares there’s nothing about being a scholar that 
exempts her from matters of justice. If anything, being a scholar “actual-
ly increases [her] obligation,” given her privileged capacity for research 
and her position to engage with and care for students.53 Scarry admits 
various impediments to reparative work, including “the difficulty of see-
ing an injury, the sense of futility of one’s own small efforts, the shame 
or embarrassment of acting, and the special difficulty of lifting complex 
ideas into the public space.”54 She concludes, however, that believing any 
issue to be a lost cause is never sufficient reason to waive duties as care-
givers and social agents.
In the wake of aesthetic autonomy, a fashionable rebranding of 
agency has flourished. Proponents of actor- network theory (ANT), thing 
theory, and object- oriented ontology nominate alternatives to anthropo-
centric models of effectivity and action.55 Everyday objects— computers, 
musical instruments, baseballs— are said to possess agency by virtue of 
having an impact on the world and its labors.56 This might sound at once 
progressive and regressive: progressive, because it poses an exciting chal-
lenge to human exceptionalism and egotism; regressive, because a vision 
of things coming to life already abounds in childhood fantasies and kids’ 
cartoons (think of the toys in Toy Story, the kitchenware in Sleeping Beauty, 
and the backpack in Dora the Explorer). ANT isn’t infantile, but it is, on 
some level, epistemologically playful. For adults, one question is whether 
these games of imagination are ethical. Just because we’re intellectually 
capable of theorizing the agencies of a yoga mat or a teddy bear, does 
this make it a morally expedient enterprise?
For ANT’s subscribers, attending to a plethora of implements and 
agents may enable us to understand better the power relations in the 
world. ANT, argues Bruno Latour, compels us to be “scrupulous in check-
ing whether power and domination are explained by the multiplicity of 
objects given a central role and transported by vehicles which should 
be empirically visible.”57 ANT anchors its conversations with materials, 
the gritty safety valves that preclude us from talking about authority and 
asymmetry in the abstract. For Richard Taruskin, however, a Latourian 
social world appears virtually anarchic. It is, he says, “a place I don’t want 
to live in. If guns are actors then it is they who kill people and we can 
empty our jails. . . . I don’t want anyone to have an alibi. I want actors to 
take responsibility, and I think it a waste of time to argue about whether 
a gun, a chanson, or a context is a responsible actor.”58 As with aesthetic 
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autonomy, ANT (especially in the eyes of people who read only a sum-
mary of it, or cherry- pick quotes without sufficient context) can come 
across as a wishful thought experiment, one that does not hold up in 
real- world courts where matters of life and death hang in the balance.
Some fans of ANT thus claim it to be ethically sound, while other 
(mis)interpreters somehow see the exact opposite, complaining that 
notions of nonliving agents are too weightless, too ethereal to sit on the 
scales of justice. This debate can be recalibrated by stressing one point. 
Taruskin states that, by attributing agency to nonconscious beings, “the 
concept of action is emptied of real meaning . . . to no good purpose.”59 
Good and purpose are key words. If, according to Latour, actors are entities 
that “make a difference,” our attention should linger on questions about 
the differences worth making.60 Rethinking human agency can do a lot 
of good. It can impugn social hierarchies, promote animal rights, and 
rectify the disempowering and dehumanizing representations of people 
who identify as disabled or queer. These are a few concrete examples 
of issues that stand to benefit from ANT’s reflexive critiques of actors 
(who), networks (who else), and theories (inquiries therefrom).
In his 2015 Dewey lecture, philosopher Peter Railton spoke about 
the academic imperatives of pursuing theories and truths. Toward the 
end of his talk, he disclosed his personal battles with depression. Depres-
sion, he said, cannot be fended off with sheer logic or “steely- eyed, care-
ful critique.”61 It can be crushing and its stigmatization equally so. “I 
know what has held me back all these years,” remarked Railton. “Would 
people think less of me? Would I seem to be tainted, reduced in their 
eyes, someone with an inner failing whom no one would want to hire or 
whom no one would want to marry or have children [with]? Would even 
friends start tip- toeing around my psyche? Would colleagues trust me 
with responsibility?”62 Railton acknowledged that his status as an estab-
lished scholar came with the privilege of mitigating some, though not 
all, of these anxieties. Yet, he continued, “Think how these questions 
can resonate in the mind of a depressed undergraduate or graduate stu-
dent, trying and failing to do his work, trying to earn the confidence 
and esteem of his teachers, worried what his friends and parents will 
think, afraid to show his face in the Department, struggling to find his 
first job. Will he feel free to come forward and ask for help?”63 Speak-
ing about one’s depression— like speaking about chronic pain, or about 
queerness or disability— can involve difficult processes of coming out. 
Railton’s words touch on a chief quandary of professionalism’s merito-
cratic logic. Scholars of high standing have relative freedom to divulge 
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personal ails without compromising job security, while junior scholars, 
whose careers remain contingent, are the ones who are urged to succeed 
by merit alone, to eschew first- person narratives, and to let their research 
do the talking (figure 2.1). In brief, those who may most desperately 
need to share private stories of self- doubt, vulnerability, and discrimina-
tion are the same people who are advised to leave identity politics behind 
and simply to work hard, keep their heads down, and try, try again.64 
I’m not sure what to call this. A bitter irony? A paradox? A necessary 
evil? In recent years, the Chronicle of Higher Education and similar outlets 
have increasingly featured articles about academics facing challenges of 
mental health. Given how, as one writer puts it, “academia promotes the 
blurring of lines between the personal and the professional,” scholars 
“are seldom trained in how to firmly draw that line and value themselves 
beyond their work.”65
How close do such issues need to hit home before we reach out to 
shelter others?
Celia Cain declares that disability, “visible or non- visible, is seen as 
ugly, malforming, queer.”66 The same could be said about depression 
and debility. “Our colleagues fear contagion,” says Cain. “We fear they 
smell weakness, so we remain hidden, speaking in whispers, silenced 
when the visibly healthy walk by. When caught, we downplay, dismiss 
and deny the centrality of pain or impairment in our lives— betrayed by 
survival instinct and our bodies. When else is ‘coming out’ seen as weak-
ness?”67 (Not usually when it comes to mainstream showcases of LGBTQ 
pride, as the next chapter soon shows.) Truth and care pose a false yet 
stubborn dichotomy in intellectual pursuits and in ideas of moral per-
sonhood. Maladies of academia inhere in the very question of whether a 
scholar’s physical and psychological well- being truly constitutes a matter 
of scholarship. Shouldn’t there be ways to determine an individual’s per-
sonhood beyond lines on a CV or apparent contributions to the field? 
Although curriculum vitae loosely translates to the course of my life, it can’t 
be the only course of life and livelihood worth caring about. Publish- or- 
perish models of career advancement insist that we prioritize mind over 
matter and, as Chomsky might say, production over people.68 Resisting 
this neoliberal mindset goes hand in hand with a radical commitment to 
reparative motions. It begins with finding truth in care, and with reevalu-
ating what really matters across efforts to sound good and to be heard.
These days, the advent of job wikis has created new arenas of con-
venient yet sometimes combative exchange. Wikis allow academics to 
post job listings, share updates, and comment anonymously. Many users 
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foster a tone of collegiality and even congratulate successful job recip-
ients; on other occasions, the websites break into venting and gossip. 
Complaints pertain to unethical hiring practices, the monetary expenses 
of applications (when, say, Interfolio is required), the underapprecia-
tion of (and systemic overreliance on) contingent faculty, and the sheer 
dearth of employment opportunities.69 Despondency, anger, and jeal-
ousy expectedly rear their heads and threaten to cast down the better 
angels of respect and generosity. Some users have even tried to discern 
and out others’ identities by tracing IP addresses or via deduction. Phil 
Gentry, in a blog post, bleakly described the 2009 Musicology Wiki expe-
rience as follows: “False rumors are spread willy- nilly, useful discussions 
are summarily (and anonymously) deleted. Job postings were hidden 
until after the deadline date. The nadir was when one anonymous par-
ticipant threatened to commit suicide if s/he didn’t find employment by 
year’s end. A few urged him or her to seek help, but really, what can you 
do?”70 To take Gentry’s important question seriously (and nonrhetori-
cally) is first to acknowledge that the apparent hopelessness of the col-
lective situation— What can we do?— does not, as Scarry would say, a priori 
exempt us from working toward solutions nonetheless. Emily Wilbourne 
was one of the people who reached out to the suicidal Wiki user. I’ve 
asked Emily if she could recall what she posted, since the 2009 Musi-
cology Wiki has been taken down and its contents are no longer view-
able online. She replied: “I imagine I just said [to this person] to talk to 
someone real (not a computer screen) and to remind themselves to dif-
Figure 2.1. Cards, sold on Etsy, intended for academics (notably graduate 
students). The card on the left reads, “I’m sorry you cried in front of your 
advisor,” while the one on the right reads, “Guh— Ah, so . . . I don’t know 
how to— Uh. Feelings, right?”
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ferentiate between a system that is constructed to grind up the people, 
and the other people who were subject to similar situations; that they 
weren’t alone, though it was easy to feel that way.”71 Emily’s gesture of 
care resonates with her reflections on the lessons imparted by her own 
mentor, Suzanne Cusick, who “has lent her ear and her time to countless 
peers and junior scholars, bending her considerable intellect to their 
problems.”72 Receiving care— knowing what it feels like and sensing the 
difference it makes— can serve as a significant impetus for showing care 
in turn and paying things forward.
In the face of job market meltdowns, financial need, professional 
strife, and outright pain, declarations of support— especially when post-
ed online by anonymous colleagues (many of whom are competing for 
the same pool of scarce resources)— may not sound helpful or sincere 
enough. Strangers who voice care are trying to do good, but no one 
can guarantee that it gets better. Indeed, paranoid conventions of criti-
cism have given academics, as much as anyone, cause to be suspicious 
of optimism and optimistic endeavors, such as the famous It Gets Bet-
ter Project aimed at queer youths. Hope, like care, can itself feel queer 
because it doesn’t traffic normatively in reason or hard evidence. As far 
as reparative affects go, hope is simultaneously a misfit and a necessity 
in moments of gravest precarity. How does someone stay hopeful when 
facing a stark absence of justifications for staying at all (staying in a pro-
fession, staying in difficult relationships, staying alive)? As good as hope 
sounds, what are we left with when its tune starts to crack?
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Chapter 3
How Hopeful the Queer
✦ ✦ ✦
Many trauma survivors who endured much worse than I did, and for much 
longer, found, often years later, that it was impossible to go on. It is not a moral 
failing to leave a world that has become morally unacceptable. I wonder how 
some can ask, of battered women, “Why didn’t they leave?” while saying, of those 




Midway through my freshman year of college, a gay friend of mine (let’s 
call him Jerry) decided to throw a series of coming- out parties. These 
weren’t parties for gay- identified individuals; they were for dormmates 
he believed to be gay, but who had not confirmed this to be the case. 
Armed with noisemakers and snacks, Jerry rounded up peers decked 
out in bright costumes. The group would march into someone’s room 
and yell, “Welcome!” The first party supposedly went well: the honoree 
enjoyed the attention and playfully asked if he was so obvious. The sec-
ond party didn’t happen: the person, it turned out, was gay- friendly but 
not gay, and casually waved off the undeserved festivity.
The third party was a disaster. I know this because I was there, eager 
to see what all the ruckus was about.
You can guess what went wrong. Although the guest of honor might 
have been gay, he definitely wasn’t ready to come out. This fêted young 
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man, eyes wide with horror, said nothing. Here’s how one of my friends 
remembers it (I reached out to her for factual corroboration):
[Jerry] had written a song for the occasion. I remember the refrain, 
“Hey, hey, hey, we’re so glad you’ve got some gaaaaaaaaay in you.” I 
recall him doing a dance that only he could do . . . arms waving slowly, 
eyes half closed, legs proceeding in a run- hop- run sort of pattern. I 
recall [another dormmate] was standing right behind him. She kept 
tapping him on the shoulder, saying, “Hey, maybe he doesn’t want 
to celebrate right now?!” Then I recall how you pulled [Jerry] back-
wards out the door, pinching the back of his “shirt,” a towel that he’d 
wrapped around himself along with streamers and Mardi Gras beads.2
Following the song and dance (which I’ve apparently blocked out of my 
memory), a painful awkwardness ensued. After what felt like minutes of 
frozen stares, I remember that Jerry bolted, beads jingling as he beelined 
for an exit at the end of the hall. The rest of us mumbled apologies, then 
shuffled away in silence.
A simple gloss of this encounter would report a collision between gay 
pride and gay shame. A bunch of out- and- proud, loud, musical freshmen 
ambushed a potentially closeted dormmate who, throughout the con-
frontation, stayed mute out of shame. Yet we, the queer posse, became 
ashamed in equal measure, disgraced and penitent for turning an exer-
cise in good- humored recruitment into a crisis of forced conscription. 
Word got out that a group of hooting queens was going around East 
Florence Moore Hall kicking down people’s doors— news that must have 
caused some people considerable paranoia.
But there was no need to sound the alarm, for the group disbanded 
immediately after the embarrassing incident. Beads and noisemakers 
and rainbow scarves were stuffed back into closets or tossed out alto-
gether, forfeit reminders of pride turned pitiful.
Hoping against Hope
Even Adorno, the great belittler of popular pleasures, can be aghast at the ease 
with which intellectuals shit on people who hold on to a dream.
— Lauren Berlant3
In queer life, paranoid and reparative drives remain odd bedfellows. 
“Even aside from the prestige that now attaches to a hermeneutics of sus-
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picion in critical theory as a whole,” noted Eve Sedgwick, “queer studies 
in particular has had a distinctive history of intimacy with the paranoid 
imperative.”4 For good reason: closeted individuals live in anxiety of 
being found out, while those who are out still face pressures of fitting in. 
On the other side of the rainbow, homophobes stew in panic about the 
great gay agenda, whether it’s same- sex marriage’s assault on traditional 
family values or, as Nadine Hubbs points out, the bigoted rumors in the 
twentieth century about a “gay mafia” ruling American classical music.5 
Paranoid motives also summed up Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. The defunct 
policy’s semantic symmetry (two pithy words on each side of the comma) 
spun cruel poetry, a flimsy Band- Aid tendering a win- win solution under 
the fair swap of I won’t show you mine if you don’t show me yours.
In 1968, one year before the Stonewall Riots, the Journal of Health 
and Social Behavior published an article called “Paranoia, Homosexual-
ity and Game Theory.” The authors, sociologists Marvin Scott and Stan-
ford Lyman, proposed that “[homosexuals] may come to see all or part 
of their world in terms of a conspiracy in which they must constantly 
be on guard against physical or financial harm, exploitation, or loss of 
status.  .  .  . The paranoid explores, in game- theoretic fashion, the pos-
sibilities of all encounters.”6 As retrograde as this article sounds in its 
terminology and sensibilities, the authors’ framework of game theory 
remains intriguing. Paranoid individuals indeed seek strategic defenses 
in the face of plausible precarity. By performing “emotional eavesdrop-
ping” on people around them— by seeking a hyperawareness of what 
others know— paranoiacs work to separate friend from foe.7 Although 
Scott and Lyman did not cite Sigmund Freud, their views resonate with 
this psychoanalyst’s sweeping hypothesis that paranoid delusions spring 
from repressed homosexual desires.8 Game theory aside, think of the 
various games at play in queer dealings more generally: guessing games 
(is he or isn’t he), reindeer games (activities predicated on exclusion and 
oppression), and language games (ciphers and circumlocutions that 
pussyfoot around the giant peacock in the room). These games aren’t 
just for laughs. Depending on the playing field, grievous penalties await.
Amid queer tensions, reparative affects are a hard sell in academic 
perspectives. Negativity, cynicism, antinormativity, and antifuturity come 
more easily, with promises of deconstructionist vigor and political vigi-
lance.9 In a book on queerness and social class, Lisa Henderson points 
to queer studies’ “near- ubiquitous” reliance on paranoid readings, which 
offer “negativity as truth and the exposure of textual or social violence 
as grail.”10 Cumulatively, there’s far more theorization of gay shame than 
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of gay pride, with the latter relegated to, as Alice Kuzniar describes, 
“something almost to be embarrassed about,” or at least, something 
that doesn’t have to be written about (figure 3.1).11 One explanation 
for queer theory’s allergy to pride may be that pride doesn’t seem to 
need critical excavation to begin with. Unlike shame and its sexy covert 
essences, pride is already bombastically out there in the rainbow stripes, 
campy music, and parades where freak flags fly.
In 2007, the year I entered graduate school, an LGBTQ group called 
the Welcoming Committee launched an experiment by the name of 
Guerrilla Queer Bar (GQB) in the Greater Boston area. At the beginning 
of each month, organizers used social media to announce a planned 
takeover of an establishment. It began with bars and nightclubs: queers 
would show up en masse and turn the heterosexual majority on its head. 
If you got to the bar early in the evening, you could observe the regular 
crowd growing visibly confused about the steady trickle of gays onto the 
scene. The Welcoming Committee has since spread to ten U.S. cities and 
diversified its venues, hosting outings to sports games (Fengay Park), 
casinos, ski resorts, and Bette Midler concerts (where admittedly GQB’s 
efforts are unnecessary). Although its events push for queer visibility, the 
Welcoming Committee doesn’t frame its agenda in political terms.12 “It’s 
not a protest— it’s a party,” declares the GQB homepage. “Is it aggres-
sive? No. Is it awesome? Yes.”13 GQB’s message takes pride as a given, 
then proceeds to insist that gays just want to have fun.14
In recent years, authors have begun building up optimism and uto-
pianism as rubrics of queer critique. It has been an uphill battle. “Opti-
mism’s very sanguinity,” Michael Snediker says, “implies epistemological 
deficit.”15 Or, according to José Esteban Muñoz: “Shouting down uto-
pia is an easy move. . . . The antiutopian critic of today has a well- worn 
war chest of poststructuralist pieties at her or his disposal to shut down 
lines of thought that delineate the concept of critical utopianism. Social 
theory that invokes the concept of utopia has always been vulnerable 
to charges of naiveté, impracticality, or lack of rigor.”16 Granted, posi-
tivity is by no means simple, nor is it the exclusive orientation of the 
allegedly simple- minded. As Snediker and Sara Ahmed point out, opti-
mism is “interesting” in the way it gestures toward (yet necessarily fails 
to promise) happiness.17 Optimism, explains Lauren Berlant, can also 
be “cruel” when “something you desire is actually an obstacle to your 
flourishing.”18 Berlant goes on to ask: “Why do people stay attached to 
conventional good- life fantasies— say, of enduring reciprocity in couples, 
families, political systems, institutions, markets, and at work— when the 
Figure 3.1. My friend Michaela Bronstein brought this to my attention: the 
Harvard library bookplate for Heather Love’s Feeling Backward: Loss and 
the Politics of Queer History specifies a fund “to portray a positive image 
of homosexuality and gay men and gay women”— which is by no means 
what Love, in her rigorous book, straightforwardly portrays. In an email 
exchange, Michaela remarked how she saw this as an example of a “clash 
between academic paranoia and institutional optimism.”
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evidence of their instability, fragility, and dear cost abounds?”19 Con-
versely, I have asked in Just Vibrations why people who have it pretty good 
might nevertheless anticipate, in paranoid and pessimistic fashion, the 
loss of present peace, obsessing over future adversity and the finitude of 
all good things. In the end, if reparative affects are elusive in queer theo-
ry and in criticism more generally, maybe it’s because they hide in plain 
sight. Much of queer theory is queer pride insofar as it contributes to 
compassionate understandings of diversity, tolerance, and justice, albeit 
via gloomy and tortuous avenues of inquiry. Pride pops up between the 
lines. Put another way, positives already tend to reside in the photonega-
tives of critical production.
For an overt example of reparative work outside academia, consider 
the crowdsourced It Gets Better Project (IGBP), initiated by Dan Savage 
and Terry Miller in September 2010 as a response to the suicides of bul-
lied youths who were gay (or were suspected as much by their peers). 
Aiming to deter self- harm, the project amassed thousands of video con-
tributions from celebrities, public officials, and ordinary people testify-
ing that life improves after high school. The project sounded unabash-
edly promissory in its reparative agenda. Personal testimonies that it 
got better (from people who had overcome adversity in their own lives) 
slipped into general assurances that it gets better. Although some contrib-
utors admitted that fortune can be fickle, most messages were unequivo-
cal in their vows of greener pastures. IGBP’s tone of certainty presum-
ably aspired to maximize pride and uplift. According to this logic, what 
dejected youths needed was faith (things will get better), not reality or 
ambivalence (things might get better). By using the impersonal pronoun 
“it” as the subject, the slogan also painted bright futures as foregone con-
clusions rather than as points of personal or collective responsibility— “It 
gets better” in place of, say, “Make it better.”
Academic responses to IGBP came fast and, in some cases, furious. 
Scholars homed in on the project’s implicit inscriptions of white, male, 
and cis hegemony and the elisions of racial, ethnic, and class issues. 
Jumping off the insights of Tavia Nyong’o, Jasbir Puar described Sav-
age’s motto as a sanctimonious “mandate to fold oneself into urban, neo-
liberal gay enclaves: a call to upward mobility.”20 Such mobility remains 
more feasible for someone like Savage, who is “able- bodied, monied, 
confident, well- travelled, suitably partnered,” than for “queer people of 
colour, trans, genderqueer and gender nonconforming youth, and lesbi-
ans.”21 The gist of these disclaimers is that, for some privileged people, it 
gets better better, while for others, it doesn’t get better at all. But although 
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it’s painfully true that life can get worse, IGBP wasn’t concerned with 
truth. Its purposes were foremost to offer selective care and to buy time. 
As with any politics of optimism, the project was epistemically treacher-
ous yet pragmatically vital. And to the credit of the paperback anthol-
ogy for IGBP, the editors include stories by diverse authors. Some stories 
even show flashes of skepticism about the viability of optimism, but, for 
better or for worse (that is the question), typically land on the sunnier 
side of hope. Here are a few excerpts from the anthology:
Jennifer Finney Boylan: It’s hard to be gay, or lesbian. To be trans 
can be even harder. There have been plenty of times when I’ve 
lost hope. . . . Some of the people I most expected to lose, when 
I came out as trans, turned out to be loving, and compassionate, 
and kind.22
Alex R. Orue (translated from Spanish): I’m a nineteen- year- 
old, Latino gay guy from Mexico City.  .  .  . I’d always gotten the 
message that being gay was wrong. That it was evil. That it was an 
illness.  .  .  . Eventually you’ll find that person that will make you 
happy and whom you’ll make happy, too. But for that to happen, 
you gotta hold on.23
Gabrielle Rivera: As a gay woman of color, I just want to let the 
youth know that it kind of doesn’t get better. All these straight, 
rich celebrities, I’m not even going to name them, they can tell 
you that it gets better because they’ve got money and people don’t 
care what they do. . . . So, do I say it gets easier? No, but you get 
stronger. And you get more beautiful. And you believe in yourself 
harder.24
Mark Ramirez (translated from American Sign Language): 
I lost my hearing when I was nine years old. We don’t know exactly 
how it happened, maybe nerve damage, but it did.  .  .  . I got 
suspended from school for participating in sexual activities with 
another male. . . . If you stand strong, be who you are, and know 
that even though people might not support you now, the days only 
get brighter if you believe in yourself.25
Reading these stories, I think back to my own angsty adolescence and 
wonder whether a viral sensation such as IGBP would have given me 
heart. No, I wouldn’t have been able to relate to Dan Savage any more 
easily than I could to the Fab Five on Queer Eye. But I might have gone 
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searching for videos featuring Asian immigrants, for example, in hopes 
that someone might lend advice on how to come out to traditional Tai-
wanese parents. At age eighteen, I told my parents I was gay and got a 
serving of full- on denial. For the next four years, my mother sporadi-
cally pleaded and bargained with me, asking what it would take for me 
to straighten up. I saw before me the arduous task of extinguishing her 
grim wish day by day. Her optimism felt cruel. So I asked my girl friends 
to stop calling the home phone, explaining to them that if my mother 
picked up and heard their voices, she would convince herself that lady 
suitors were on the line. I also asked these friends, after evenings out, 
to drop me off a few blocks from my house so that my parents wouldn’t 
see us in the car together and get wrong ideas. Some of these games 
may sound childish and paranoid, but at the time, the battle felt heart-
breaking and unwinnable. Seeing my sexuality as a repairable illness, my 
parents prayed for me to get better. So it was me versus them, hope against 
hope. From my perspective, I alone had the right to hope; they had to let 
theirs go. Eventually, they did, through blunt dialogue and raised voices 
and tears and work. Today, my parents are hoping tenfold for something 
different: for my chronic pain condition to resolve, for things to get bet-
ter where it matters.
In an essay titled “It Gets Worse . . . ,” Jack Halberstam calls out IGBP’s 
toxic masculinities and whitewashed sermonizing. Not all gay youth sui-
cides, Halberstam adds, result definitively from despair about gayness. 
Halberstam’s criticisms build toward an all- out indictment of the project: 
“The touchy- feely notion embraced by this video campaign that teens 
can be pulled back from the brink of self- destruction by taped messages 
made by impossibly good looking and successful people smugly recount-
ing the highlights of their fabulous lives is just PR for the status quo. . . . 
By all means make cute videos about you and your boyfriend, but don’t 
justify the self- indulgence by imagining you are saving a life.”26 In a para-
noid reading of IGBP, Halberstam slams its schmaltzy, gallant ventures 
at repair, presuming self- centered motives and ineffectual efforts. Of 
course, most people who recorded videos for IGBP were imagining pre-
cisely that they could save a life, and my guess is that several lives were 
indeed bettered as a result. For that matter, if Halberstam or Puar or 
Nyong’o had made their own It Gets Better videos, in which they tried 
to queer IGBP by speaking about the project’s problematic normativities 
(and reflecting on their personal challenging paths toward becoming 
influential queer theorists and educators), their messages might have 
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reached receptive ears as well— maybe the ears of despondent high 
school or college students eager to engage queerness radically, critically, 
and colorfully.
But scholars by and large did not record videos for IGBP. I, for one, 
didn’t think to do so. Based on academics’ quotes above, you might assume 
this owed primarily to elitism (we know better) and ivory tower insularity. 
But I believe the answer is more complex. I believe there’s a worry that 
hope weakens critical inquiry— that when we cling to dreams, we slacken 
our grips on the darker realities of why hope is never enough. IGBP, for 
all its imperfections, helped some people. But perhaps it’s always too 
soon to celebrate, because for so many left unsaved, it was too late. So 
first, we mourn: we remind ourselves that all lives are grievable.27 Then, 
we dare to hope, recognizing that not good enough (critique’s impulse) 
shouldn’t have to mean not good at all. The bar isn’t always blanket revolu-
tion. Sometimes, things have to begin with patchwork repair, little efforts 
sewn together to cover those most vulnerable, as many as we can.
A common problem with demanding strength is how it implicitly 
dumps the onus of survival and flourishing on the individual— whether 
it’s enjoining queer kids to tough it out, or telling a chronic pain patient 
or underemployed instructor to hang in there, or mandating preemptive 
resiliency training in the U.S. Army so that returning veterans with post- 
traumatic stress disorder or physical injuries are less likely to ask for help 
and resources.28 It gets better— as mere mantra, as just vibrations— can’t 
always make good on its promises. Yet are the battle lines between camps 
like IGBP and academic skepticism necessary? Are they overdrawn? A do- 
it- yourself maker of an It Gets Better video and a scholar of postcolonial 
queer- of- color critique might not care much for (or even know much 
about) each other. These respective labors, however, depend on each 
other. They need to be held in tension and held mutually accountable, 
but one doesn’t need, in neoliberal fashion, to co- opt or cannibalize its 
counterpart.
Academics have legitimate reasons to feel disempowered by the 
thought that someone’s five- minute It Gets Better video could achieve 
more immediate results than a five- hundred- page monograph with a 
university press. As scholars lambast the pomp and pretentiousness of 
IGBP, they’re led to grapple with their own feelings of helplessness in 
facing youth suicides and other crises. In the end, the operative affect 
behind scholars’ heated reactions against IGBP is not, as I hear it, resent-
ment or rage. It is anguish, a hope to hope, slipping all the while. No 
guarantees, no happily- ever- afters. Yet the overwhelming magnitude of 
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any reparative task doesn’t release us from trying. It simply means we 
try that much harder, in more ways than one, hoping against hope that 
some good can come to pass.
How to Sound Musicological
There’s nothing like music to teach you that eventually if you work hard enough, 
it does get better. You see the results.
— Chuck Todd29
All musicians, we must remember, are faggots in the parlance of the male locker 
room.
— Philip Brett30
Since the 1990s, feelings of pride and duty have driven musicologists 
toward queer topics. But especially in cases of classical composers, 
researchers have not typically positioned pride itself as an explicit affec-
tive locus in their work. Musicologists have tended to focus instead on 
aesthetic traces of passing and sublimation, from Handel’s psyche to 
Tchaikovsky’s angst, from Ravel’s repression to Elgar’s secrets.31 Although 
sorting out musical codes and closets served reparative agendas (reme-
dying prior silences), pioneers of this work faced their own share of para-
noia.32 Early scholars of queer musicology had to brace themselves for 
resistance and ridicule, worrying about reputation, employment, tenure, 
and professional adversity. Yet even with all of these risks, musicologists 
went around pinning postmortem rainbow badges onto canonical com-
posers, thanking them (with elaborate hermeneutic tributes) for their 
brave service in the trenches of the creative arts.
Both homosexuality and musicality, as Philip Brett memorably noted, 
can connote deviance. For gay youths who “often experience a shutdown 
of all feeling as the result of sensing their parents’ and society’s disap-
proval of a basic part of their sentient life, music appears as a veritable 
lifeline.”33 This rings true to my own experience. On the one hand, my 
musicianship made me vulnerable to accusations of homosexuality: in 
school, I was called a fag or fairy on some occasions, though my male 
flutist friends got it worse. On the other hand, being a musician offered 
perfect plausible deniability. I could sound out gaily on the ivories while 
insisting that this is simply the way you play piano— just sounds, just vibra-
tions, none of it admissible evidence in the court of bullies.34 If people 
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further assumed I took lessons due to pressure from a tigerish Asian 
mom, then I had license to play as queerly as I wanted (arch my wrists, 
trill with pinkies up), leaving no one the wiser.
At a 2014 conference in Milwaukee (jointly for the American Musico-
logical Society and the Society for Music Theory), a session titled “Queer 
Music Theory” ruffled feathers when multiple presenters began harping 
on a common theme: that maybe music theory, particularly music for-
malism, has been queer for some time, certainly far queerer than its own 
early snipes at gay and lesbian musicology would suggest. The panelist 
Roger Mathew Grant remarked that it is not just the “play with surface 
and depth, visibility and invisibility that formalist music analysis shares 
with gay identity,” but that such “contemplation of art and pure form 
is also characteristic of the queer dandy, whose careful self- stylization 
and meticulous control over details allowed him to exist in a universe 
somehow distant from and untouched by the concerns of the surround-
ing quotidian world. Music theory’s world was and still is somewhat like 
this: rarefied, out- of- touch, completely obsessed with nuance, style, and 
form.”35 Gay sensibilities resonate in formalism’s doting demeanor and 
curatorial approaches to music.36 Analyses show careful labor, proof of 
effort and devotion. In this sense, music analysis can appear precious, 
even sentimental, belying its reputation as a severe and domineering 
task, a form of strong theory with a high barrier of intellectual entry. At 
the same Milwaukee panel, Judith Peraino stressed how music theory 
articles almost ubiquitously depend on the device of the reduction— 
Schenkerian, neo- Riemannian, and set theory diagrams that distill 
musical pieces into daunting lines and figures.37 Reductions jibe with 
paranoid readings in that both boast command over the text at hand, 
decrypting and reencrypting it via feats of interpretative and rhetorical 
prowess. A reduction can disorient certain readers not least by how it 
enfolds, distorts, and deconstructs the time frames and proportions of 
the original musical composition. Just as queer critics have lately rolled 
out sophisticated theories of futurity, asynchrony, and temporality, so 
music theory, Peraino observed, has relied on such time- bending devices 
for over a century.38
Given the troubled history between music theory and queer musicol-
ogy, it’s easy to find gratification and even glee in taking shots at the for-
mer’s own queer tendencies. It’s the same kind of satisfaction that some 
people derive from outing homophobic politicians who get caught tap-
ping their feet under restroom stalls at airports, or from peeling back the 
veiled homoeroticism of slur- saturated rap lyrics.39 Crying hypocrite is a 
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national pastime. Go watch some reruns of the Daily Show or the Colbert 
Report, and you can see how most punch lines hinge on the faux pas and 
dry humor of hypocrisy in the news. But is the point really to fight fire 
with fire, to drum up paranoia through accusations of self- loathing? Or 
is it to recognize how insecurities drive us all to make mistakes from time 
to time, and then to find ways forward across bridges worth repairing?
From the AMS 2014 conference in Milwaukee, rewind one year to 
AMS 2013 in Pittsburgh, where an evening session for the LGBTQ Study 
Group welcomed the prominent scholar David Halperin. The session 
was called “How to Sound Gay,” and the abstract read: “Halperin and 
[Ryan] Dohoney will discuss the broad range of musical influences and 
implications of Halperin’s most recent book, How to Be Gay, including 
the role of music in the formation of LGBTQ cultures, sound’s ability to 
produce queer affect, and the role music plays in both queer identity- 
formation and dissolution.”40 Although the session drew a large and 
enthusiastic crowd, the mood of the room began to waver as the evening 
wore on, partly for one odd reason: despite How to Be Gay’s frank discus-
sions of gay countertenors, opera queens, and Broadway musicals’ queer 
appeal, Halperin (who teaches in an English department) insisted to 
the audience over and over again that he was not a musicologist.41 He 
said so virtually every time he was asked by Dohoney (who remained 
deferential and patient throughout) about the musical dimensions of 
performance, gesture, and song. These repeated disavowals of disciplin-
ary affiliation came to sound both comical and confusing. On the one 
hand, Halperin was replicating the identity games of the closet, produc-
ing queer resonances between ashamed claims of not gay! and cautious 
pronouncements of not a musicologist! On the other hand, Halperin, 
though far outnumbered at the event by scholars of a certain musical 
persuasion, voiced abject disclaimers that queered musicology itself— 
presuming musicology to be an Other, a camp resistant to newcomers 
who don’t fit the part. Halperin’s hemming and hawing ultimately led 
Emily Wilbourne from the audience to stand up and declare that, on 
behalf of her colleagues, she dubs him a musicologist. The beknighting 
drew chuckles and applause. Heather Hadlock recalls the moment:
Emily W made a final comment in which she granted Halperin the 
title and status of “musicologist” because he has written interesting 
things about music.  .  .  . She recalled a conversation with a scholar 
in theater studies, where she referred to Wayne Koestenbaum as a 
musicologist and the theater scholar said, “Koestenbaum’s not a musi-
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cologist,” and Emily said, “Sure he is, he’s written about opera and I 
read him in musicology seminars,” and the theater scholar said some-
thing to the effect that Koestenbaum’s writing doesn’t have musical 
examples, ergo Not Musicologist.  This seemed like a self- evidently 
silly criterion, and got a big laugh.42
Is a lack of technical musical know- how enough to disqualify some-
one from claiming musicological identity? Perhaps not, yet Halperin’s 
song and dance made him appear as if he feared speaking to a room of 
music- analytical wizards who would condemn him for the slightest slip 
in vocabulary or aesthetic judgment. Halperin, in short, evinced para-
noia about sounding bad (musicologically) and being shamed by people 
(musicologists) he wouldn’t call his own.43 The original aims of this AMS 
session went off the rails through Halperin’s discomfort with musicologi-
cal affinity, but this queer failure broached valuable issues nonetheless. 
How does one sound musicological? And who’s to judge?
Rewind again, this time two more decades, to a musicological con-
troversy that pitted paranoia against repair: the inquisition of Franz 
Schubert’s sexuality.44 The question went unresolved. No one managed 
to forge a historicist or hermeneutic silver bullet to establish Schubert’s 
orientation one way or the other— which was the takeaway lesson. The 
whole affair exposed the means, stakes, and risks of music exegesis. 
Alongside contemporaneous studies in critical musicology, the kerfuffle 
around Schubert alerted the community to the importance of rhetori-
cal nuance. With expansive vocabularies and theoretical toolkits, judi-
cious scholars have since learned to lead with abundant disclaimers 
about music’s semantic promiscuity and the contingencies of interpre-
tive frameworks, taking care not to overtax or overdetermine a musical 
work’s evidentiary capacity.
Susan McClary penned some of the most high- profile contributions 
regarding Schubert’s sexuality and subjectivity.45 Apart from the bat-
tles that McClary’s work stoked in academic circles, Marcia Citron has 
described its curious reception in her own undergraduate classroom. I 
quote Citron’s illuminating anecdote at length:
Each year in the survey of [classical] and romantic music that I teach 
to sophomore- level music majors, we read Susan McClary’s article on 
Schubert’s “Unfinished” Symphony. . . . With considerable contextu-
alization and explanation, McClary suggests that such a narrative [in 
the second movement] might reflect an alternative sexual identity on 
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the part of the composer. She is careful to explain that this is not an 
essentialist relationship; she sets it up as a possibility. McClary also 
provides background by relating the fiasco of having presented this 
hypothesis at a [1992] Schubert symposium at the 92nd St. Y in New 
York, and of its disastrous reception at the time and in print: snide 
comments in the ladies’ room and the question session after the pre-
sentation, and the mocking post- mortems in the New York Times. As 
for my music history class, this is our first foray into gendered analy-
sis, and one reason I choose the essay is because of its care in fram-
ing contentious issues. So imagine my surprise when, at least twice in 
recent years, the reaction to the article is something like, “Just say it! 
If you mean that Schubert was gay, and that’s what’s coming across 
in his music, then don’t apologize for it. Don’t bring all these other 
issues into it.” .  .  . Now, these are very smart students and excellent 
musicians, and they’re not just blowing off steam or a historical mind-
set. No— they value it. But I think they’re annoyed with the sensibil-
ity behind the arguments. They don’t want what they see as fudging; 
they’re ready to hear a direct call and seem to respect this approach 
more— or at least think they respect it more.46
What can be more disheartening and paranoia- inducing than overhear-
ing “snide comments in the ladies’ room” about one’s research, like a 
scene straight out of Mean Girls?47 What better demonstration of how 
schoolyard bullying and petty gossip snake their way into adulthood? 
McClary’s project was caught in a double bind from the start. Some of 
Citron’s students were frustrated by the caution that McClary displayed, 
preferring that she not dance around what they took to be the point of 
her article— namely, the outing of Schubert through musical analysis. 
They wanted her to “just say it” (do ask, do tell). From the opposite cor-
ner, McClary’s professional detractors— those with rigid attachments to a 
heterosexual, masculine image of Schubert— wanted her to refrain from 
saying “it” (gay) at all, no matter how deft the euphemisms and rhetorical 
choreography. For some homophobes, even insinuation was too much. 
On the topic of Schubert and sexuality, the only acceptable stance was 
silence.48 Let music be music (or Let Schubert be Schubert), they’d argue— it’s 
just music, just vibrations; to which an activist might respond, Not until 
you let gays be gays (or, perhaps, Not until you let Schubert be Schubert).
Just say it, don’t say it: a no- win, can’t- please- everyone situation. Unfor-
tunate, but also unsurprising given that there are no real winners when 
paranoia is in play. Suspicion begets more suspicion, more defensive for-
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mations, and more ping- ponging of negative affects. To sail into repara-
tive horizons is to get out of this game for a moment and to explore what 
lies outside its vicious magic circle. Because within this circle, good is 
scarce. Media reports often emphasize how youth suicides result from 
shame, humiliation, and bullying. Comparable emotions and offenses 
come up in academic exchanges, albeit with less (or, one could say, few-
er) tragic consequences. Following the terminologies of psychologist Sil-
van Tomkins, Sedgwick used the label “humiliation theory” as another 
name for “strong theory.”49 Proceeding from paranoid motives, humili-
ation theory is “monopolistic” in its aim to ward off contradictions, and 
can “snowball” in its aspirations to colonize larger and larger swaths of 
epistemic terrain.50 Authors wield humiliation theories to avoid being 
humiliated by others’ criticisms. In the process, this writing might humil-
iate peers and predecessors so as to seize an intellectual high ground.51 
Conventional wisdom tells us that bullies might bully because they have 
themselves been bullied (either at school or at home), and that they join 
in bullying to escape being bullied.52 Adversariality in scholarship isn’t so 
different. Sometimes it can feel like the only option to avoid being prey 
is to play predator.
Hitting Close to Home (A Parable)
In this era of viral publicity, bullies morph into the bullied and back again with 
dizzying speed. We feel constantly pushed around and always on our last nerve.
— Tavia Nyong’o53
In an episode titled “Bully” from season 1 of the dramedy Louie, the pro-
tagonist (played by comedian Louis C.K.) goes to a New York diner with 
a date. Rowdy teenagers nearby start making noise, and Louie, unable 
to carry on a conversation, yells, “Guys! Can you keep it down, please? 
Thank you.” Moments later, one of these teens, knuckles bruised and face 
scarred, comes over to Louie’s table. He asks Louie when he last had 
his ass kicked, then asks if he’s scared. Louie says no, because he’s “a 
grown man” and “not afraid of some young kid, some high- school bully.” 
But as the teen escalates his threats, Louie grows visibly nervous about 
whether it’s just empty words. The teen says if Louie asks him nicely, 
maybe he won’t get beaten up. Facing a choice between pride and physi-
cal self- preservation, Louie mumbles: “Please don’t kick my ass, okay?” 
The amused teens take off, leaving Louie to sort out the aftermath of 
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emasculation with his date, who, throughout the ordeal, wore a mixed 
expression of disbelief and exasperation.
The story doesn’t end here. After parting ways with his turned- off lady 
friend, Louie catches sight of the teen bully at a subway entrance and, for 
whatever reason, follows him all the way to his house in New Jersey. Lou-
ie goes into the house and confronts the parents, tattling on this teen’s 
misdeeds. The father summons his son and, when he appears, begins to 
beat him. Louie immediately intervenes. “Stop hitting him! How do you 
think he turned out like this?” Louie exclaims to the dad. “You teach him 
to just hit people; what was he gonna be but a stupid bully? I mean, you 
never gave him a chance!” In a sardonic turn, the teen’s mother takes 
offense and goes after Louie for telling her how to raise her child. She 
calls Louie an “Obama- loving faggot” and chases him out of the house 
while smacking his head.
But against all odds, the scene ends with a whiff of repair. The boy’s 
father comes out of the house to see Louie, and the two smoke some 
cigarettes. They engage in calm, honest conversation. In response to 
Louie’s exhortation against spanking children, the father says: “Well, 
that’s what I know. My dad hit me, and his dad him.” The two men sit on 
the front stoop, swap more stories, then fall silent. The only sound that 
lingers is the wail of a distant siren.
Moments from this Louie episode capture many of the dilemmas 
born of bullying: the troubled teen’s use of brute intimidation; Louie’s 
feminized passivity (cowering in the diner) and exceptionally proactive 
gesture thereafter (following the boy home); the mother’s wholesale 
rejection of criticism and use of a politicized gay slur; and the father’s 
revelation of systemic violence. These are the sorts of concerns that rip-
ple through queer life, academic toils, and everyday precarities. Even 
more revealing is how the episode ends on the front steps of a house, 
on the physical and symbolic threshold of a residence. Moral and behav-
ioral lessons, this closing scene conveys, may begin and end at home, 
and yet, according to the teen’s abusive domestic life, not all homes feel 
safe. For scholars who consider musicology their disciplinary home turf, 
business might proceed as usual until a guest like David Halperin invites 
reconsiderations of what real and imagined boundaries circumscribe the 
field. For homeless queer youths whose voices and lives remain under-
addressed by well- meaning projects such as It Gets Better, hope alone 
isn’t enough. Trans people, people with disabilities, and others who face 
stigmatization might not always feel at home in societies or even in their 
own bodies. So I repeat verbatim a question posed in the previous chap-
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ter when I quoted Peter Railton’s reflections on depression, interper-
sonal responsibility, and the life of the mind: How close do issues need 
to hit home before we reach out to shelter others?
A musicological ear, by way of a final note, can read more deeply into 
how the Louie episode ends with the sound of a siren in the distance. In 
television shows and movies, sirens are a common sound effect, typically 
used (alongside honks of cars and general buzz of traffic) to delineate 
an urban, maybe disorderly, setting. But when we hear a siren in the 
real world, we rarely process it as just background noise. Whether we’re 
inside our house or at school or on the road, a siren compels us to won-
der, Is it getting farther or closer? Loosely translated— is it someone else’s 
problem, or could the problem hit close to home? Is there reason to 
care? Sure, once out of earshot, the siren is out of mind. If it starts get-
ting louder, however, the noise begins to remind us that emergencies can 
land on any of our doorsteps.





In 1969, two Phantoms were sent to sow fear in the skies of Cairo. A year later, 
Phantoms from the Patishim (“Hammers”) squadron did this in the skies of 
Damascus. This is how a bully demonstrates his strength. Over the years, we also 
used this method in the skies of Lebanon. But our enemies have never known the 
type of wholesale booms like those of recent weeks in Gaza. Anyone who has never 
awakened in a house full of children and infants at the sound of this thunder 
cannot understand how frightening it is. I once heard a boom like this over the 
Jenin refugee camp, and I was unable to breathe for a moment.
— Gideon Levy, describing the fear- mongering  
tactics of Israeli jets’ sonic booms over the Gaza Strip1
Unjust Vibrations
Musicologists or not, most of us don’t have much control over music and 
sound in the grand scheme of things. We can elegantly theorize, analyze, 
and contextualize sonorous objects, but their unruly energies— their 
uses and abuses in daily life— take few cues from what we write or say. 
This doesn’t usually occur to us until we find ourselves facing unwanted 
noise: a roommate’s late- night racket, the thumping bass of a passing 
vehicle’s radio, Muzak at the mall, or rowdy teenage bullies at a diner. 
With some cases of noise pollution (say, another person’s car alarm), we 
have few means of addressing the offense. In other scenarios (raucous 
neighbors), we could be in a position to intervene, yet might choose not 
to act.
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Noisy offenses breed suspicious minds. As we sit idly on the train, 
quietly fuming at the audacity of a commuter playing music through her 
iPhone’s speakers, we are prone to wonder: Is she aware of how loud her 
music sounds to other passengers? Does she know and not care? Is she doing this 
on purpose, just to be cool and rebellious, to give a middle finger to the world, or 
even to get a rise out of me specifically, since I’m sitting right across from her and 
maybe trying too hard to look like I don’t notice? This might not be the verba-
tim inner monologue of every disgruntled by- listener, but it gets to the 
heart of how acute annoyances can lead to chronic mistrust.2 Paranoia 
means we assume the worst of noisemakers. Are television commercials 
and Internet ads disproportionately, gratingly loud relative to the main 
programming (or is it just our imaginations)? Is the on- hold music of 
a company’s customer service line deliberately insipid, repetitive, and 
staticky in order to drive inquirers off the phone and to regulate call 
volumes? Are vrooming motorcyclists desperate for attention, measur-
ing their badassery by the number of heads turned? Adopting paranoid 
relations to sound is to suspect and even to resent the acoustic output 
of service providers, marketers, motorists, and noisemakers at large— 
believing they are out to get us and make life less pleasant, vibe by vibe.
Such paranoia gets cranked up to eleven when the issue turns from 
everyday noise pollution to the deliberate weaponization of sound. An 
egregious example is music torture, which has received growing critical 
attention in recent years. In its war on terror, the American government 
has interrogated prisoners with systematic techniques of noise bombard-
ment.3 As with any form of torture, a core issue is control: the detainee 
has none, while the interrogator has more than any human should have 
over another. The torture victim has reason to be perpetually paranoid, 
dreading the administration of intolerable, unpredictable punishments, 
which leave any hope for repair— relief, release, rejuvenation— beyond 
reach.4 With music torture, there’s also the matter of whether we are 
dealing with music at all. Suzanne Cusick observes:
Whether the sounds used in detention camps functioned as music 
or not, among the most horrifying aspects of these practices is the 
degradation of the thing we call “music.”  .  .  . The thing we have 
revered for an ineffability to which we attribute moral and ethical 
value is revealed as morally and ethically neutral— as just another tool 
in human beings’ blood- stained hands. This feels like the stripping 
away of a soul from a body, and therefore like some kind of violent, 
violating death. It is, therefore, as horrifying for us as it is for its obvi-
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ously intended victims (though not as painful), tearing away parts of 
the collective subjectivity— the culture— we have for so long taken for 
granted, and subsumed under the heading of “Western values.”5
Have darker words about music ever been uttered? Cusick’s wrench-
ing statement pinpoints the difficulties of coming to terms with a world 
where grave abuses of music exist. No art, to be sure, is inviolate. In 
one sense, the idea of music torture sounds wildly unbelievable. But in 
another sense, the tactic seems coolly logical. Loudness hurts. So with 
advances in audio reproduction and amplification, wasn’t it only a mat-
ter of time before music crept into the interrogator’s arsenal?
In December 2014, media firestorms broke out following the U.S. 
Senate Intelligence Committee’s damning report on the CIA’s torture 
practices during the George W. Bush administration. The findings 
exposed the CIA’s deceits, identified previously unknown victims, out-
lined heretofore unpublicized interrogation methods, and stressed tor-
ture’s ineffectiveness at obtaining accurate and actionable information. 
The 525- page declassified portion of the report refers to over two dozen 
cases of interrogators using loud music and white noise (figures 4.1, 4.2, 
and 4.3).6 In every instance, sound- based tactics receive mention in con-
junction with additional torture methods: restraints, hoods, interrupted 
sleep, sensory deprivation, and sexual humiliation, to name only a few. 
At no point does the report isolate music or elaborate much on its spe-
cific abuses. Music torture gets lost in the mix, just one weapon in the 
battalion, fading into the background amid the buzz surrounding tor-
ture scandals writ large.
Casting music torture into a heinous miscellany of interrogation 
methods poses a problem— not because music torture is unequivocally 
more or less abhorrent than other forms of torture, but rather because 
of the exceptional ease with which perpetrators of music torture ratio-
nalize the practice as “no- touch torture” (or not “torture” at all), an 
enhanced interrogation technique within legal and ethical bounds.7 It’s 
just music and just vibrations, the argument goes— when, in actuality, 
it may be the most unjust deployment of music imaginable. For espe-
cially when music is extremely loud, repetitive, and imposed, it can do 
far more than touch. It pricks the skin, pummels the bone, penetrates 
the viscera, and unhinges the mind. It can discombobulate, traumatize, 
and humiliate.8 It breaks down subjectivity, rendering prisoners unable 
to hear themselves think. The vibrations, while invisible, do leave visible 
marks on their victims: twitches and tremors, the aftershocks of injury 
Figure 4.1. Senate Committee on Intelligence report, 53 (my highlights)
Figure 4.2. Senate Committee on Intelligence report, 136– 37 (my highlights)
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echoing in flesh.9 It’s all the more crucial, then, to ask what ideological, 
material, and ontological dimensions of music torture have enabled it 
(more so than, certainly, waterboarding and graphically shocking meth-
ods) to receive administrative sanction, elude media coverage, and fly 
under the public’s sonar.
One explanation has to do with music’s connotations of culturedness 
and leisure. Music, in the popular imagination, is a thing of pleasure. 
How bad can it be?
Figure 4.3. Senate Committee on Intelligence report, 428– 29 (my highlights)
76  •   just vibrations
Failures of Imagination
[Torture] corrupts the whole social fabric because it prescribes a silencing of what 
has been happening between those two bodies, it forces people to make believe that 
nothing, in fact, has been happening, it necessitates that we lie to ourselves about 
what is being done not far from where we talk, while we munch a chocolate bar, 
smile at a lover, read a book, listen to a concerto, exercise in the morning. Torture 
obliges us to be deaf and blind and mute. Or we could not go on living. With that 
incessant awareness of the incessant horror, we could not go on living.
— Ariel Dorfman10
In a Charmed episode titled “Primrose Empath,” a demon secretly curses 
the good witch Prue, granting her the capability to sense everyone else’s 
feelings. The scenario begins comically, with Prue catching the laughing 
bug from a dentist patient who’s under the effects of nitrous oxide. Then 
she begins empathizing willy- nilly with her sisters’ and friends’ emotions 
of love, shame, and denial. But soon, Prue finds herself shouldering the 
weight of the world. Murmurs of others’ anguish thunder through her 
mind until she becomes, in her words, “one big raw nerve ending.” She 
retreats to her basement and curls up into a ball, tortured and afraid. 
“There are these people and they’re in my head, and they’re in my heart, 
and it just hurts,” she cries (figure 4.4). A priest arrives and tells Prue to 
embrace the (dis)ability as a gift rather than a scourge. “You have a once- 
in- a- lifetime opportunity to feel the world’s emotions,” he proclaims. “All 
it means to be human: the good and the bad.” Prue listens, and then— in 
a display of resilience and overcoming— channels her motley feelings 
into sheer power, using a mix of magic and martial arts to vanquish the 
demon responsible for her affliction.
Ariel Dorfman, in his epigraph, declares that torture is a crime not 
just against the body, but also against the imagination. By this, he means 
that torture “craves the abrogation of our capacity to imagine others’ 
suffering, dehumanizing them so much that their pain is not our pain.”11 
To go on with our ordinary lives, Dorfman says, we must turn off (or at 
least turn down) our empathic impulses and block out these victims’ 
presumed hollers of pain and pleas for relief. We, the nontortured, are 
impelled to compress these cries into white noise— random, indiscrimi-
nate frequencies emptied of meaning and human value. Although I 
find Dorfman’s assertion persuasive, it rubs against the common ways 
in which people, when talking about torture, try to put themselves in 
the detainee’s shoes. In a five- minute segment about “Sesame Street Music 
Torture” on the popular online news show Young Turks, the two hosts, 
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Cenk Uygur and Ana Kasparian, discuss the music torture used at Guan-
tánamo Bay. Uygur and Kasparian play a few seconds of the Sesame Street 
theme song and note how the detainees were subjected to this music at 
extraordinarily loud volumes and long durations (matching the decibel 
level of a jackhammer for up to two hours). Here’s an excerpt from the 
segment:
Ana Kasparian: They used Sesame Street music to drive these detainees 
crazy during interrogation.
Cenk Uygur: I could hardly stand it [the Sesame Street theme] for five 
seconds. . . . Now imagine listening to that at deafening volume for 
hours on end. . . . 
Kasparian: Imagine listening to a jackhammer for two hours. I could 
barely handle it when I’m walking by.
Uygur: Yeah, and imagine— I think that it’s in some ways worse with 
music ’cause it’s so repetitive, and, you know, bores down into 
your head.12
As Kasparian and Uygur verbally work through their thoughts and feel-
ings about music torture, they repeatedly call on the imperatives of 
imagination. Yet even as they say imagine, imagine, imagine, the chant rhe-
torically pronounces its own failings in light of unimaginable injury.13 
Predictably, this Young Turks video also set its viewers’ imaginations on 
fire. Aside from the usual trolls dangling incendiary bait about religion 
and terrorism, hundreds of YouTube users offered ideas for the types 
Figure 4.4. Prue in Charmed (left) retreats from the world and (right) returns 
to fight the good fight. Closed captions in original.
78  •   just vibrations
of music that could be most effective for music torture. People recom-
mended dubstep, ABBA, Rebecca Black, and other genres and artists for 
interrogators’ playlists.
Misguided presumptions about torture’s imaginability may account 
in part for why debates persist at all about torture’s legality, the grounds 
for permissibility, and ticking time- bomb scenarios.14 In other words, 
moral opposition to torture is enabled largely by people’s ability to draw 
on their own memories of pain and the consequent efforts to empathize; 
yet the reason such opposition is not absolute or unanimous owes to 
the imperfections of such empathy. In everyday speech, people use the 
word “torture” to color and amplify expressions of distress, such as “why 
waiting in line is torture”15 (according to a New York Times op- ed) or the 
“little academic tortures”16 experienced by young scholars. (And sure 
enough, among the prevalent metaphors containing torture is the term 
tortured metaphor.) One could argue that these are just idioms, just verbal 
vibrations, hyperbolic yet harmless. But might the very circulation of tor-
ture’s metaphors signal a faulty imagination of torture’s realities? For if 
thorough understanding prevailed, could people really stand to deploy 
its linguistic charge in banal contexts? Is it possible that trite references 
to torture dilute the perceived severity of actual torture and thus mask 
the urgency of antitorture measures?
Media’s abundant representations of torture have long risked nor-
malizing the practice and glorifying it as a way (and the only way) to 
obtain information from suspected criminals. We see torture in televi-
sion (infamously, 24), film (Zero Dark Thirty), and even books popular 
with youths (Harry Potter and its Cruciatus curse).17 In the first season of 
the show Homeland, CIA agents capture a presumed al- Qaeda terrorist 
and detain him in a room. They subject him to cold temperatures, blink-
ing lights, and a loud grindcore song (a cross between thrash, indus-
trial, and punk). Every few seconds, the song cuts out before starting up 
again.18 Agents observe the room on a monitor for several hours. The 
detainee eventually gives up an email address that proves useful. As view-
ers of the show, we necessarily fail to grasp the nature and magnitude 
of what the music- based interrogation entails: the scene itself lasts only 
fifty seconds total; it alternates between shots of the detainee and shots 
of an agent watching the detainee on a monitor, hence allowing us to be 
twice removed via embedded screens; and we retain the option of turn-
ing down the volume of the torturous music as it pipes through our tele-
vision speakers or our headphones (figure 4.5). This effort to represent 
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music torture remains hopelessly sanitized, glossed over by flat images 
and flattened (standardized- for- television) audio levels.
It’s further worth noting that, prior to this interrogation scene, the 
show’s protagonist (CIA agent Carrie Mathison) explicitly claims it to be 
not torture. During preparations, Carrie explains to onlooker Nicholas 
Brody that she needs to “unsettle [the detainee], to prove we have com-
plete control, to demonstrate our omnipotence.”
“One question,” says Brody.
“Go ahead,” replies Carrie.
“Will he be tortured?”
Carrie breaks into a gentle smile and shakes her head sagely, almost 
patronizingly: “We don’t do that here.”
Cue music.
Although some shows and movies problematize torture, they none-
theless tend to depict it as effective and utilitarian, as a means of drasti-
cally injuring one person so that many others may live. In a mission from 
Rockstar Games’ acclaimed 2013 video game Grand Theft Auto V (GTA 
V), torture becomes a playable, interactive assignment. The player, con-
trolling the protagonist Trevor Philips, is tasked with extracting informa-
tion from an unarmed captive. Actions available to the player include 
Figure 4.5. Carrie in Homeland watches the interrogation of a suspected 
terrorist.
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electric shocks, blunt force, pulling teeth, and waterboarding (figures 
4.6 and 4.7). If the captive isn’t pushed far enough, he won’t give up 
intelligence. But if the captive is pushed too far, he flatlines, and a shot 
of adrenaline is needed to revive him. The game asks the player to exer-
cise cruel imagination and to think like a torturer: what is the right mix 
and sequence of injurious techniques needed to draw out actionable 
intelligence?19 It must be stressed that while GTA V has dozens of option-
al missions, this one is mandatory. The mission has to be undertaken to 
advance the game’s main story. The player thus faces a choice: either 
complete this torture simulation or forfeit the chance to play subsequent 
story missions. Even players who are turned off by the torture mission 
are likely to tough it out— regarding it as a necessary evil— so that they 
can get on with the rest of the game (a game they have presumably paid 
for and already sunk dozens of hours into). It almost doesn’t sound like 
a choice at all  .  .  . except it is. Among the few people I’ve found who 
reported permanently quitting GTA V upon reaching the torture mis-
sion, one gamer wrote: “Witnessing a man beg for his life passively in a 
film like Reservoir Dogs as he has his ear forcibly removed and gets doused 
in gasoline is disturbing enough. But having to slowly and deliberately 
select which weapons to use before entering the button prompts to rip 
a man’s teeth out, break his kneecaps or almost drown him to death as 
he screams and begs for mercy is something else entirely.”20 Amnesty 
International, Freedom from Torture, and activist organizations protest-
ed this portion of GTA V. But fans defended the scene as satire.21 Just a 
game, just a simulation, they claimed; why so serious?
With all this talk of imagination, let’s conduct our own simulation. 
How might someone react upon hearing about music torture for the first 
time? For this hypothetical scenario, I extrapolate from several of my 
own experiences where I’ve mentioned the existence of music torture to 
people who had never before given the topic any thought. I encourage 
readers likewise to test out such conversations and see whether their out-
comes align with or differ from mine. In any case, let’s call our interlocu-
tor Jon. When Jon hears about how the American government has sub-
jected detainees to the songs of Britney Spears and Barney the Dinosaur, 
he appears at first confused, even amused. As if by instinct, he lets out a 
chuckle— not because he’s a mean person, but because the case admit-
tedly sounds absurd. It doesn’t take long for Jon to recognize, however, 
that this is no laughing matter and that musical bombardment can be 
grievous indeed. Jon requires no hand- holding to arrive at this conclu-
sion. He draws on his own memories of unpleasant noise, and tries to 
Figure 4.6. Torture sequence in Grand Theft Auto V— pulling teeth
Figure 4.7. Torture sequence in Grand Theft Auto V— waterboarding
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imagine these feelings boosted hundredfold. He comes to feel a little 
ashamed of his initial response. All he really needed was a few extra sec-
onds to think through, on his own, the terrible potential of music when 
it is flagrantly repeated, amplified, and wielded as a weapon. But these 
extra few seconds are everything. The lag— the time it takes for compre-
hension to dawn, for bemusement to turn to horror, for a chuckle to be 
stifled— harbors the alibis of music torture, the sneaky reasoning that 
enables interrogators to pass off the practice as torture- lite. For even 
though it doesn’t take much thought to grasp the severity of music tor-
ture, it takes some thought nonetheless. And if people aren’t prompted 
to give this transgression any thought at all, then it’s already game over.
Jonathan Pieslak, who has studied music’s usages in psychological 
warfare, recounts how, when he presented a paper at a conference on 
this subject and played Barney’s “I Love You” on a loop for seventy- five 
seconds, “a chorus of groans and laughter erupted from the audience.”22 
Given that torture is no laughing matter, the audience’s laughter was 
riven with contradiction: on the one hand, audience members didn’t 
immediately grasp the true horrors of music torture (for if they did, they 
probably wouldn’t have been so quick to laugh); on the other hand, they 
may have perceived such an offense to be eminently graspable because, 
as Pieslak notes, they think they can “relate to the situation of having to 
listen to music they do not like,” and whether it’s “loud party or techno 
music blasting from a house at 3 am, the muzak of a doctor or den-
tist’s office, or a heavy metal guitarist practicing for hours in an adja-
cent apartment, the shared response to being annoyed by music often 
involves laughter.”23 Many people, not least parents of young kids, know 
what it’s like to be irked by repetitive children’s songs. Such humdrum 
annoyance is a common irritant, as demonstrated by the existence of a 
YouTube video (linkable from the Young Turks torture feature) called 
“Can You Survive 10 Minutes of Barney Saying ‘I Love You’?”24 It’s easy 
to shame people for laughing during a presentation on torture. But one 
reason for such laughter owes to the fact that a seventy- five- second clip 
of “I Love You” is a far cry from a real interrogation scenario. Pieslak did 
not play the music for two hours at 130 decibels. A conference room 
is a safe space where attendees aren’t subjected to extreme tempera-
tures, stress positions, starvation, humiliation, and other traumas that 
prisoners always suffer alongside music torture (as the Senate Committee 
on Intelligence report made brutally clear). Imagining music torture as 
involving only music— just vibrations— is to miss the broader regime of 
injury at the scene of criminal interrogation.
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Given what I’ve said so far, a reader has reason to assume I would 
advocate against comparisons between music torture and quotidian son-
ic annoyances. Instead, I believe comparisons are necessary. I propose 
that, while we must not facilely conflate injuries big and small, we have to 
reflect on how our problematic mentalities toward acoustic offenses (big 
or small) intersect and interrelate. If people are antsy about the utter-
ance of music torture and freakin’ car alarm in the same breath, it’s for fear 
of trivializing the former’s exceptional status. The (paranoid) assump-
tion is that the speaker must be connecting the two examples and insen-
sitively asserting their equivalency. But in some ways, what I see is over-
correction— a denial of any connection whatsoever, a denial that lets us 
off the hook. We cannot understand or work against music torture unless 
we glean why such extraordinary torture goes largely unquestioned in 
public domains. And this we cannot do without taking stock of social 
attitudes toward ordinary sonic disturbances. My most pressing question, 
specifically, is this: are we, as members of society, in any way capable of 
mobilizing our littlest everyday behaviors to illuminate (or even to coun-
teract) the government’s grandest operations of music torture?
Quiescence: Microrepair?
First, let’s consider the most obvious means of protesting music torture: 
speaking out. Musicians have taken varied stances on the issue. In 2008, 
Christopher Cerf (composer for Sesame Street), Pearl Jam, R.E.M., Tom 
Morello, Rosanne Cash, Trent Reznor, and other artists formed a coali-
tion called Zero dB to decry the use of music in interrogations. Stevie 
Benton of Drowning Pool, however, voiced the opposite, saying: “I take it 
as an honor to think that perhaps our song could be used to quell anoth-
er 9/11 attack or something like that.”25 And then there’s the strange 
case of Canadian industrial band Skinny Puppy, who, upon learning that 
their music had been co- opted for purposes of torture, demanded a dev-
ilish $666,000 in royalties from the U.S. Department of Defense.26
In academic circles, three leading music organizations— the Ameri-
can Musicological Society, the Society for Ethnomusicology, and the 
Society for American Music— proposed individual resolutions in 2007– 
8 condemning torture, with a focus on music torture. “Some critics,” 
Suzanne Cusick points out, “have dismissed these resolutions as ineffec-
tual vainglory, ‘feel good’ gestures that served only to substitute public 
sanctimony for real political action.”27 Such dismissals target the ivory 
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tower stereotype, the notion that academics, through bids for social rel-
evance, are all bark and no bite. Consider the resolution introduced at 
the 2007 Business Meeting of the Society for American Music:
Whereas, We, the Society for American Music, join the chorus of 
protest and dissent against the use of torture in military interroga-
tions; whereas, we, as scholars and musicians, who devote our lives to 
sustaining American music, protest the contamination of our culture 
by the heinous misappropriation of music as part of psychological 
torture; whereas, art has an ethical, in fact spiritual dimension, no 
matter what style or genre, and its corruption shames us all; Resolved, 
we, the Society for American Music, condemn the use of music as 
torture in military interrogations and in particular the debasement of 
American music in such a fashion.28
This resolution is admirable, yet raises several questions. For all its 
emphasis on music’s ethical dimensions and musicians’ shame toward 
sound- based interrogation techniques, the text omits overt references 
to the victims of torture. The particular mention of American music also 
comes across unnecessarily narrow. Is it that this Society’s members feel 
qualified to speak out against torture only by citing their core exper-
tise in American music? Does such wording reflect an excessive mind- set 
of compartmentalized protest— that musicologists should rally against 
music torture, queer theorists against sexual humiliation, and physicians 
against forced medication?29 Does the specter of aesthetic autonomy and 
disciplinary division haunt this resolution’s vocabularies?
Official petitions, public denunciations, and legal indictments can 
bring about change and awareness. But without discounting their effi-
cacy, these interventions come off as socially conventional, as they seek, 
with paranoid motives, to expose the authorities and to out their sins. 
A more radical question— one that may yield reparative possibilities of 
a different stripe— pertains to how the everyday sonic habits of a gen-
eral population resonate with its government’s interrogation strategies.30 
Even if it sounds like a long stretch, how might we evaluate the responsi-
bilities and complicities of a citizenry whose ruling bodies practice music 
torture?
A public’s role in regimes of acoustic offense can be plotted through 
a number of behaviors. First, we, the people, compose a culture of sonic 
impropriety when we inflict undesirable noise on others, contributing 
actively to cacophony by violating explicit laws or implicit customs for 
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the respective noise levels of neighborhoods, apartments, dormitories, 
hospitals, libraries, the Amtrak Quiet Car, and different times of day. Sec-
ond, even if we’re mindful of our own sonic footprints, we can, through 
inaction and apathy, enable the proliferation of noisy infractions. When 
we abstain from asking a stranger on the subway, Please turn down the 
loud music from your iPod, we show passive acceptance of acoustic distur-
bance, hence forfeiting any janitorial duties we might bear with respect 
to noise. And third, we endorse the social glorification of loudness when 
we enter into spaces and events that pump up the volume in the name of 
celebration (New Year’s Eve in Times Square), competition (a football 
game), or basic pursuit of a good time (at a concert or a club).
In cultures that flaunt audio amplification, people reciprocally flaunt 
their tolerance of amplified sounds that verge on the intolerable— 
decibels that cause discomfort, even pain. At the risk of aural distress, 
we might bring earplugs to a rock concert but end up leaving them in 
our pockets because we decide that the volume isn’t totally unbearable. 
Or picture the nightclub: even if the music is too loud for our taste, we 
head onto the thumping dance floor because most of our friends are 
there and that’s where all the fun is, where actions speak louder than 
words. Once on the dance floor, there’s collective recognition of thun-
derous noise as the cost of clubbing cool. Thus even noise- averse patrons 
play along as convincingly as they can, grinding and merging into all the 
other shiny happy people and becoming worthy of emulation in turn. 
Enduring loudness becomes a point of pride, a show of strength and 
resilience. It’s a way of declaring that we can take it (yes, we can)!
A common urban occurrence involves fire trucks and ambulances 
screaming down the streets, bringing sounds that elicit despair as well as 
reassurance (signaling a nearby crisis while insisting that, have no fear, 
help is on its way). As a pedestrian, I sometimes cover my ears as the 
emergency vehicles zoom by— both ears if I can, or just one ear if I’m 
carrying something in my hand. Then there are times when I’m on the 
fence about whether covering my ears is necessary, and by the time I 
decide, the vehicles have passed, rendering the decision moot. Finally, 
there are instances when I feel the impulse to protect my ears, yet end up 
choosing not to, for fear of appearing weak, delicate, queer. As best as I 
can describe, I feel a twinge of embarrassment for instinctively wanting 
to cup my ears. Maybe it’s because the sirens of emergency vehicles are 
among the few sounds of the city that have legitimate reason to be loud. 
Their loudness literally helps save lives, enabling rescuers to cut through 
mazes of moving metal. Furthermore, the sirens need to be loud only 
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because the rest of the urban environment is so irrepressibly loud. They 
must drown out miscellaneous clamor to reach the ears of inhabitants 
who are keen on tuning out the city— iPod- carrying joggers, radio- piping 
drivers, and cyclists talking on headsets.31 As odd as it sounds, then, my 
hesitation to cover my ears might stem from an anxiety about showing 
disrespect. Perhaps I’m worried that my act of self- concern would look 
uncouth, as if, by raising my hands, I’d be gesturally linking my fleeting 
aural discomfort with the far graver suffering of the people whom the 
emergency vehicles are rushing to save.
Ambivalent anecdotes aside, all of this is to say that our relationships 
and responses to music and everyday sounds aren’t so simple. They can be 
riddled with uncertainty, irrationality, paranoia, and self- consciousness. 
We make a lot of noise, don’t always redress others’ noisy habits, and put 
up with noise at detrimental amplitudes out of peer pressure, habit, or 
vanity. Given sound’s phenomenal pretext as somehow ephemeral and 
relatively innocuous, people might overlook or downplay how noises can 
put them in bad moods, deprive them of rest, and impair overall well- 
being. Quiescence toward noise ripples through society. It may not caus-
ally or straightforwardly trickle up to a political administration’s prac-
tices of music torture, but civilian complacency does validate noise’s free 
passes on smaller levels, codifying cultures where acoustic violations are 
too easily waved off with Eh, not that bad. With each display of passivity, 
sonic offenses inch toward the boundary of the normal, fortifying their 
status as typical and tolerable. And although it’s scientifically evident that 
sustained exposure to loud sounds can lead to hearing loss, people con-
tinue to underestimate such consequences in part because this loss is so 
gradual.
Not all noise needs suppressing. We can opt to celebrate loud sounds 
knowing full well the risks; admire people who blast music as champi-
ons of social audacity, artistry, and free speech; and embrace emergency 
sirens as gratifying signals of medical aid. We can, in sum, try to absorb 
and absolve a rip- roaring world through a rose- tinted aural lens, listen-
ing to and through the noise for hints of playfulness, generosity, humor, 
pride, love, and invigorating affects. A reparative acoustemology would 
accommodate these possibilities while calling for simultaneous pursuits 
of alternative sonic regimes. To achieve more aurally tolerable and acces-
sible environments, we have to play the long game. The goal? Not to dial 
down noise per se, but maybe to edge toward a world where something 
such as music torture would be inconceivable as anything but unequivocal 
torture— where the question of whether music torture can be torturous 
Earsplitting  •   87
wouldn’t be asked in the first place. The same could be said of torture in 
general: the goal isn’t just to pass and follow laws that prohibit torture, 
but moreover to work toward a world where torture’s absolute prohi-
bition starts sounding axiomatic and feeling commonsensical.32 These 
lofty objectives bubble with idealism, but their means are grounded in 
the real: palpable actions, rectifications, and results. “The ideal, then, is 
real,” muses Martha Nussbaum. “At the same time, the real also contains 
the ideal. Real people aspire. They imagine possibilities better than the 
world they know, and they try to actualize them.”33 One has to start some-
where, sometime. So why not here, now? And if not us, then who?
In the spring of 2015, I taught an undergraduate course at Dart-
mouth College on music, media, and politics. For a unit called “Defense 
against the Dark Arts,” during which we discussed music’s weaponiza-
tion, the students received the following assignment:
Step 1. Find a situation involving what you perceive to be a noise 
violation.
Step 2. Do something about the infraction, or don’t. Do not put 
yourself in any danger (when in doubt, play it safe).
Step 3. Attempt to articulate the social, psychological, and 
circumstantial factors that drove you to action or inaction.
Over the course of a few weeks, students found situations that included 
noisy dormmates, ruckus in the library, a disruptive passenger on a bus, 
and the music of Phi Delta Alpha, a Dartmouth frat house notorious for 
the way it blasts songs every evening using outward- facing loudspeakers. 
Two of the ten students chose action: one simply asked a dormmate to 
turn down his music (took all of three seconds), while the other met 
with a friend from Phi Delta Alpha for a half- hour debate over why the 
frat members insist on dominating the sonic airspace of Webster Avenue 
night after night. Other students shied away from direct confrontation 
and resorted to throwing dirty glances, sighing audibly, putting on head-
phones, and venting on social media.
One student wrote about a time when she was the source of noise. She 
and her marching band had gone around campus giving a late- night 
tour to prospective Dartmouth students. Although the band members 
didn’t think they were bothering anyone, they decided to consult Yik 
Yak, an app that lets users post and view anonymous messages (sortable 
by up- votes) within a ten- mile radius.34 “We checked Yik Yak,” the student 
noted, “and saw such Yaks as ‘not saying that I wanted to sleep, but if I 
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did, it’d be great if the band would shut up’ and ‘The marching band 
needs to get the f**k off gold coast lawn.’ We gained an insight to the 
true thoughts and feelings of our fellow students. . . . We laughed at the 
fact that people thought we were on the Gold Coast lawn, which is half 
way across campus, but also realized how far our sound traveled, and 
how many people we were disturbing.”35
In the following class, all students read their papers out loud and 
together worked through their motives for action or inaction. Consensus 
formed around factors such as anxiety about confrontation, concerns of 
shaming or being shamed, and fear of developing a reputation as a whin-
er. In simple terms, complaining about noise isn’t cool, least of all for col-
lege students. Doing so hurts their hip image and can make them come 
across as curmudgeons who gripe about damn kids and their music. For 
what it’s worth, musicologists aren’t supposed to rant about noise either. 
Scholars are presumably meant to exemplify open- mindedness, to recu-
perate noise as art, and to study soundscapes without moral judgment.36
Little inactions add up. But for all the paranoia that can inflect our 
relations to noise, reparative orientations are possible. A request or 
gesture to quell a disturbance, a brief reflection on sound’s infractions 
and inevitabilities— little victories add up too. In the romantic chaos 
of consequence, the flutter of an insect’s wings makes a sound, vibra-
tions beget vibrations, and difference is made. Call it what you will: 
the butterfly effect, grassroots activism, bottom- up democracy, affec-
tive citizenship, or minority influence.37 If these models sound like 
optimism for suckers, we could recall how, even as children, we were 
taught that change begins with a single person, that every recycled bot-
tle matters, and that only we can prevent forest fires. For all the talk 
about microaggressions in daily life (concerning race, class, sexuality, 
disability), we can think constructively about microrepair— little acts 
that add up to something big.38 A “micro- politics of justice,” suggests 
Michael Shapiro, “references a process in which individuals and collec-
tives, who are affected by legality/illegalities, participate in a culture of 
feelings or sensibilities and subsequently engage in discursive encoun-
ters about what is just.”39 Micropolitics can productively challenge and 
complement justice’s macropolitics, namely how “states, through their 
decision- making bodies, promulgate, execute, and administer the 
law.”40 Individual optimism doesn’t have to breed complacency. Believ-
ing things could get better is sometimes precisely what cheers us to fight 
harder for a world worth redeeming.
Insisting on greater attention to noise and its potential harms isn’t 
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antithetical to respecting articulations of Deaf Gain (countering notions 
of deafness as deficit), biodiversity, and alternate embodiments.41 (Some 
Deaf people, for that matter, might pick up and prefer loud voices in 
conversations, or enjoy high- volume music and its sensational pressures 
on the dance floor.) Nor is this to say that normative hearing abilities 
are universally desirable and extra- deserving of preservation. The point 
is to recognize the injustices and calls for help that sometimes don’t get 
heard— or seen, signed, felt, sensed, cared for— amid the competing 
clamor of modern life. We often don’t speak up against public distur-
bances because, as my students pointed out, these awkward interventions 
are prone to mark us as peculiar and, in terms of societal expectations, 
veritably queer. To keep noise abatement from crossing into censorship 
and sanctimony, the focus can’t be on the indiscriminate silencing or 
bullying of noisemakers, as this would introduce yet more shame into 
networks of paranoid exchange. The objective, where possible, is to find 
creative means of retuning the world. In certain cases, the relief can feel 
very real, not just for ourselves but also for people around us— even if 
they don’t thank us out loud.
Overloaded / Understanding
If an agenda of quiescence still sounds too idealistic, it’s worth keeping in 
mind the individuals for whom quiet can be an especially valuable com-
modity. Some people on the autism spectrum, for example, experience 
sensory overload in everyday settings (variably called sensory defensive 
disorder or sensory integration disorder).42 Buzzing machinery, flick-
ering lights, scents, tastes, fabrics, temperatures, and other stimuli can 
feel disturbing and even overwhelming. Cynthia Kim, an Autistic adult, 
describes her aural sensitivities born of Asperger’s syndrome: “It’s not like 
I want to hear the person sitting next to me in the library chewing gum 
and typing and breathing, but I can’t not hear it. This barrage of sound 
often results in sensory overload in public places, especially crowded 
public places like stores, restaurants, or public transit. It can also make 
it difficult to follow conversations or make out speech in environments 
with a lot of background noise.”43 Educators invested in inclusivity have 
advocated for sensory- friendly environments and for students’ freedom 
to customize the intake of their surroundings via noise- canceling head-
phones, sunglasses, and additional devices.44 Students who begin to feel 
overloaded may also benefit from the option of temporarily leaving the 
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classroom and accessing a sensory retreat (a quiet and peaceful room) 
elsewhere in the school.
Such accommodations are important because they make good on the 
understanding that not everyone hears or feels the world in the same 
way, and just as crucially, that it’s vital yet difficult to empathize with 
the sensory experiences of others. Consider the free browser simulation 
Auti- Sim, designed by Taylan Kay for the 2013 Hacking Health Vancou-
ver event, which brought together “health professionals and technolo-
gists to work together to prototype and problem- solve new ways to deliv-
er healthcare.”45 Kay’s interactive Auti- Sim sought to depict the following 
encounter:
The player navigates through a playground as an autistic child with 
auditory hypersensitivity. Proximity to loud children causes sensory 
overload for the player, impacting cognitive functions. This impact 
is represented as visual noise and blur, as well as audio distortion. 
Participants described the experience as visceral, insightful and com-
pelling.46
According to players’ comments, reactions in fact varied widely. Some 
appreciated the simulation and thanked the creator for a revelatory 
experience. But others, including those who identified as Autistic, 
scorned the simulation for misrepresenting the sensory realities of their 
everyday lives and for portraying all Autistic subjects as hopelessly anti-
social. Case in point: if the player’s avatar spends too much time around 
raucous (and supposedly nondisabled) children, the visual and auditory 
output whips up a machine- like aesthetic of autism’s sensorium. Static, 
shrieks, blips, and alarming signs of failure verge on dehumanizing the 
protagonist, conjuring a broken, glitched victim (figure 4.8). The simu-
lation presents the child as someone tortured by noises that, to most 
ears, sound harmless, even good (laughter, conversation, and euphony 
of children at play).
The designer of Auti- Sim displayed good intentions and, in his 
responses to players’ feedback, has expressed willingness to take criti-
cism under advisement.47 But despite the potential for Auti- Sim to raise 
awareness and to do good, the problem with the simulation— indeed, 
with any program or exercise in imagination— is that it may lead par-
ticipants to feel overconfident about their understanding of the condi-
tion and lifestyle in question. Critics of Auti- Sim worry that “having taken 
part in a simulation exercise, non- disabled people will believe they fully 
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understand disability. [People with disabilities] say that unless you are 
disabled and live with the knock- on consequences like unemployment, 
pain and prejudice, it doesn’t give a true picture.”48 Overconfidence can 
be the enemy of empathy if it fast- tracks to complacency and halts fur-
ther inquiry. When we’re too certain that we know what it’s like to live in 
someone else’s mind and body, we risk feeling entitled to cease listening 
to their stories. The apparent catch in empathy simulations is that, for 
people who actually endure challenging conditions, the game is reality 
and doesn’t have easy solutions. (Besides disability simulations, contro-
versial examples of recent empathy exercises have included Tyra Banks 
wearing a fat suit to incur judgmental stares and to understand obesity, 
Gwyneth Paltrow trying— and failing— to live on food stamps for a week, 
and rampant cases of slum and poverty tourism. Banks took off her fat 
suit after one day, Paltrow went back to eating like a millionaire, and 
tourists, by definition, always return home.)49
Recall the many pleas for imagination and the crises of empathy 
throughout this chapter’s discussions of sound, injury, and quiescence: 
Prue in Charmed experiencing sensory overload and, against her will, 
empathically absorbing the world’s chronic pain; the imagine, imagine, 
imagine rhetoric of the Young Turks hosts as they pondered music tor-
ture; the necessarily imperfect and even misleading simulations of tor-
ture in Homeland and Grand Theft Auto V; a conference audience groan-
ing and laughing as Jonathan Pieslak played a few iterations of Barney’s 
“I Love You”; and Gideon Levy, in his epigraph, insisting that if you’ve 
never experienced the roof- knocking sonic booms of fighter planes, you 
Figure 4.8. (left) Approaching crowds on the playground (loud and blurry 
stimuli) and (right) moving away from crowds in Auti- Sim
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can’t understand how it feels. Empathy, according to Martha Nussbaum, 
involves “a kind of ‘twofold attention,’ in which one both imagines 
what it is like to be in the sufferer’s place and, at the same time, retains 
securely the awareness that one is not in that place.”50 Because empathy 
entails affective approximation rather than total equation, it remains, as 
Susan Brison argues, a necessary but not sufficient foundation for justice.51 
Hurdles in empathy, however, don’t release us from attempting and hop-
ing to empathize widely, creatively, and generously. Challenges of care 
and compassion serve as reminders that, beyond our verbal claims of 
resonating with one another (I feel you), the next step is action (. . . and 
I’d like to help).
Action might mean dialing down noise. But on some occasions, it 




If We Break . . . 
✦ ✦ ✦
This book has been concerned with ideas and ideologies of music as I have 
apprehended them. . . . It would be silly to conclude it on a note of prediction. A 
coda is no place for presentiments. I draw attention to the above trends as hopes, 
not as predictions: as hopes for motion.
— Joseph Kerman, Contemplating Music, final lines1
Unvoiced
As I write this, America is burning. Protests sweep the country coast to 
coast, from Ferguson to Baltimore to Chicago; from Mizzou to Yale to 
Dartmouth College. Windows and hearts are breaking amid civilian dem-
onstrations against police brutality, racism, hate crimes, and systemic 
injustice. Shouts of Black Lives Matter have reached fever pitch yet some-
how, in various political and social domains, still seem to go unheard. In 
addition to using batons, tear gas, stun guns, smoke grenades, and rub-
ber bullets, officers in several cities have been employing Long Range 
Acoustic Devices (LRADs), which can weigh over three hundred pounds 
and fire cones of noise up to almost 150 dB and 2.5 kHz. Development 
efforts for the LRAD originated in the wake of the 2000 terrorist attack 
on the USS Cole in Yemen. Since then, the LRAD Corporation, based in 
San Diego, has sold its line of products to military and security personnel 
worldwide. Thanks to strong international business, LRAD’s revenues 
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totaled $24.6 million in the fiscal year 2014, up 44 percent from $17.1 
million the year before.2 As of today, more than seventy countries have 
purchased LRAD systems.3
The LRAD Corporation markets its devices in benevolent, caring 
terms. Promotional materials stress LRADs’ utility for wildlife protection, 
emergency mass notification, public safety, and rescue operations (such 
as talking a suicidal person off a bridge or communicating with strand-
ed hikers on a mountain). The website states, complete with emphases: 
“LRAD is not a weapon; LRAD is a highly intelligible, long range com-
munication system and a safer alternative to kinetic force.”4 Nonkinetic, 
no- touch maneuvers— we’ve heard this claim before. A blanket denial of 
LRADs as weapons runs counter to the maker’s proud claims about the 
devices’ potential to scare off sea pirates and overcome enemy combat-
ants in wars abroad. “If [LRADs’] maker tempered its initial [weapon] 
metaphors,” Juliette Volcler points out, “it’s because this allows distribu-
tors to sidestep the U.S. and European prohibitions on weapons sales to 
China that have been in place since the Tiananmen Square massacre in 
1989. It allows . . . the LRAD Corp. to publish glowing notices after its 
products are used to distribute information to survivors of natural disas-
ters, such as in Haiti, or to counter anti- capitalist protesters in Canada.”5 
LRADs use a technology called piezoelectric transducers to focus sound 
waves into a narrow field of impact (hence their moniker of sound can-
nons). In January 2010, the Disorder Control Unit of the NYPD released 
a seven- page briefing on the LRAD (figure 5.1). One section stated that 
“while the sound being emitted in front of the LRAD may be very loud, 
it is substantially quieter outside the ‘cone’ of sound produced by the 
device. In fact, someone could stand next to the device or just behind 
it and hear the noise being emitted at much lower levels than someone 
standing several hundred feet away, but within the ‘cone’ of sound being 
emitted.”6 Security forces and governing bodies to date have not sub-
jected LRADs to extensive regulation, presumably because the devices 
fly under the radar as weapons in their own right.
Underestimations of LRADs’ deleterious potential can contribute to 
their treatment by police as mere tools or even toys. LRADs’ ability to 
focus sound into a narrow field doesn’t eliminate the risk of collateral 
damage. In any case, the promise of exactitude doesn’t make LRADs less 
problematic than drones (with purported capacity to carry out precision 
strikes) or sniper rifles (in the hands of a mass murderer). More gener-
ally, there’s a lack of research on LRADs’ injurious capabilities. Here’s 
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Amnesty International’s report on the use of LRADs in the Ferguson 
protests:
On the night of Aug. 18 [2014] at approximately 10:00 p.m., follow-
ing the reported throwing of bottles at police and a group of pro-
testers stopping in front of a police line in defiance of the five sec-
ond rule, law enforcement activated a Long Range Acoustic Device 
(LRAD). The LRAD was pointed at [a] group of stationary protestors 
on the street approximately fifteen feet away. Members of the media 
and observers were likewise about the same distance from the device. 
No warning from law enforcement that an LRAD would be used was 
given to the protesters. After providing earplugs to a member of 
Amnesty International, a St. Louis County police officer says, “This 
noise will make you sick.” Several members of the delegation report-
ed feeling nauseous from the noise of the LRAD until it was turned 
off at approximately 10:15 p.m. LRADs emit high volume sounds at 
various frequencies, with some ability to target the sound to particular 
areas. Used at close range, loud volume and/or excessive lengths of 
time, LRADs can pose serious health risks which range from tempo-
Figure 5.1. Page 3 of the “Briefing on the LRAD by New York City Police 
Department: Special Operations Division/Disorder Control Unit” (January 
2010)
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rary pain, loss of balance and eardrum rupture, to permanent hear-
ing damage. LRADs also target people relatively indiscriminately, and 
can have markedly different effects on different individuals and in 
different environments. Further research into the use of LRADs for 
law enforcement is urgently needed.7
A well- documented case of LRAD’s power took place during the protests 
at the G- 20 Summit in Pittsburgh on 24 September 2009. Karen Piper, 
a scholar of globalization and a visiting professor at Carnegie Mellon 
University, stopped to take photographs of protesters and their signs. 
Suddenly, she found herself caught in the blast zone of an LRAD, acti-
vated with no warning (figure 5.2). Later, Piper filed a lawsuit, describ-
ing how she “suffered immediate pain in her ears,” became nauseated, 
and “was forced to sit down . . . unable to walk.”8 Her long- term injuries 
included “permanent nerve hearing loss; tinnitus; barotrauma; left ear 
pain and fluid drainage.”9 In an interview with the American Civil Liber-
ties Union, Piper recalled how the LRAD’s noise made her think she was 
dying of an aneurysm.10 She won a (meager) settlement of $72,000 from 
the city of Pittsburgh.
Despite Piper’s lawsuit, LRADs have only grown in popularity among 
security personnel. On 12 December 2014, attorney Gideon Orion Oli-
ver sent the NYPD commissioner a memo on behalf of several people 
who claimed to have been injured by an LRAD while protesting the Stat-
en Island grand jury’s failure to indict the primary police officer involved 
in the death of Eric Garner.11 Oliver requested that the NYPD refrain 
from using LRADs until thorough and independent testing has been 
conducted, until guidelines have been drafted and published, and until 
officers have received appropriate training to operate these devices. But 
a hurdle in such pleas lies in a lack of public awareness and empathy. 
Unless, like Karen Piper, you’ve been bombarded by an LRAD, it’s dif-
ficult to imagine or even believe the degree and nature of pain that this 
sonic artillery can inflict. The fact that LRADs, like music torture, tend 
to leave few visible traces of injury on victims’ bodies doesn’t make the 
devices any less in need of regulation than, say, bullets and batons. LRADs 
are a sonorous smokescreen: because a relative absence of discernible 
wounds raises the victim’s burden of proof in a court of law, these devices 
require stricter, not laxer, operational guidelines. It’s too easy to write off 
an LRAD’s deployment as mere warning shots that precede escalation of 
true force. In a video that shows a nighttime demonstration in Ferguson, 
we first hear the sounds of LRADs and police instructions; then we hear 
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and see rubber bullets and tear gas lobbed into the crowd.12 No matter 
how piercing the LRADs may have felt to this crowd, our attention (as 
YouTube viewers here and now, as protesters then and there) necessarily 
jerks toward the bullets once they start flying. Because look: bullets. Dur-
ing violent confrontations, nonlethal weaponry can serve practically as 
a euphemism for pre lethal. The announcement of a technology that’s 
unlikely to kill nonetheless augurs the presence of external force and the 
weighted options of consequent lethality.13 By the same mortal token, a 
tragic reality in the name Black Lives Matter is how it comes fueled by 
laments that black deaths matter— for it is black deaths that repeatedly 
and horrifically make the news, inciting outrage and after- the- fact dam-
age control.14
LRADs leave protesters with little choice but to cover their ears with 
both hands. There’s yet another brutal irony here given how one of the 
rallying cries of Black Lives Matter is precisely, “Hands up! Don’t shoot!” 
Many protesters in the above- mentioned Ferguson video already had 
their hands raised above their heads to signal their weaponless status and 
to decry police killings of unarmed individuals. Police actions that force 
protesters to cup their ears effectively strip the hands- up- don’t- shoot ges-
ture of its symbolic charge. The raising of hands transforms from a delib-
erate sign of willful pacifism into a reflexive show of self- preservation. 
Figure 5.2. Protest and LRAD at the 2009 Pittsburgh G- 20 Summit. Note 
the striking diversity of people’s protective actions against the LRAD: some 
cover their ears tightly, while others do not (choose to) cover their ears at all.
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So beyond the capacity of LRADs to inflict harm, the devices pervert the 
protesters’ choreographies of resistance. They also drown out protesters’ 
words and music, overriding free speech and rendering dialogue among 
assemblies inaudible. For the wielders of an LRAD, a major selling point 
is the clarity with which it amplifies the speech of those controlling it. 
The makers declare that “LRAD’s optimized driver and waveguide tech-
nology ensure every voice and deterrent tone broadcast cuts through 
wind, engine, and background noise to be clearly heard and under-
stood.”15 Voices transmitted through the devices boast exceptional intel-
ligibility and range. But are such clarion vibrations just when protesters’ 
voices are getting muted? In this case of asymmetrical conflict, should 
police have access to a technology that broadcasts crystalline instructions 
when the people’s calls for reform are going unheard?
A Different Kind of Love Song
Concerning her pathbreaking research on music torture in the war on 
terror, Suzanne Cusick laments: “Nothing could be more paranoid (or 
less reparative) than my torture project. Accusatory in its taxonomies, 
brimming with conscious and unconscious projections of fear and rage 
toward practices motivated by exactly those affects, and so obviously pre-
mised on the paranoid’s belief in the power of exposure and demystifica-
tion, it is the ultimate in paranoid musicology.”16 If reparative possibili-
ties hinge on the salvage of love, then a “reparative musicology,” Cusick 
writes, “would restore love for music; would reconstruct musical experi-
ences so that we could love them.”17 I agree with Cusick’s call, and would 
just add that a reparative musicology would simultaneously restore love 
for people and reconstruct the opportunities for care among them. It 
means reflecting on our incentives to do good work; dissolving all objec-
tions over whether a graduate student’s well- being is a scholarly concern; 
asking how we can make it better for people of all persuasions; and keep-
ing the music— the conversations— going.
Because we all break from time to time. Our bodies, through tor-
rents of pain. Our spirits, in times of depression and grief. Our group 
formations, when sirens make us scatter. Our selves, as shame takes over. 
A reparative stance has to urge collaboration and dialogue over preten-
tion and coercion. For we see a surplus of humiliation as it is: childhood 
humiliation at the hands of schoolyard assailants, humiliation theory 
(the term used by Sedgwick and Tomkins) in academia, sexual humilia-
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tion in black- site interrogations, and humiliation tactics of gotcha! jour-
nalism. With modern media, opportunities for humiliation have indeed 
proliferated, from reality show pratfalls and political scandals to revenge 
porn and cyberbullying. Reparative endeavors involve holding account-
able those who voice prejudice, sow injury, and do wrong. But just as 
important is learning to acknowledge people as more than the sum of 
their worst deeds and words. Mercy is an essential option, for others’ 
sake as well as our own.
One challenge with reparative and caring work is that we don’t always 
have a clear sense of what’s real and what’s fantasy. We roam a land of 
paper tigers: inflated targets of scholarly polemics; a music- blasting 
commuter who’s oblivious rather than intentionally heinous; and other 
threats overblown by misperception or paranoid construction. Then 
there are the hidden dragons in the mist: youth bullying that gets writ-
ten off as playful teasing; music torture passing as torture- lite; and addi-
tional dangers that elude intervention. So whereas paranoia entails con-
stant and sometimes irrational suspicion of bad things— call it a doubt 
of benefit (that is, of beneficence, of people’s trustworthiness and the 
world’s goodness)— repair, in reverse, has to advocate benefit of the 
doubt. More than offering words of corroboration and flattery, a repara-
tive agenda would insist on an active search for positivity and potential. 
In academia, this might manifest in magnanimous attempts to recog-
nize others’ expressions as worthwhile. With grading and peer reviews, 
we show this with compliment sandwiches, opening and closing with 
encouraging comments while tucking constructive criticism in between. 
We may, however, be so accustomed to such procedures that we follow 
them mostly out of courtesy and convention. A subtle but significant 
distinction exists between casually dispensing praise out of habit and 
actually cultivating the belief that there’s value in all colleagues’ and stu-
dents’ effortful contributions, no matter how unusual a piece of writing 
appears or how far a presentation strays from the institutional expecta-
tions of able- minded, good- sounding rhetoric. Epistemologically, suspi-
cion and trust are two sides of the same coin, both grappling with things 
either not yet proven or outright unprovable. The former fears the bad. 
The latter hopes for better.
Hope is a funny thing because it’s what we do when evidence remains 
incomplete. In ongoing situations, there’s at once never and always rea-
son to hold on to hope— because reason isn’t omniscience. “The belief 
that things can, once and for all, be made right, makes no more sense 
than the belief (which takes hold of me, on average, once every few 
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months) that everything is totally, irreparably, ruined,” Susan Brison 
ponders. “But does it make any less sense?”18
Reader, it makes no less sense.
Calls for optimism don’t discount a recurring need for suspicion, out-
rage, and protest.19 As Barbara Ehrenreich warns, buying wholesale into 
cults of positive thinking can generate excessive pressure to be happy, 
counterproductively breeding discontent.20 But the paranoid and the 
reparative are not locked in a zero- sum game. A rule of thumb would be 
to pursue repair where possible and to rely on paranoia when necessary. 
For as important as it may be to shoot for the reparative, it’s even more 
vital to recognize that not everyone can afford to do so. Sociopolitically, 
foreswearing paranoia is a luxury reserved for those lucky enough to 
live under safe circumstances. It is not always a sound option for people 
oppressed by scarcity and states of emergency. And academically, the 
requirements for professional advancement still tend to favor scholar-
ship that resembles paranoid criticism and its hermeneutics of suspicion 
(strong theories, virtuosic deconstruction, and spectacular demystifica-
tion). Scholars who are seeking employment might therefore feel like 
they don’t have enough job security or financial wherewithal to experi-
ment with reparative readings and alternative writing styles. From the 
outset of Just Vibrations, I’ve stressed that because repair is a privilege, 
its exigencies should weigh that much more heavily on the shoulders of 
those who are in the most secure positions to undertake the task.
The theme of repair informs one of the first nursery rhymes that 
English- speaking children learn. Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall, then 
had a great fall. Despite the efforts of all the king’s horses and men, he 
could not be put together again. Curiously, this is a story of failed repair, 
with pessimistic undertones belied by an uppity dactylic lilt. Although 
the ending isn’t as traumatic as the grim conclusions of many fairy tales, 
it’s a depressing narrative all the same, squeezed into just a few lines. We 
can imagine how youngsters, upon completing a concerted recitation of 
this bouncy rhyme, might feel rather melancholic about the cracked pro-
tagonist, letting the briefest moment of silence descend over the class-
room before resuming their commitments to jovial noise. But maybe 
the rhyme’s takeaway lesson is how a rescue mission was launched at all. 
If Humpty Dumpty couldn’t be revived, it wasn’t for lack of trying. The 
king took extraordinary measures, sending every man and horse at his 
disposal. He made repair and caregiving a public matter (figure 5.3).21
Frivolous though they may sound, childhood vignettes bookend and 
anchor Just Vibrations because they channel ageless wisdoms. The terror 
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of bullies, the poison of gossip, and the aching need to believe it gets 
better don’t end with puberty or college or entry into esteemed jobs. 
Think about this game that children play shortly after learning the rudi-
ments of language: you say something and they say, “Why?”; you respond 
thoughtfully, and then, “Why?”; you answer again, patience wearing 
thin, but still, “Why?”; and on it goes until you exclaim, “Okay, just stop!” 
(“Why?”— then finally, irritated silence). Children understandably find 
delight in this infinite deferral (they are keen little Derridas)— deferral 
not so much of meaning and context, but of bath times and bedtimes. 
Such a small word, so much power. As we age, these back- and- forth word 
Figure 5.3. Cartoon by Alex Matthews (2007)
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games live on. They go by fancier names, whether it’s dialectics or cri-
tique or legal adversariality. We uphold combative systems in the name of 
intellectual rigor, free speech, and fairness. In the process, we would do 
well to safeguard the reparative constellations of thriving in this world: 
love, care, empathy, respect, and other glints of good. Can we adopt 
these affects as foundations rather than as electives in everyday life, aca-
demic work, and relationships? Can we do so without fear of looking 
weak, feeling queer, or sounding like a clichéd cat poster or a self- help 
book or a Hallmark card?
Few of society’s subjects are more vulnerable than children. Few make 
ruckus with more abandon. Fragile in physique and easy to deceive, they 
have the most reason to be paranoid, yet they can be among the most 
trusting (sometimes at their own great peril). Granted, children play at 
paranoia, conjuring foes and dangers for their games, dancing through 
the dark and bounding through the noise. But for the children who 
are relatively fortunate— the ones with homes, health, resources, social 
advantages— the make- believe threats in their lives are usually short- 
lived: tag’s terrible It at recess becomes a friendly goofball once back 
in the classroom; the stuffed animals that look creepy at night revert to 
benign cuddle- things come daybreak; and the costumed scourge that 
overruns Halloween’s carnivalesque streets is gone by the end of the eve-
ning, leaving only litters of candy wrappers as proof of prior antics. After 
flights of fancy, after raids of ninjas, order is magically restored.
Should children ever become genuinely afraid, they rarely think 
twice about voicing their concerns. As adults, however, we’re no longer 
so quick to cop to anxieties and phobias. Paranoid about being judged, 
we obsess over showing strength, sounding good, racking up wins, and 
scrambling to the top of that wall. We’re afraid to lose, to yield, to fail. 
Yet as Jack Halberstam puts it, failure may be what “preserves some of 
the wondrous anarchy of childhood and disturbs the supposedly clean 
boundaries between adults and children, winners and losers.”22 Bound-
aries stand to fall; most walls fall with time.
In the event we sound bad, who will care? As we slow down, who 
will keep pace? If we break, who will come put us back together again? 
Should our lives shatter, whose reflections show up in the shards? Rejec-
tion, loss, and heartache can sting so fiercely that they fire up promises 
never to aspire again. The cost of failing at repair is continued or added 
injury, from which recovery may be arduous as ever. The cost of shun-
ning reparative efforts altogether is that there may eventually be noth-
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ing and no one worth recovering for anyway. Trust and suspicion, pride 
and shame, comfort and pain, love and indifference, hope and forfeit: 
a gamut of feelings rising early in life and shadowing us ever after. With 
each step, we face choices of how to face these shadows. Fear them, fight 
them, fold them into our innermost worlds— worlds for us to rue or 
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